

CONFIDENTIAL.

TRN/AVA/1 # 2

270/4

SECRETARIAT

0270/4.	0270/4.

(Formerly)

Accident to Beaver Aircraft

No. VPFAP 828.

↓ No. VF-FAL

CONNECTED FILES.

NUMBER

--

PUBLIC NOTICE.

An accident occurred to one of the Beaver Aircraft during take off from the Moro this afternoon, as a result the plane turned over. The Pilot, Mr. Toye, reports that -

All are safely ashore and although a little wet, are well and of good heart.

The passengers were:-

Miss Heather Jaffray

Miss Heather McLaren

Dr. Emerson.

Mr. Basil Reive.

Mr. J. Oversen.

As things are at present there will be no passenger flights tomorrow.

Colonial Secretary's Office,
Stanley,
Falkland Islands.

19th February, 1958.

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From..... GOVERNOR'S DEPUTY.....

To..... GOVERNOR, H.M.S. PROTECTOR.....

Despatched . 20th February, 1958. Time : 0915

Received : 19 Time :

IMMEDIATE.

Beaver crashed on take off yesterday and overturned at Douglas Station. No casualties or injuries. Position is that probably best and possibly only chance of salvage is by using Shackleton if we are to save the plant. I had arranged for "Shackleton" to sail 5 a.m. this morning for Douglas Station and was wiring you this schedule to see how much time you could give me with the "Shackleton" before she must sail South. Unfortunately on casting off she got great deal of rope round her screw and I cannot say at the moment when we will be able to sail her. Grateful to know immediately maximum time you can permit "Shackleton" to remain here in light of commitments South.

COPY: SJA

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From GOVERNOR

To GOVERNOR'S DEPUTY.

Despatched : 20th February, 19 58. *Time* :

Received : 20th February, 19 58. *Time* :

IMMEDIATE.

1- Your 200900. Use "Shackleton" to salvage Beaver and when position clarifies advise date she will be free to sail South.

SJA

22nd February, 1958.

From: Acting Director of Civil
Aviation,
STANLEY.

To: The Honourable,
The Colonial Secretary,
STANLEY.

Report on Accident to Beaver Seaplane VP-FAT. at Douglas
Station on February, 19th, 1958.

Nature of accident:- Day,
Water,
Take-off.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the accident to the above aircraft.

At 15.20 hours, I prepared to take-off from a point named The Moror; this is the normal landing place for Aircraft visiting Douglas Station.

When the throttle was opened the aircraft moved forward a few yards and capsized. The weather conditions were good with a 20 knot south-west wind, with wind from this direction the take-off run is fairly sheltered.

None of the five passengers were injured and after leaving the cabin a boat took them ashore.

The salvaged aircraft was shipped to Stanley by R.R.S. "SHACKLETON", on February, 22nd. Unfortunately, damage to the aircraft's wings and top of fuselage were sustained during salvage operations.

I am not stating my opinion of the cause of the accident as an enquiry is to be held.


I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Acting Director of Civil Aviation.

Rough Sketch showing positions of **afc** prior
after accident.



- "A." PLANE AT JETTY TO EMBARK PASSENGERS.
- "B." APPROX POSITION OF PLANE AFTER SAILING DOWNWIND FROM JETTY
- "C." APPROX POSITION OF PLANE AFTER TAXIING TO TAKE-OFF POINT.
- "D." PLANE AFTER CAPSIZING DRIFTED TO BEACH WHERE THE PASSENGERS WERE TAKEN ASHORE BY BOAT.

A. ALZIR, BOATMAN WITNESSED ACCIDENT AND ROWED BOAT FROM JETTY TO POSITION "D"

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

3.

From GOVERNOR.

To GOVERNOR'S DEPUTY.

Despatched . 23rd February, 19 58 *Time* : 0044.

Received : 24th February, 19 58 *Time* : 1415.

Much regret accident to Beaver and most relieved no casualties.

Governor.

P/L:FH

(Intld)

A.G.D.T.

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE.

FALKLAND ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES.

