

CONFIDENTIAL.

TRN/AVA/1 # 1

0270/1
AIR

SECRETARIAT

0270/1

0270/1

(Formerly)

SUBJECT:

INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS
TO AIRCRAFT.

CONNECTED FILES.

NUMBER

No.

MEMORANDUM.

1949.

It is requested in any reference to this memorandum the above number and the date may be quoted.

11th April,

To. The Honourable,

From. Harbour Master.

The Ag. Colonial Secretary.

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

Stanley.

SUBJECT :-

In connection with the aircraft accident at San Carlos I have the honour to quote the Handbook of Service Instructions O - 290-1 and -3 Aircraft Engines Section IV page 21 para 7.

"When engines have been in accidents that involve sudden stoppage of the propeller.....should be checked for runout as follows....."

(c) "If total movements of hand is more than .005" the engine should be removed and sent to a depot for disposition".

Thus quite apart from a rigid inspection of the airframe now required a competent mechanic should check the engine.

Untill such time as the qualified aircraft mechanic arrives to carry out these duties I advise, most strongly, that the aircraft should be grounded.

E. S. Bunting

Harbour Master.

*Discussed with E.E. who
agrees that since Mr Hill's exam
has shown aircraft must be
returned to Stanley - question has
arise as immediate physical check*

Stanley,
April 11th, 1949.

Ref. Accident to Aircraft VP.FAA at San Carlos on April 7th, 1949, at 0840 approx.

Nature of accident:- Day
Land
Landing.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the accident to Auster Aircraft VP. FAA.

The aircraft took off from Stanley at 0715 on Thursday, April 7th, carrying one passenger, Lt. Col. K.S. Pierce-Butler. The long range tank was full and radio was carried. As the Meteorological Station was not manned at that time, no R/T contact was established.

The purpose of the flight was to obtain photographs of Port Sussex at the request of Mr Thomas Tinker of the Colonial Development Corporation. To facilitate this flight previous contact with Mr Tinker had been made, and map references obtained from him. Also Mr Bonner of San Carlos had laid smudge fires at Port Sussex to mark the area concerned.

On arrival at Port Sussex, a considerable amount of cloud was still covering the area, and it was decided to land at San Carlos, where a landing had been made on a previous flight, and await an improvement in the weather which appeared probable. The smudge fire at Port Sussex was already alight.

On arrival at San Carlos, a light wind was blowing from the S.W. and a normal landing was carried out on the E.W. runway. No drift was experienced below 100 feet. After landing the aircraft continued to taxi for approximately 120 yards, and then the mainwheels of the undercarriage sank into soft ground. The aircraft overturned, and Lt. Col. Pierce-Butler received a blow on the head from a piece of equipment which fell from the back of the aircraft.

Attempts were made to right the aircraft, but it was found necessary to rig two purchases before this could be done. The aircraft was turned back onto the undercarriage about 1½ hours after the accident occurred.

The following damage was sustained.

Airscrew broken ✓
Rudder top damaged ✓
Perspex on top of fuselage broken ✓
Approximately 6 riblets in each mainplane dented -
Some damage to lift strut fuselage attachment bolt and bushes ✓
Cowlings dented. ✓

The mainplanes were removed to safe storage. The remaining damaged components were also removed and the aircraft was covered and picketed. A preliminary inspection of damage to one mainplane was carried out by Lt. Col. Pierce-Butler and self, and dented cowlings repaired and replaced.

Acting upon orders received from Stanley we returned, via horse and "Philomel", on Sunday, April 10th, leaving the aircraft at San Carlos.

The Executive Engineer,
Stanley.

I am, Sir, Yours Respectfully,

V.H. Shewer. (Pilot)

H.A.G.E.S.

Submitted

EHB

12.4.49.

DECODE.

231

TELEGRAM.

From Governor's Deputy

To Governor "John Biscoe"

Despatched : 15th April, 19 52 Time : 1100

Received : ... 19.. Time : ...

CONFIDENTIAL. Auster leaving for hospital case 12th April failed become airborne owing breakdown steering control. This makes fourth accident in three weeks. Latest accident apparently due either negligence by Engineer which he denies or deliberate tampering by person unknown. Consider early official enquiry necessary and suggest it be conducted by Registrar Supreme Court and Gutteridge as Harbourmaster required as witness.

GOVERNOR'S DEPUTY.

GTC.
JB.

PIA

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From H.E.the Governor. "John Biscoe"

To The Governor's Deputy.

Despatched : 16th April, 19 52 *Time :* 1330

Received : 16th April, 19 52 *Time :* 1400

MC 18/4. Your telegram AUSTER. It would have been best to have asked IEVERS hold immediate enquiry.

In the circumstances I think it would now be preferable for you to preside with GUTTERIDGE and if he agrees HORNCastle or one of his officers as member.

GOVERNOR.

P/A.
(Intld)C.C.

GTC
SS

23C
4

23rd April, 52.

Sir,

Inquiry into the Breakdown of the Auster
Floatplane on 12/4/52.

I am directed by His Excellency to express his appreciation of the very clear report which was submitted by the Board and to convey his thanks to all members.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd) C. Campbell
COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Mr. E.C. Gutteridge,
STANLEY
Captain R. Horncastle, D.S.C., R.N.,
Commanding Officer,
H.M.S. Veryan Bay,
STANLEY.

P.A. [Signature]
196.

24
52.

MEMORANDUM.

25rd April, 19

52.

NO.

It is requested that, in any reference to this memorandum the above number and the date may be quoted.



To: Harbour Master,

STANLEY.

From: The Colonial Secretary,

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

SUBJECT:- Instructions arising out of Inquiry into Breakdown of the Auster Floatplane.

Arising out of the report on the breakdown to the Auster floatplane on the 12th of April, 1952, submitted by the Board of Enquiry, I am directed by His Excellency to request you to take early action as follows:-

- (a) You should ensure that the doors to the hangar are properly secured and that entry can only be effected by use of the keys.
- (b) You should ensure that the Log Books of all planes are kept up to date and completed in more detail, as far as possible in accordance with the instructions in their covers.
- (c) You should make an investigation as to how far it is practicable to conform with the Ministry of Civil Aviation regulations regarding maintenance and inspection of planes and you should submit recommendations to Government. Written instructions to Falkland Islands Government Air Service personnel should subsequently issue.

2. The Auster Log Book is returned herewith.

C Campbell

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

*Res
H. Ke
Return this copy
original. 3/5*

Asm.

In your retention accp.