SENT.

Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed in at	Date
--------	------------------	-------	--------------	------

24.2.58

To

GOBLIN MONTEVIDEO

H.O. A/C.

Following for Tull Grateful to know whether you could possibly come down to Stanley as we are in urgent need of your advice and assistance Stop There has been an accident to one of the Beavers and we should like another opinion as soon as possible as to what extent she can be repaired Stop Darwin connections are as follows depart Montevideo 1st March arrive Stanley 6th March and leaving again for Montevideo 12th March Stop Next connection is depart Montevideo 20th March arrive Stanley 25th March and leaving again for Montevideo 31st March

SECRETARY.

Time

o270/U

25
24th February, 1958.

D/O

We are really very grateful indeed for all the assistance you gave us over the unfortunate accident to the Beaver. The pilot and engineers report that you and the people on the farm could not possibly have done more to help.

I should be very glad if you would thank all those who helped and assisted in any way. We are really most grateful.

A. G. D. T.

H. Greenshields Esq.,
DOUGLAS STATION.

AGDT/SJA

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE.

FALKLAND ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES.

SENT.

Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed in at	Date
				24.2.58.
To	CROWN, London.			H.O. A/C

Beaver aircraft No.VPFAF 828 was seriously damaged on take off on 19th February stop No personal injuries or loss of life occurred stop Plane has been salvaged and is being stripped down by engineers to ensure saving as much equipment as possible from effects of salt water erosion stop Whether plane was off the water or still taxiing remains to be established at enquiry and there is some conflict of opinion on this point stop How much of the aircraft can be used again is problematical at the moment and we are taking steps to obtain expert advice from Bellavilland's stop In any event engine and propellor assembly are finished stop We don't hold insurance policy here but as we understand the position vis a vis ground risk we are not covered by insurance in this instance stop Grateful you check and advise us of the position detailing any further information you require and take any steps with Insurance Company you consider advisable stop Lloyd's Agents here are being informed stop

Time

Reply at 9.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

AGST/MC

DECODE.

TELEGRAM SENT.

From GOVERNOR to SECRETARY OF STATE

Despatched: 24.2.58. Time: 1545 Received: Time:

15 a 0270/I No.32. Your Circular 22955/51. Investigation of
Accidents to Civil Aircraft.

An accident occurred on the 19th February when Beaver aircraft No.VPFAF 828 was seriously damaged on take off. There were no personal injuries.

2. I propose to hold an enquiry under provisions of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1951. It is not thought however that accident was caused by any structural defect in plane.

3. Details follow by Savingram.

GOVERNOR'S DEPUTY.

P/L:MC

25th February, 58. 8.

Sir,

I am directed to inform you that on Wednesday, the 19th February, 1958, Beaver Aircraft No.VPFAF 828 was seriously damaged when attempting to take off at the Moro, Douglas Station. There were no personal injuries to the pilot or passengers.

2. The damaged plane was salvaged by R.R.S. "Shackleton" on the 22nd February and is now in the hangar where it is being stripped in order to preserve as much equipment as possible from the effects of erosion.

3. It is proposed to hold an enquiry into the accident in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1951.

4. The Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and Administrations who effect insurance on behalf of this Government have been notified of the accident by telegram.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) A. G. Denton Thompson.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Manager,
Falkland Islands Company Limited,
Agents for Lloyds,
STANLEY.

C/UC

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

20.

From CROWN LONDON.

To COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Despatched : 25th February, 1958 *Time* : 1733.

Received : 26th February, 1958 *Time* : 0900.

6. Your telegram 24th February confirmed Beaver VPFAF not covered in flight or taxiing. Legal liability to passengers and third party valid in this instance.

Crown.

P/L:FH

B.U.F.

¹⁰
(Intld) J.B.

See 18.

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

25.

From TULL HAVILLAND.

To COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Despatched . 26th February, 1958 Time : 1043.

Received : 27th February, 19 58 Time : 0855.

Arriving this Darwin but imperative return same voyage.