B/S/S

24

With reference your Memo. dated 23rd April, 1952.-

(a) I have asked the Superintendent of Works to inspect and attend to the doors so that they will in future be "burglar proof".

(b) Logs will in future will be completed at the correct time.

(c) Routine maintenance in the past has been carried out as nearly as possible here to the regulations laid down by the Air Registration Board, but governed more by the weather than by the number of hours flown. In some cases aircraft have been given their routine inspection earlier than is laid down owing to a lull in the flying operations, whereas on other occasions when there has been a long list of bookings, the plane has been allowed to fly over the hours so long as the engineers have agreed that the aircraft is in good condition.

If it considered necessary, F.I.G.A.S. can keep to the letter of the law as regards these inspections, but this would curtail flying operations, and I am personally satisfied that the present system is perfectly safe and adequate, and as evidence of my confidence I would like to point out that outside the actual members of the Air Service staff I probably am more hours in the plane than anyone else.

John G. ...
H.M.

2.5.52.

Seen and agreed.

W. Smith

Engineer, F.I.G.A.S.

2.5.52.

P.u. on a suitcase FIGAS file

By on H's return

*27.5
B.U. 15/5/52
27/5*

Yh.

Ref (24)

Pac see (25)

2) Ref (26)

(6) (10) (13) (5) + (22) are pertinent.

3) I fear, whether intentionally or not, that we have been rather lax in this respect. (6) would appear to make it mandatory for us to report all accidents however small, and the definition of 'accident' in (22) leaves us no loopholes.

4) May I please discuss with Yh. what action we should take.

14/5

When 6 was received we had no air service nor contemplated such a possibility; its provisions were not unusually involved and we have a reasonable excuse.

2. Quite clearly we must discharge the next chapter of accidents and should do so under separate dispatch. P. discuss at convenience.

MC 14/5

Yh. Draft despatch submitted at cover.

3) As I read (26) + previous correspondence I do not think that we are required to send a detailed report in duplicate. If they this is really an initial report & if they require further details, I feel they will ask for them.

14/5

Ague. Fair as v. slightly overstated

New par. 12. is most necessary.

Yh.

Report on the proceedings & findings of the Custer plane Board of Enquiry submitted.

I apologize for the untidy longhand document but this is in the interests of speed & security.

2) I have the following additional observations:-

a) In addition to the fact that a conviction against Mr. Hall is unlikely; legal proceedings would be protracted. I believe Mr. Hall belongs to some pilot's guild & he might easily wish to obtain legal representation which the guild no doubt supplies free.

b) Apart from the above, I feel genuinely sorry for Mr. Hall, ~~and~~ ^{as} ~~even~~ ^{even} if he engineered this breakdown, he did so through neurosis and mental strain. It may be that we were at fault in not grounding him earlier.

c) The Board feels that he should not fly again. I fear I must recommend that this should apply even to training H/M.

On his ^{own} admission about his low flying and taking into account this enquiry, I do not think we would be taking grave risks if he was permitted to supervise this training, and it would be difficult to justify our actions to the public.

d) As regards his 'grounding', I feel that this could be done gracefully by a

medical board. If S.M.S. does not so recommend, then we must take administrative action but I feel sure this will not be necessary.

e) I suggest that Mr. Halls be given 3 months notice and that we get him and family away on the first boat, which will probably be the end of July.

He would get half pay on the journey home if specially granted by Government.

Perhaps we might be guided in this by the report of the Medical Board.

f) This accident & enquiry, though still confidential, has aroused plenty of local interest, and I suggest that we can only publish the finding of "tampering by person or persons unknown". It would be unwise to say anything about the ground staff and in any case, the above finding presupposes that the accident was not due to maintenance negligence or to a defect in the plane's structure.

Q.

The Board has, in my view, reached the only possible conclusion and I accept its recommendations as expressed in the last paragraph of the report and finding.

Mr. Halls should be bonded; I share your sympathy in his predicament. We have just been unfortunate although my feeling is that his dislike for flying - as distinct from instrument flying in which he has been engaged for the

21/74

past few years - is no new thing. I think the justification for X of your minute would lie in the fact that Mr Hall's lack of confidence in himself precludes us from allowing him to carry passengers at all. Subject to SMO's views, and Mr Buckle's, I would see no objection to Mr Hall earning his keep to the point where H/M can start flying unassisted. I gathered from Hall that it would only be about a fortnight.

M.D. 21/iv.

I am obliged to you for the very clear
 fr. report; please convey my thanks also to the
 members of the Board.

Record of meetings of a Board of Enquiry set up to investigate the breakdown of the Government Anster floatplane on 10/4/52

Members

Hon. C.S.

Commander R. Tomcotte R.C. R.N.

Mr. Cuthbertson.

Formation of Board.

On 12/4/52 the H/M reported to H.C.S. that the Anster plane had been unable to proceed to Hill Cove owing to a breakdown of the rudder controls. He stated that certain aspects of the break down had necessitated his calling in the Chief Constable to make certain investigations.

On 14/4/52 H/M reported that ~~these~~ these investigations had not clarified the situation and he requested an official enquiry.

The matter was reported ^{to H.C.S.} to H.C.S. who replied on 16/4/52 instructing that an immediate enquiry should be held by a Board constituted as above.

Evidence witnesses heard by the Board

On 17/4/52 the Board met in H.C.S. office and heard the following witnesses.

Mr. Morris Smith.

Mr. Hall.

Mr. Aldridge.

2
The Harbour Master
Mrs Harvey
Mr Cahill

The Board also visited the hangar and inspected the Amster

On 19/4/52 the Board again met in the S. Office and heard.

The Chief Constable
Mr D. Jones
Mrs Harvey (recalled).

The Board again visited the hangar & plane.

Narrative.

The Board considers ^{that} the following narrative ~~to~~ constitutes the chain of events leading up to the enquiry :-

The Anker had been awaiting favourable weather for some days to proceed to Hill Cove to pick up a hospital case.

On Thursday 10th April, Mr Smith carried out a Daily Inspection in case the trip took place the following day.

Mr Walls was ~~stand~~ in the hangar with him.

Friday 11th April was Good Friday and as the weather conditions were not favourable ^{for flying} work was carried out in the hangar.

On Saturday 12th it was decided to make the trip.

Mr Smith opened up the hangar with the keys in his possession and Mr Walls later turned up. Mr Aldridge was present having returned from ^{camp} leave on that day.

A passenger, Mrs Hawley, with three children was also present.