Suggest prepare Beaver for inspection regards

Tull Havilland.

P/L:FH

12

Mr. Tull's return passage booked on 12th March "Darwin".

(Intld) J.B.
27.2.58.

Reply at 13.

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From Colonial Secretary.

To De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd., Downsview, Ontario

Despatched . 27th February, 1958 Time : 0925.

Received : 19 Time :

Following for Tull. ^{il} Many thanks looking forward to seeing you. Return passage booked 12th March. Glad if you will stay with us regards

Denton Thompson.

P/L:FH

Confirmatory phoned to W/T Station 0925 a.m.

0270/C/V
0270/U

28th February, 1958.

D/O

0270/C/V.

Thank you very much for your letter of the 20th December. We are really most grateful for the advice you have given us with regard to packing and inhibiting the engines, the protection of airframes, flutter in the flaps and beaching gear wheels.

This information has been passed on to the engineers and they found it most helpful. We were particularly pleased to see Mr. Tull here and his visit was, from our point of view, a most useful one. As you have probably heard we have had to ask him to come down again to advise us on the Beaver aircraft which just recently crashed on take off. The reason for the accident has not yet been established as we are awaiting the outcome of a formal enquiry. As far as we can see, however, there is no structural fault in the aircraft and the real reason may remain something of a mystery. Fortunately, however, there was no loss of life or injury to the pilot or passengers although the aircraft itself was quite extensively damaged and the engine, after its immersion in salt water for two days, is of course quite unserviceable. We have asked Mr. Tull to come down to advise us on the serviceability, in particular, of the fuselage. It's the first mishap we have had in several years of successful operation by the Beavers which really have proved ideal aircraft for our rather severe conditions.

A.G.D.T.

C. Dickins Esq.,
Sales Director,
The De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd.,
TORONTO.

ACBJA

F. I. ref: 0270/U

C. O. ref:

SAVING TELEGRAM.

From: The Officer Administering the Government of the Falkland Islands.

To: The Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Date: 28th February, 1958.

No. 37 SAVING. COLONY.

7

My telegram No. 32 of the 24th February. Investigation of Accidents to Civil Aircraft.

I attach for your information a schedule setting out the information required under Regulation 4 (2) of The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1951.

2. There is nobody in the Falkland Islands at the present time who can carry out an unbiased and expert enquiry into the accident. I am, however, proposing to arrange for either Mr. B.F.W. Tull, De Havilland's Chief Engineer for the Latin American Area, who is coming down to the Falklands shortly to inspect the damaged aircraft or, subject to the approval of the Admiralty, an experienced pilot from H.M.S. PROTECTOR on her return to Stanley to be appointed an Inspector of Accidents and to carry out the necessary enquiry.

3. A copy of the Inspector's report will be forwarded for your information as soon as it is available but it is unlikely that it can be despatched until the 31st March.

4. The plane has been salvaged and brought into Stanley for immediate stripping down in order to mitigate the effects of salt water corrosion.

GOVERNOR'S DEPUTY.

AGDT/SJA

See 50

See 90.

Reply at 87.

The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1951.

REGULATION 4. (2)

- (a) Beaver Seaplane. British. VP-BAF
- (b) The Falkland Islands Government.
- (c) G.C. Toye.
- (d) 19th February, 1958. 1820 G.M.T.
- (e) Douglas Station. Stanley.
- (f) The Moro, Falkland Islands.
- (g) There were no fatalities or injury to pilot or passengers.
- (h) The aircraft overturned when about to take off.
- (i) The wings and propellor of the aircraft have been damaged. Some of the damage may have occurred during the course of salvage operations. As a result of salt water corrosion the engine will not be serviceable again. Some damage has also been done to the main fuselage and the extent to which it can be repaired is awaiting expert advice from the De Havilland's Chief Engineer who is coming down to the Falkland Islands to inspect and report on the damaged aircraft. A further detailed report on the extent of the damage will be submitted at a later date.

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From GOVERNOR'S DEPUTY,

To GOVERNOR, H.M.S. PROTECTOR.