Mr Smith started the engine and tried the controls but did not carry out a full D.I. The passengers and two suit cases were embarked and the flight started.

Mr Walls taxied out approximately due north of the hangar. He then did two or three short circuits on the water, probably to the right, and then lined up for the take off.

He gave the plane full throttle and started his ~~own~~ take off run but ^{after a short distance} ~~the~~ and before becoming airborne the plane started veering off to the right. He ~~and~~ applied the left rudder pedal but got no response and so cut the engine.

By this time he was nearing the north bank of the harbour and he continued drifting until the plane finally beached itself with some superficial damage to the floats.

The ~~by~~ ^{by} ~~and~~ ^{and} Mr Smith came up in the 'Alert' and took off the passengers and towed the plane back to the hangar. Mr. Hall reported that the left rudder cable appeared to be broken.

The plane was hauled into the hangar and a cursory examination revealed that the left rudder cable had come adrift from ~~the~~ the pedal and did not appear to be broken. The shackle pin & split pin, which normally held it in place, were missing.

~~The~~ ^{By} As it was Saturday work finished for the day but on Sunday 13th Mr. Hall & Mr. Smith went to the hangar to carry out a detailed investigation.

They found that the breakdown had occurred as set out above & they conducted a search for the missing shackle pin & split pin.

These they found under the floor boards beneath the control pedals.

As the split pin (which, when in position,

is opened out ^{with} ~~and~~ the amp bent back) was not broken or corroded, as it seemed impossible for it to ^{have} ~~be~~ shaken loose by itself and as there were marks on the head which could have been caused by pinners, the H/M concluded that ~~either~~ ~~the~~ the breakdown was either due to maintenance negligence or deliberate sabotage.

He was sufficiently impressed by the Smith's denial of negligence to pursue the question of sabotage and his immediate suspicions fell on the Halls.

Some acrimonious discussion took place between the three parties at the hangar and H/M then decided to report to the P.O. Chief Constable. This he did & requested the C.C. to ask the passenger if she had seen Mr Halls fiddling with or touching the controls at his feet at any time between her entry into the plane and the occurrence of the breakdown.

As previously recorded this C.C.'s investigation bore no fruit.

Preliminary conclusions by the Board.

After hearing the evidence and examining the exhibits, the Board ^{agreed} considered that the ~~only~~ breakdown could only have occurred in the following fashions:-

- a) Act of God
- b) Negligence during maintenance.
- c) Deliberate tampering by person or persons unknown.
- d) Deliberate tampering by person known - Mr Halls.

The Board proceeded to examine these conclusions.

A. Act of God.

All members of the Board ~~can~~ and witnesses were agreed that the split pin and shackle pin could not have come adrift of their own accord. The split pin found under the floor boards had not broken, It was straightened out and had obviously been in use. It was not corroded. It had pincer marks

on it. Its general appearance was consistent with its having been drawn out of its ~~no proper place~~ ^{proper place} by pincers.

As the thorough search had revealed no broken pieces of ^{split} pin and as that was the only ~~split~~ ^{split} pin found, the Board could only conclude that it was the split pin in question. All witnesses, including Mr Halls, agreed with this conclusion.

The Board was therefore compelled to dismiss the theory of Act of God.

B. Maintenance Negligence.

Mr Smith stated that he could swear that the split pin and shackle pin were correctly in place ~~there~~ when he carried out a thorough overhaul of the plane three weeks before this breakdown.

He was positive that the pins were in position when he carried out his ~~job~~ ^{job} on Tuesday 10th but he could not ~~positively~~ ^{definitely} swear to it.

He stated that in his opinion the shackle pin & split pin had not been removed since the plane had been assembled and that unless any corrosion or defect was noticed, they would only be removed at the annual complete overhaul which had not yet taken place.

~~Mr Aldridge~~ He further suggested that the part in question came already assembled from the makers & that the pins were probably not put in by F.I.G.A.S.

Mr Aldridge, ~~too~~ who has worked as apprentice for 15 months, had not seen the pins removed but thought they might have been when the main tank was taken off.

Mr Jones confirmed Mr Smith's statement that the pins had never been removed, even when the tank was taken off.

He restated however that these ^{pins} parts were not assembled put in at home but by F.I.G.A.S., when the plane was

initially assembled. Mr. Jones also drew the Board's attention to ~~possible~~ ~~finger~~ marks, consistent with pin or marks, on the shackle pin, which had not previously been noticed.

This indicated that the shackle pin as well as the spirit pin had been deliberately withdrawn.

The Board was impressed by the clarity and sincerity of these three witnesses and therefore ruled out the possibility that the break down was due to maintenance negligence. They were satisfied that the both pins were properly in position after Mr. Smith's A.I. on Thursday 10th.

C. Deliberate tampering by person or persons unknown.

Assuming that both pins were in position after the Dr. on Thursday 10th, some person must have removed the split pin between that time and the breakdown.

The shackle pin, even if ^{also} removed, ~~also~~ must have been replaced firmly or lightly before the Smith's tried the controls on the Saturday morning ^{or} its absence must have been noticed then.

The split pin might ^{also} have ~~also~~ been replaced lightly but this is most improbable as ~~is~~ ^{would} pressure would have kept it in place, unless ^{it was} removed by the pilot himself. It is more probable that the split pin was removed before the Smith's check up on Saturday - the day of the flight.

Cross examination of witnesses failed to disclose any motive for this tampering except on the part of the Halls which will be dealt with later.

No member of F.C.B.S. seems to have any grudge against another & no ~~member~~ outside person seems to have a grudge against any F.C.B.S. members or the organization itself.

Conclusions.

In particular, the mechanic Smith can be ruled out, as any act such as this could only reflect back on him & adversely affect his professional career.

As regards opportunity, the Smith held the keys of the hangar & did

not give them to any one else between the Thursday & Saturday. All FIGAS members however, agree that express entry ^{into the hangar} can be effected without the key by people 'in the know' i.e. FIGAS members, and ~~as~~ it will be shown later that Mr Halls, in company with Mr Cahill, did so enter on Good Friday.

Now.

This narrows the field down to FIGAS employees, and of the five, Jones was absent, Aldridge was absent on leave, ~~it was~~ ^{it and} there seems no conceivable reason why Huckle or Smith should tamper in this way.

Only Halls the pilot ~~was~~ ^{is} left. He had opportunity and as, is shown later, some motive.

41
11

D Deliberate Tampering by person known - The Halls

The Case against Halls

It is common knowledge that the Halls' flying nerve has partially gone. He himself admits that he has lost the inclination to fly.

It was suggested by Messrs Smith & Strickland that Mr Halls was particularly loathe to fly to the West Island, though he did not seem to mind trips on the East. Mr Halls admitted to the Board that this was correct as he considered flights to the West too hazardous.

Mr Halls seems to have an inexplicable tendency towards low flying which indicates some abnormality of outlook.

Mr Halls was most unimpressive as a witness. Granted that he may have been extremely nervous, his whole attitude was one of vagueness & lack lustre. Though he must have given the problem considerable thought, he appeared to hold no strong views or theories and he seemed to concentrate mainly on obscuring the issue & taking refuge behind 'bad luck' & 'prelims'.

As an Appendix, a list of the four recent flying accidents is attached. These were discussed with Mr M & Mr Smith & though most of their theories amounted to hearsay & conjecture the following points were noted by the Board.

1) Accident I

This was a flight to the West with

The Blake as passenger. The Halls, force landed on a shallow pond when flying on the belly tank.

slipped and
with me and
I spotted this
to Halls as a
good reason
for flying at a
low height

This defect ~~was~~ had happened before but ~~both~~ ~~was~~ the previous pilot had always kept sufficient height to enable him to switch over to the main tank.

The Halls was unable to do so. He said he was flying at about 800 ft but the Blake put it at about 350 ft.

It is conceivable that the Halls purposely switched to 'off' instead of to 'main tank' in order to escape this emergency landing.

2) Accident 11

All witnesses agreed that this was an Act of God. It was possible for the Halls to land with the jetties but most improbable as the operation was a difficult one & the risks suicidal.

3) Accident 12

The Halls when flying solo to the west turned back some ten miles past Darwin & landed at Darwin. He said that he had been flying at about 800 ft & must have hit something in the air - a bird - & damaged the propeller.

It was subsequently found that the propeller was bent in a most peculiar fashion a ^{trace of} blood or feathers, ~~attached~~ ^{consistent} with hitting a bird, could be found.

It is conceivable that the Halls poked

or which or threw some object through the propeller after he had landed at Darwin, or even in some nearby creek. It would however be very difficult to prove this.

4) Accident IV

~~Under consideration~~ This is the cause of the present enquiry.

A suspicious aspect of this accident is the nature of the take off.

Mr Halls had on a very full load of passengers luggage & petrol, yet he started his take off run almost due north of the hangar.

The Spencer, and Mr Halls on other occasions, was used to get off to the north east near Fairy cove, when the wind was in the same direction as on the day in question.

It indicates that Mr Halls never seriously contemplated taking off that day.

Again when he left the hangar, he taxied out towards the far ~~bay~~ ^{buoy} and did two or three short circuits on the water before lining up for the take off.

Neither Smith nor Aldridge can remember which way he turned but the passenger thought it was to the right.

All agreed that this was an unusual manoeuvre not previously carried out.

It would be consistent with billing time while Mr Halls worked out the shackles pen with his hand.

Mr Hawey was taken to the plane & seated therein & asked to give an account of the hand movements carried out by

the pilot. Though she ^{said that she} saw him bend forward she did not think that he reached as far as the control in question.

Whatever Mrs. Harvey's evidence should not be relied upon very much either way, as she was occupied with a child on her lap & two others behind her.

However members of the Board sat in the pilots seat & were satisfied that Mr. Halls could ~~possibly~~ have reached down & removed the loose shackle pin without arousing any undue suspicion on the part of the passengers.

Mr. Halls was asked whether he entered the hangar on Good Friday & he denied that he went anywhere near it. It was suggested that he went there with Mr. Cahill to collect firewood & he then admitted that he did go to collect wood near the hangar, but he denied going inside & could not remember the exact day on which this visit occurred.

Mr. Cahill stated that they went to collect the wood ^{on Good Friday} & both entered the hangar as Mr. Cahill wanted to borrow a little petrol.

Possibly Mr. Halls' denial was due to a desire to hush up this somewhat doubtful petrol transaction but, if so, it was very foolish of him not to present the true facts to the Board.

However Mr. Cahill stated that he was with Mr. Halls all the time in the hangar & they did not go near the Auster.

A further point was made by the mechanics that if the split pin had been removed immediately before the flight, it was

most improbable that the shackle pin would have ^{been} shaken loose immediately by vibration.

It is much more likely that it would have had to be pulled out by hand.

Again this particular piece of deliberate tampering is much more likely to have been done by someone with some knowledge of aircraft and could well have been done by a pilot suffering from a form of mind due to nervous troubles afflictions and without any real desire to wreck the machine or sabotage the organization for which he was working.

Case for Halls

If Mr Halls really could not face further flying, he could ^{have} easily got himself honorably ~~been~~ provided by a medical board & he would not have lost financially thereby.

If he wished to promote the plane he probably had the knowledge to do it far more effectively than ~~the incident~~ by staging minor defects & thereby only putting off the evil hour before his next flight.

If he had in fact removed the split pin sometime before the flight on Saturday, would it not have been safer to throw it away, rather than leave it as damning evidence beneath the floor board.

It cannot definitely be said that the split pin found was the pin in question.

Similar pins are used in several other parts of the aircraft & one might have been accidentally dropped some time ago.

Mr Smith is possibly lying when he swore that the split pin was in position 3 weeks before the accident. Mr Smith's professional career would be ruined if he was convicted of such negligence.

possibly
misleadingly.

21.4.52 Mr Halls - recalled

Mr Halls was again questioned about his Friday visit to the hangar with Mr Cahill.

He admitted that he went in to lend Cahill some petrol and stated that he had previously withheld the information as he thought the petrol transaction was illegal.

He was questioned about this extraordinarily short take off he proposed to employ on the Saturday & he replied that he considered it adequate taking into account weather conditions & he indicated that he was in the best position to judge.

He was questioned again about his 2 or 3 short circuits before the take off. He replied that he vaguely remembered doing them & said he would have been kneeling time while the engine was warming up. He denied that this procedure was out of the ordinary.

He was questioned about his unusually low flying. He admitted that he feared flying high and, because he was worried about this tendency, he ^{had} discussed the whole question of his flying nerve with the S.M.C.

The Board had hoped that, when confronted with these questions, Mr Halls might give a better indication of his guilt or innocence.

However he still gave his evidence in rather a vague manner and his ^{general} latitude was ~~limited~~, inclined to be prevalent on this occasion.

Stoncastles
CR. RN.