Despatched : 3rd March, 19 58 Time : 1615

Received : 19 Time :

Beaver accident. We shall have to have an enquiry into the accident to the Beaver and for that purpose will require to appoint one or two Inspectors of Accidents. For this we should need to call on H.M.S. Protector and I should be grateful to know whether the Commanding Officer would be prepared to release say one pilot and one air engineer at his discretion to carry out enquiry into the accident immediately Protector returns. We should by that time have a report from Tull De Havillands Chief Engineer for Latin America who is arriving on the Darwin, which should be of assistance. I am telegraphing early in case C. in C's. authorisation is required and I want to make early arrangements for the enquiry to take place before Tull departs on next outgoing Darwin.

Governor's Deputy.

P/L:FH

Reply at 19.

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

4.

From H.M.S. PROTECTOR,

To COLONIAL SECRETARY:

Despatched . 4th March, 19 58 Time : 1250.

Received : 4th March, 19 58 Time : 1630.

17) Your 031920z. Governor has agreed my proposal to make Lieut. Commander Cornabe and Lieut. Brigham available. Aircraft artificer (CPO Morley) will attend as their technical adviser.

Protector.

P/L:FH

A.C.S.

20

Reply at 21.

Please reply.
Very early to Mr. Trees please.
(Intld) A.G.D.T.
4.3.58.

21

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SENT

W. A. S. LTD.

Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed In at	Date
				3 5.4.58.
To				
H.M.S. PROTECTOR.				HOA/C

19 Your telegram 4th stop Most grateful for your help in this matter.

Governor's Deputy.

Mr. Tees

22.

Submitted in accordance with 20

D.R. 5/3/58

Time AGDT/FH

0270/U

6th March, 1958.

D/O

Starting on Monday, the 10th March, we are holding an enquiry into the cause of the accident to the Beaver seaplane.

Two officers from H.M.S. PROTECTOR have been appointed as Inspectors of Accidents and they will wish to hear the evidence of witnesses.

It is understood that one of your men named Alazia saw the crash and his evidence will be most valuable.

I wonder, therefore, whether you would release him for two or three days. If you have no objection it is proposed to pick him up on Saturday, the 8th so that he will be available for the enquiry on Monday. We will, of course, pay his expenses in Stanley and wages for the time that he is absent from work. Perhaps you would let me know what his wages amount to after he has returned.

There remains the question of his accommodation in Stanley. Do you happen to know whether he has any relations or friends here with whom he could stay? If not, we'll have to look around for accommodation for him.

As we seem to be out of communication with you - I understand you have no R/T and the land line is broken somewhere, could you possibly reply by return and arrangements will be made for the plane to pick it up on Friday. Should there be no flying on Friday, the reply will have to come in with Alazia on Saturday. If on the other hand the line is repaired as it may be today, would you please telephone me at the office, No.143 or at home during the evening, No.231.

All this is probably most inconvenient to you, particularly if you are still shearing, but we'd be most grateful for your co-operation.

S. G. T.

Greenshields Esq.,
DOUGLAS STATION.

P/SJA

*Alazia is riding in on Saturday -
He has accommodation.
Greenshields wants his back by Wednesday
to complete shearing.*

6th March, 58.

Sir,

I am directed to inform you that His Excellency the Governor has been pleased to appoint you, with the concurrence of the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. PROTECTOR, to be Chief Inspector of Accidents for the purpose of enquiring into and reporting on the cause of the accident to the Government-owned Beaver floatplane, No.VP-EAF 826, which capsized on the 19th February, 1958, when about to take off from the Moro, Douglas Station.

2. His Excellency has also appointed Lieutenant J.G. Brigham, R.N. as Inspector of Accidents and Aircraft Artificer J.P. Morley as technical adviser to assist in the enquiry. Miss M. Canning has been appointed as Secretary.

3. The enquiry, to be held in private, should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the United Kingdom Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1951, a copy of which is attached.