48/18

Edgworth
C Campbell

Finding

It is the considered opinion of the Board that this accident occurred through deliberate tampering.

Suspicion rests heavily on Mr Halls but, as there is a certain amount of doubt and as much of the evidence is hearsay and conjecture, it is not considered that a criminal prosecution would be likely to succeed.

A finding of deliberate tampering by person or persons unknown is therefore recorded.

As regards negligence on the part of the engineer and mechanics, the Board noted that the aircraft log has not been kept up to date; nor was any Daily Inspection carried out on the Saturday.

Apart from these considerations, however, the Board is satisfied that the breakdown could in no way be attributed to negligence on the part of the F.O.S. ground staff.

Recommendations by the Board:

- 1) Mr Halls should be 'grounded' either by a medical board or by administrative action.
- 2) The hangar doors should be properly secured.
- 3) The log should be kept up to-date and completed in more detail, as far as possible in accordance with the instructions in the cover.
- 4) The Harbour Master should make an early investigation as to how far it is practicable to conform with the Ministry of Civil Aviation's regulations regarding maintenance and inspections, and he should submit his recommendations to Government. Written instructions to F.O.S. personnel should subsequently issue.

21.4.52.

C Campbell

RECENT DEFECTS OF THE AUSTER SEAPLANE.

- 1. Date: 22nd March, 1952.
 Fault: Engine cut while plane flying using belly tank.
 Result: Emergency landing.
 Cause: Suspected faulty design.
 Remedy: Not yet remedied. Pilot instructed not to use belly tank until maker's advice received.

- 2. Date: 23rd March, 1952.
 Fault: Lubricating oil drained from system while plane flying.
 Result: Emergency landing.
 Cause: Suspected faulty gasket.
 Remedy: Renew gasket.

- 3. Date: 4th April, 1952.
 Fault: Propellor damaged in flight.
 Result: Emergency landing.
 Cause: Struck bird.
 Remedy: Replace propellor.

- 4. Date: 12th April, 1952.
 Fault: Steering control ^{disconnected} ~~broke~~ while plane taxiing on water.
 Cause: Split pin and bolt securing left rudder cable to pedal out of position.
 Result: Aircraft grounded in harbour out of control and slightly damaged starboard float.
 Remedy: Replace split pin and bolt.

Exhibit 1 Split pin & shackle pin in question found under the floor boards

Exhibit 2 Split pin & shackle pin corresponding to the above removed by the Board from the rudder control. Specimen unused split pin also enclosed.

PUBLIC NOTICE

On Saturday the 12th of April, 1952, the Falkland Islands Government Air Service Auster plane, which was proceeding to Hill Cove to pick up a medical case, failed to become airborne owing to a breakdown in the rudder control system.

2. A Board of Enquiry under the Presidency of the Honourable the Colonial Secretary, and with ~~Captain~~ ^{Commander} R. Horncastle, R.N., Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Veryan Bay and Mr. E.C. Gutteridge, Superintendent, Power House, as Members was convened to ascertain the cause of this breakdown.

3. After investigation the Board was satisfied that the breakdown did not occur either as a result of negligence on the part of the maintenance staff or on account of a mechanical defect in the plane.

4. In the opinion of the Board the breakdown occurred as a result of deliberate tampering with the rudder control system by some person or persons unknown and they duly recorded this finding.

5. The Government is taking steps to prevent the possibility of a recurrence of such an incident.

Colonial Secretary's Office,
STANLEY.
23rd April, 1952.

Folder

51
28

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
STANLEY.
19th May, 1952.

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

No. 123. COLONY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your Circular Respatch of the 26th January, 1946, and to report four minor accidents which have recently occurred to the Falkland Islands Government Air Service Master float-plane.

2. The delay in submission is regretted and the oversight attributable to the fact that no air service was either operating or contemplated here at the time when your despatch was received.

3. On the 22nd March, 1952, the engine cut, while this plane was flying on its belly tank, necessitating an emergency landing on a pond. The reason for the cut has not yet been satisfactorily ascertained and the problem has been referred to the makers. In the meantime the pilot was instructed not to use the belly tank.

4. On the 23rd March, 1952, a further emergency landing took place as a result of the lubricating oil draining from the system when the plane was flying. The trouble was diagnosed as resulting from a faulty gasket which was subsequently replaced.

5. On the 4th of April, 1952, an emergency landing took place when the propellor became damaged during flight. The accident may have occurred as a result of striking a bird in flight and a new propellor was fitted.

6. On the 12th of April, 1952, when the plane was taxiing in the Harbour for take-off, the steering control became disconnected. The plane subsequently grounded on the harbour beach and the starboard float was slightly damaged. It was discovered that the split pin and shackles pin, which secure the left rudder cable to the pedal, were missing.

7. Owing to the various peculiar aspects of this accident following on the heels of those reported above (all of which occurred while this aircraft was in the hands of the present pilot) I caused an immediate enquiry to be held by a competent Board.

8. After investigation, the Board was satisfied that the breakdown did not occur either as a result of negligence on the part of the maintenance staff or on account of any mechanical defect in the plane. In the opinion of the Board the breakdown occurred as a result of deliberate tampering with the rudder control system by some person or persons unknown.

9. From the evidence received by the Board and from their sifting up it was, however, clear that suspicion for the tampering rested heavily on Mr. A. B. Falls, the pilot, although insufficient proof was available to justify any criminal proceedings or departmental disciplinary action.

10. This officer has for some time given grounds for suspicion that his flying nerve has, in some way, been adversely affected and it is well within the bounds of possibility that he staged this accident because he could not face the flight.

11. Mr. Falls has since been "grounded" for medical reasons and his contract has been terminated.

12. I should add that only one accident occurred during the three years of the previous pilot's service and was occasioned by alighting on a newly prepared landing strip which had been inadequately drained.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

(SGD) MILLS CLIFFORD,

Governer.

DECODE.

TELEGRAM SENT.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to GOVERNOR

Despatched: 24.5.52 Time: 1545 Received: 25.5.52 Time: 1000

No. 73. CONFIDENTIAL. A. S. Halls, Government Pilot.

British Air Line Pilots' Association have received a letter dated 25th April, 1952, from person named stating that he has recently had four forced landings in five flights due to engine trouble and other troubles. He alleges that the aircraft received no proper maintenance nor overhauls and has no certificate of airworthiness. He states that he asked for an enquiry and alleges it was decided he had deliberately caused the trouble himself. He adds that official findings of the Court was that aircraft was tampered with by a person or persons unknown with a private rider that he (Halls) was under strong suspicion and that he would be shipped home in July although his contract does not expire till September. He seeks help of B. A. L. P. A. and suggests they should warn their members against accepting posts. Grateful your confidential observations of his allegations.

2. It would appear from paragraph 1 of your Telegram No. 108 Saving Colony of 26th April, 1952, that person named has been declared medically unfit to fly. Grateful to learn whether his contract has been terminated on this account or in connection with Findings of Court of Enquiry.

G.T.C.
WH.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

Reply at 59

With reference our conversation this morning, we are agreed I think that the only really important part of the Secretary of State's telegram requiring attention is the reference to the Certificate of Airworthiness. The other points are almost so ludicrous as not to require a serious response.

Perhaps it would help if I first run through the normal procedure in Britain for the granting of a Certificate of Airworthiness. The plane is stripped by qualified engineers (qualified in the various categories, engine, airframe, instruments etc), and it is then inspected by the Air Registration Board representatives, who recommend that a certificate be granted by the Ministry of Civil Aviation. This certificate may be a modified one, such as "to be used only for private flying" etc: you will see the point of this remark anon.

The procedure outlined above is carried out annually at home: here it is obviously impossible to carry it out at all - not only would it take far too long, but we have no inspectors and not all the licences for engineers required. On the other hand we do possess an engineer (Maurice Smith) with an airframe and engine licence, who inspects the plane before every take-off and certifies it as being up to the standard required by a Certificate of Airworthiness. In my own mind this procedure is every bit as safe as if we had a nice piece of parchment signed by all sorts of high-ranking engineers - sometimes I think it is more so, seeing how cautious all concerned are that the plane should not suffer in any way!

But we cannot answer in the above sense unfortunately, because Maurice Smith has recently been on leave for some seven months, during which time these routine checks before flights were carried out by Dave Jones who is unlicensed. The only way over this difficulty is for the Governor to grant Jones a back-dated local licence - I think he is allowed to do this according to the letter of the law, although it is sticking very much to the letter and very little to the spirit if we did so out here. Certainly in the case of Halls the Secretary of State informed the Governor that he could issue a licence, and that was an almost parallel case. I do not like the idea of back-dating, but if we are going to try and bluff our way out, this is the only answer. Once he finds out that we have said that the plane is always inspected by a licensed engineer, Halls is almost bound to say that this is not true: but if we can then say that a local licence was issued to Jones as soon as he took over those duties during Smith's leave we have an answer.

But even so we are not out of the wood: the last Certificate of Airworthiness issued to that particular plane (i.e. the F.I.G.A.S. float Auster) was issued when it was a landplane and before it crashed. The crash automatically annulled that certificate, and the conversion to a float plane would also have cancelled it. As we only sent home the fuselage for the conversion, no new certificate was issued to that plane when it was last in England as it was not a complete flying unit at the time.

Worse is to follow: the previous float Auster (the F.I.D.S. one) arrived out here with a Certificate of Airworthiness from Britain which specifically stated that the aircraft was not to be used as a commercial passenger carrying machine in the way that we use it. That means that even allowing that our engineers were qualified to certify the converted F.I.G.A.S. Auster as fit to fly out here, they certainly could not say that it was fit to carry passengers. Halls may not fortunately be aware of the fact that the plane should not carry passengers, and so we may never hear any more about this point, but it means we shall have to word the reply to the Secretary of State pretty carefully.

P.T.O.

52B

Very roughly I suggest that our reply follows the following lines:

"Plane maintained in state of complete airworthiness by competent engineering staff and is certified as airworthy before each flight by qualified engineer. No Certificate of Airworthiness granted to planes in Government Air Service as there is no competent inspecting body in the Falklands to take the place of the Air Registration Board, but am satisfied that standard of maintenance here is up to that laid down by I.C.A.O. Shortly before failures complained of by Halls, plane was flown by very experienced Fleet Air Arm pilot (Captain J. Ievers O.B.E., R.N.) who was completely satisfied with the standard of maintenance, and plane was flight tested by pilot holding Air Line Transport Pilots Licence (Mr - Jessup of Aquilla Airways) shortly after incidents: his report was also entirely favourable. This system of maintenance has now been in operation for two and a half years with the same Superintendent Engineer without previous mishap."

The above could be polished up and contracted, but contains the bones of my suggested reply. You may think it peculiar that I have not quoted Mr Spencer as a referee, but I feel it would perhaps be better not to because in his post immediately prior to his joining F.I.G.A.S. he killed his employer in a crash and very nearly lost his licence in the subsequent inquiry! His record will be held at the Ministry of Civil Aviation, and although we may regard him as an exceptionally good pilot, they may not! So far as I know Ievers and Jessup have escaped similar unpleasant incidents!

H.M.

26.V.

Summita by Mr. Huckle

P.S. Before any reply is sent I feel it would be as well to check with Messers Smith and Jones that the details are correct. As a matter of fact they stand to loose most in this matter if things do become difficult for us - certainly Maurice Smith may loose his licence through it, so it is only fair to keep them in the picture.

acs

In view of last para (not P.S.) shd
be filed where pt?

UWH
20/6/52

Y.H.

Page 222 (29)

53

I await H/M's comments on X1, but we have fully qualified ground staff. Though not included in the report Mr Hall, told the Board that he had every confidence in Smith & the other ground staff.

2) Hall, did not ask for an enquiry. - it was Govt who decided on it.

3) Hall ^{Ref: Y} had no access to the Board's confidential report which has been seen only by Y.H., Captain Horncastle, SP/M & son. If there was no leak he could only have gained this impression after a conversation with me when I was discussing his future.

4) He is not being 'shipped home'. His contract was terminated as he could no longer fly. It was also proposed to give him full benefits of earned leave & 1/2 pay during passage.

5) Y/Z is the dangerous bit which I think Mr Hall should be taken up on with a view to cancelling any benefits proposed by Govt unless he withdraws the statement.

6) His contract was terminated as a result of the medical board though it could have been done under the Court of Enquiry. The former course was taken out of sympathy towards Hall.

7) I will draft after I have seen H/M tomorrow

Annals

We are up there to his name.

267

Thank you. I have very poor vision & he has been a

54
31

4/6

4/6

Draft telegram for at once.

I am to discuss at noon to-day.

2) Note from W/m attached to draft.

276⁵

Y.S.

I have dug up some useful information re Certificates of Airworthiness but I fear that the whole story in the file cannot be found despite search at here, FIGAS & Air's Office.