4. The enquiry will be held in the Council Chamber, Town Hall, Stanley, and arrangements have been made for it to begin at 10 a.m. on Monday, 10th March, 1958.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) A.G. Denton-Thompson.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Lieut. Commander A.G. Cornabe, R.N.,
H.M.S. PROTECTOR,
at STANLEY.

GT/SJA

6th March,

58.

Sir,

I am directed to inform you that His Excellency the Governor has been pleased to appoint you, with the concurrence of the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. PROTECTOR, to be Inspector of Accidents for the purpose of enquiring into and reporting on the cause of the accident to the Government-owned Beaver floatplane, No.VP-FAF 328, which capsized on the 19th February, 1958, when about to take off from the Moro, Douglas Station.

2. His Excellency has appointed Lieut. Commander A.G. Cornabe, R.N. as Chief Inspector of Accidents and Aircraft Artificer J.P. Morley as technical adviser to assist in the enquiry. Miss M. Canning has been appointed as Secretary.

3. The enquiry, to be held in private, should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the United Kingdom Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1951, a copy of which has been sent to Lieut. Commander Cornabe.

4. The enquiry will be held in the Council Chamber, Town Hall, Stanley, and arrangements have been made for it to begin at 10 a.m. on Monday, 10th March, 1958.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) ^{SGT} A.G. Denton-Thompson.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Lieutenant J.G. Brigham, R.N.,
H.M.S. PROTECTOR,
at STANLEY.

SGT/SJA

6th March, 58.

Sir,

I am directed to inform you that His Excellency the Governor has been pleased to appoint you, with the concurrence of the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. PROTECTOR, to be the technical adviser to Lieut. Commander A.G. Cornabe and Lieutenant J.G. Brigham who have been appointed as Chief Inspector of Accidents and Inspector of Accidents respectively, for the purpose of enquiring into and reporting on the cause of the accident to the Government-owned Beaver floatplane, No.VP-PAF 828, which capsized on the 19th February, 1958, when taking off from the Moro, Douglas Station.

2. The enquiry, to be held in private, should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the United Kingdom Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1951, a copy of which has been sent to Lieut. Commander Cornabe.

3. The enquiry will be held in the Council Chamber, Town Hall, Stanley, and arrangements have been made for it to begin at 10 a.m. on Monday, 10th March, 1958.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

for SGT
(Sgd.) A.G. Denton-Thompson.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Aircraft Artificer J.P. Morley,
H.M.S. PROTECTOR,
at STANLEY.

SGT/SJA

GOVERNMENT NOTICE.

Enquiry into accident to Beaver Aircraft.

It is hereby notified that a ^{in private} private enquiry into the recent accident to the Beaver aircraft will begin on Monday, the 10th March, 1958, in the Council Chamber, Stanley.

Any person who may desire to make representations concerning the circumstances or cause of the accident may do so in writing to the Colonial Secretary on or before Saturday, the 8th March, 1958.

Colonial Secretary's Office,
STANLEY.

6th March, 1958.

SGT/SJA

Stanger/SJA

6th March,

58.

Madam,

I am directed to refer to the recent accident to the Beaver aircraft in which you were a passenger at the time and to inform you that His Excellency the Governor has appointed a Board of Enquiry to investigate and report on the cause of the accident.

2. Witnesses are to be called and I am to request that you will be so good as to attend at the Council Chamber, Town Hall, Stanley, at 10 a.m. on Monday, the 10th March, 1958, for the purpose of giving evidence.

I am,

Madam,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) G. H. Dwyer.

G. H. DWYER
COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Miss N. McLaren,
c/o Mrs. Short,
STANLEY.

6th March,

58.

Sir,

I am directed to refer to the recent accident to the Beaver aircraft in which you were a passenger at the time and to inform you that His Excellency the Governor has appointed a Board of Enquiry to investigate and report on the cause of the accident.

2. Witnesses are to be called and I am to request that you will be so good as to attend at the Council Chamber, Town Hall, Stanley, at 10 a.m. on Monday, the 10th March, 1958, for the purpose of giving evidence.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd) J. G. D. [Signature]

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

E. Reive, Esq.,
STANLEY.

309

Damage report on aircraft VP-BAF.