2) It would appear that we are working on page (28) flap of The Air Navigation (Colonies) Order 1927 attached.

3) Attached also is (extracted from our Copies file) is our letter to Air Albedo's B.A. & his reply at (7) on FIGAS/1 attached.

Our original should certainly have been put in the same file but was not & there is no indication of a follow up to (7) FIGAS/1.

4) I would deduce, though Y.S. will remember the history, that

a) we were satisfied that Y.S. can issue certificates of airworthiness & this is borne out by the penultimate para of (7) FIGAS/1.

b) we then explored the best method of getting the planes inspected to Y.S.'s satisfaction & decided that Trinidad B.A. or Monte were out of the question & that the engagement of Smith was the answer.

5) Draft telegram in FIGAS(7) resubmitted with amendment in line 2. We have erred in not having an annual certificate but as Y.S. can issue one & is always prepared to

Y.S.
N-1
1/10/27

Y.S.

That we did
communicate with
Trinidad & the
fact of my meeting
with Y.S. & that
I got on together
with B.A.C. last year

are covered.

28/5

Since writing the above minute (123 on FIDS/74 attached) has come to light. Therein it is ~~stated~~ the original C of A of the Anster used down south or subsequently used here.

It specifically prohibits the carriage of passengers when it was converted into a float plane. By stretching the law, however, I think perhaps this power under the Order in Council referred to above would enable you to amend by means of the issue of a fresh certificate.

Q.

We have Col. Buller then Rayner to thank for this muddle - they and things added broke up all my FIDS files without so much as a record of what they had done ^{rather no idea} & I have even been able to put my hands on anything since. It has taken over 2 years to clear up the results of their deplorable meddling - or rather muddling - and I still keep on coming up against difficulties such as the present. I am however quite satisfied that we are in order and need no advice handed to us as we

average for annual inspection for the
West Indies - it would cost, at the very
least, £1000 - 1500 p.a. and is not of the
quintessence.

I have sharpened up the ~~telegram~~
which should be supported in ~~my~~ ^{my} ~~draft~~ by a
statement from SMO. I hope that you
will discontinue my ^{frankly} attempt to ~~assist~~ ^{assist}
whose conduct has exposed him as a
blackguard in addition to his other faults.
Not only has he fallen down ~~in~~
on the job but he is now bent on
breaking up the organization to which he has
done such little credit.

MC 28/1

Jreg / I desire this form of file factory etc.
should be discontinued.

Y.E. Ref: 4C's draft telegram

I have shown to you this only ~~concern~~
is suggested change of 2½ to 3 years in para
2) I feel that perhaps para 2 of (29)
not been answered specifically & perhaps
sympathetic attitude towards him comes
stressed more.

MC 28/1

29/5

Regd. H. copies
of draft submitted.
Action also by SMO.

YE ref (34)

Suggest insertion after 'medical grounds' of
* 'in his own interests ~~though every justification existed~~
for so doing on ~~various~~ the grounds of his ~~own~~
~~best~~ interest.

295

Is this strictly correct? Would we have been ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~position~~
in ~~the~~ ~~position~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~contract~~ as the ~~contract~~
was?

Mc. 30/V

Spoke. Amend on above and in draft.

Mc. 30/V

Mc. 30/V

A

DECODE.

0270/12
59
44
TELEGRAM SENT.

From GOVERNOR to SECRETARY OF STATE.

Despatched: 31. 5. 52 Time: Received: Time:

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 84 Your telegram No. 73 Confidential. A. S. Halls, Government Pilot.

My Colony Despatch No. 123 Confidential already enclosed in mail refers.

Aircraft properly maintained in airworthy condition to my full satisfaction by qualified engineer and experienced mechanic. No complaint made this score hitherto by Halls who in fact informed Board of Enquiry that he had every confidence in Engineer. He did not repeat not ask for Enquiry which was in fact convened by me for reasons stated in my Despatch No. 123. Findings were as quoted by him though he must presumably have deduced confidential rider. He is not being quote shipped home unquote but has been grounded and given three months' notice of termination of contract on medical grounds in his own interests/for so doing on the grounds of his *erratic* flying conduct. Statement by Senior Medical Officer follows in mail.

It had been my intention subject to his good behaviour to give him all such ex-gratia benefits as half pay during passage and earned leave although we shall have had no work out of him for three months.

2. This individual has been a *thoroughly* bad investment. He arrived in Colony without valid licence despite requirements of advertisement although to some extent I blame

66/0270/12 Crown Agents for this. See my ltr No 281/51

He appeared from the beginning to be unwilling to profit from the advice or instruction of the senior Pilot, Spencer, and his method of flying was the subject of unfavourable comment. After a quite inexcusable display on 10. 1. 52 in which I was one of his unhappy passengers I found it necessary to counsel him against low flying which is particularly dangerous here. He had no explanation to offer than that he thought it to be safer and a few days later complained that his nerve had gone. He was given a month's holiday (at great inconvenience, Spencer having already left) and upon his return was restricted to emergency flights. I am firmly persuaded that three of ~~his~~ the alleged "accidents" to which he refers were devised by himself as he did not wish to do any further flying. It is of interest to note that the Auster was flown immediately before the last "accident" by Captain Ievers a most experienced Fleet Air Arm Pilot and immediately after the "accident" by the 2nd Pilot of the Falkland Islands Company's charter plane. Neither found anything wrong with the machine.

3. It is significant also that there was no accident during the whole of the previous pilot's service (extending over three years) except to one of the land Austers due then entirely to an insufficiently drained landing strip.

44/

43

4. It would appear that Halls having proved himself inadequate is now bent on destroying the organisation to which he has done such little credit and which before his most regrettable engagement had won the confidence of every man woman and child in the Colony. He has been treated with considerable generosity which I now feel disposed to review.

5. I suggest that Department should invite late Pilot to attend for interview and should refer British Air Line Pilots' Association to him. It may open their eyes. Spencer's address is

186, Edge Lane Drive,
Broadgreen,
LIVERPOOL, 14.

Cypher.
WH.

GOVERNOR

F. I. ref: 0270/1.

C. O. ref: 001 63/183/02.

21

58

SAVING TELEGRAM.

From: The Officer Administering the Government of the Falkland Islands.

To: The Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Date: 1st July, 1953.

No. 114 SAVING. COLONY.

44

P

Your Circular 226/53. Statistics on Aircraft Accidents.

No aircraft accidents occurred in this territory during 1952.

GVERNOR.

B. U. 31/12/53

MS

File acc. 10.

ACB This may now be
understand copy. 10 90

ACB

~~This can now be~~
amalgamated B.O. with conf. file -
I think they can be amalgamated but
will first have a look P. 9



60

C.O. Ref: COM 177/192/02

0270/1

MEMORANDUM C.M.2.

CIRCULAR 204/54

4th March, 1954.

STATISTICS ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

62 44

With reference to Colonial Office circular No. 226/53 of the 4th March, 1953, a copy is enclosed of a form for the reporting of accident statistics (Form G) which has been drawn up by I.C.A.O. and which modifies in some respects the information which Colonial Administrations have hitherto been asked to furnish for I.C.A.O. in respect of aircraft accidents.

2. It will be seen from the instructions on the back of the form that the most important change is that information is now required by I.C.A.O. only in respect of operators engaged in public air transport, either scheduled or non-scheduled, and that no return will therefore be needed in future from those territories in which no such operator is registered.

127

3. The operating statistics now called for are the number of landings made (i.e., stage flights) and hours flown. The latter figure has not previously been asked for but there will probably be little difficulty in obtaining it for the scheduled operators. In the case of the United Kingdom, I.C.A.O. has been informed that it will not be possible to provide either of these figures for the non-scheduled operations of the independent operators registered in the United Kingdom and it is presumed that similar difficulties will exist in Colonial territories.

4. Colonial Administrations in whose territories operators engaged in public air transport are registered are asked to submit the completed return annually in triplicate as soon as possible after the close of each year, commencing with the return for 1953. Other administrations should submit a brief statement to the effect that there are no such operators registered in their territories. It is appreciated that in some cases returns for 1953 have already been submitted in the form previously required and the duplication of work involved in the preparation of new returns is regretted.

/5.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS.

John
2
314

5. Unfortunately stocks of the new form at present available are insufficient to allow a distribution of more than one copy to each administration. Additional copies are, however, being obtained and will be despatched by circular note as soon as possible. Thereafter additional copies may be obtained as and when required direct from the following address:-

Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation,
Department EICA3,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.

6. This modification of the requirements of I.C.A.O. in relation to accidents to aircraft does not, of course, affect the desire of Her Majesty's Government to be informed, as indicated in my predecessor's circular despatch (2) of the 30th June, 1950, of all accidents to aircraft occurring in Colonial territories or to Colonial registered aircraft elsewhere.

7. This circular has not been addressed to the Governments of Brunei, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, St. Helena and Seychelles. It has been sent to the High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya under cover of a separate despatch.

COLONIAL OFFICE,
The Church House,
Great Smith Street,
London, S.W.1.

Reply at 63

b.

H.C.S. Is this really necessary? To work out the number of landings made by the three aircraft used during 1953 as required will be a major job, & all the other columns, other than flying hours, will be nil returns.

c. [Signature] 13.4

[Signature] As the emphasis appears to be on accidents & we have fortunately none to report, we might ignore Col. 13 on the Reporting Form for 1953 & see what happens!?

[Signature] 14/4

As they particularly want it apparently - cannot we press for it as a prime in relation to the hours flown? [Signature] 15/4

Am.

D Offtake ?

S
144.

H.C.S./

Slaying hours (1953) = 427

Landings + take-offs (1953) = 1300.

ab
25. 18.

F. I. ref: 0270/I.

C. O. ref: COM 177/192/02.

SAVING TELEGRAM.

From: The Officer Administering the Government of the Falkland Islands.

To: The Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Date: 3rd May, 1954.

No. 76. SAVING. COLONY.

60 Your Circular 204/54. Statistics on Aircraft Accidents.

Enclosed is return for 1953.

GOVERNOR'S DEPUTY.

ACF

2.60 a/c for return in
Kempster etc of part
copy of ?

BU 28/2/55

F. I. ref: 0270/I

C. O. ref: COM 177/192/02

66

SAVING TELEGRAM.

From: The Officer Administering the Government of the Falkland Islands.

To: The Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Date: 7th March, 1955.

No. 59. SAVING. COLONY.

60 Your Circular 204/54. Statistics on Aircraft Accidents.

Enclosed is return for 1954.

GOVERNOR'S DEPUTY.

X BU 2/1/56

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SENT

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Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed in at	Date
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11.2.57.

COMMANDING OFFICER
HMS PROTECTOR

A/C HO

0270/1/72 OUR DISCUSSION ON HELICOPTER CRASH REFERS STOP
SUBJECT YOUR APPROVAL GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD INFORM COMMANDER
TREACHER THAT I HAVE APPOINTED HIM TO BE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF
ACCIDENTS AND LIEUTENANT BRIGHAM THAT I HAVE APPOINTED HIM
TO BE AN INSPECTOR OF ACCIDENTS UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE CIVIL
AVIATION INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS REGULATIONS OF 1951 FOR
PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING AND REPORTING ON ACCIDENT TO BELL
HELICOPTER 47D1 WHICH CRASHED AT TOMERS ISLAND ON 10TH DECEMBER
1956 STOP INVESTIGATION WILL BE CARRIED OUT UNDER SECTION 7
WHICH PROVIDES THAT INSPECTOR MAY SUMMON AND EXAMINE ANY
PERSON HE THINKS FIT AND CALL FOR ANY INFORMATION DOCUMENTS
OR ARTICLES WHICH HE CONSIDERS RELEVANT STOP HE MAY TAKE
STATEMENTS AND REQUIRE ANY PERSON TO MAKE AND SIGN DECLARATION
OF THE TRUTH OF THE STATEMENT STOP INSPECTOR MAY HAVE ACCESS
TO AND EXAMINE AIRCRAFT OR ANY PART OR EQUIPMENT AND HE MAY
EXAMINE REMOVE TEST OR PRESERVE AIRCRAFT OR ANY PART THEREOF
STOP INVESTIGATION SHOULD BE HELD IN PRIVATE STOP ANY PERSON

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SENT

73

Number

Office of Origin

Words

Handed in at

Date

- 2 -

WHO MIGHT APPEAR TO BE BLAMeworthy SHOULD BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY
TO MAKE A FULL STATEMENT STOP CHIEF INSPECTOR SHOULD SUBMIT
REPORT IN DUE COURSE TO ME STOP I AM ADVISED THAT LOG BOOKS
HAVE ALREADY BEEN FORWARDED TO LONDON

OAG

copy at FIDS 5/409

[Handwritten initials]

On His Majesty's Service.

Exhibit I

(See 28-50 in 6270/I)



On His Majesty's Service.

Exhibit 2