The exact damage sustained to the above aircraft at the time of the accident and the amount of damage inflicted during the salvage operations is very difficult to determine. This is due to the fact that even at low water the greater part of the aircraft mainplanes, engine and forward part of the fuselage structure were under water.

Some of the damage must have been sustained when the aircraft in its upside down position was drifting on to a rocky beach with the incoming tide and remaining in that position overnight. With the aircraft resting in this position it was impossible to remove the mainplanes as at all states of the tide the attachment points were under water. In view of this the aircraft had to be turned over onto its floats. This was accomplished with the assistance of two tractors and lines from the shore. During this operation the mainplanes parted from the fuselage and I can only assume that this was due to the added weight of the water trapped in the mainplanes.

The total damage however sustained is listed below:

1. Port and Starboard mainplanes.

Root end fittings and all other connections to the fuselage torn away, extensive leading edge and skin damage, Pitot tube broken from port mainplane.

2. Port Aileron.

Horn balance fractured and trailing edge damaged.

3. Port Flap.

Minor trailing edge and skin damage.

4. Starboard Aileron.

Minor damage to trailing edge.

5. Starboard Flap.

Badly buckled and skin damage.

6. Forward of Engine Bulkhead.

Engine and all accessories immersed in salt water for approx. 30 hours and all must be considered as a total loss. Engine top ring cowling badly damaged. Propellor badly corroded and one blade bent.

7. Fuselage front structure and cabin.

Cabin top hood severely damaged beyond local repair. All instruments and electrical equipment unserviceable after salt water immersion. Control column badly corroded. Flap interconnecting system badly damaged, flap and aileron operating rods fractured, cabin roof rib torn, root end attachments for mainplane and struts bent and damaged, centre fuel tank distorted, mainplane lift struts damaged beyond local repair.

8. Tail Group.

Rudder horn badly dented.

2/16.
11/17
6/18

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SENT

W. & T. LTD.

Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed in at	Date
Confirmatory phoned to R/T Station 0900 8/3/59.				8. 3. 58.
To	LT. COMMANDER CORNABIE, H.M.S. PROTECTOR.			Admiralty a/c.

Are you or John Brigham likely to be coming ashore this morning stop
If so could you call in to see Stan Trees to discuss arrangements for
enquiry.

Denton Thompson.

Time AGDT/FH



32
55 Davis Street
Port Stanley

Sir,

I wish to attend the
court of enquiry on the Beaver aircraft
on Monday,

Yours faithfully.

Mrs Peter Mc Kay,

Stanley,

Falkland Islands.

12th March, 1958.

Sir,

35
In accordance with your instructions under the letter O270/U dated the 6th March, I have the honour to submit the enclosed Report of the Board of Enquiry into the accident to a Beaver aircraft on the 19th February, 1958.

40
2. Transcripts of the evidence taken are attached.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

[Signature]
Lieutenant-Commander, Royal Navy.

The Hon. The Colonial Secretary,
STANLEY.

AGC/SJA

CONFIDENTIAL.

Ref: 0270/U

14th March, 1958.

MEMORANDUM NO. 17 FOR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

Accident to Beaver Aircraft VP-FAF.

The Report of the Chief Inspector of Accidents and the Inspector of Accidents on the recent accident to Beaver Aircraft VP-FAF is attached for the information of Honourable Members.

A. G. Henton Chapman
COLONIAL SECRETARY.

AGDT/SJA

CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL.

RECORD OF MEETING OF BOARD OF ENQUIRY TO INVESTIGATE ACCIDENT
TO BEAVER AIRCRAFT VP-FAF ON THE 19TH FEBRUARY, 1958.

Members:-

Lieutenant-Commander A.G. Cornabe, R.N., Chief Inspector of Accidents.
Lieutenant J.G. Brigham, R.N., Inspector of Accidents.
Aircraft Artificer Second Class J.P. Norley, Technical Adviser to the Board.
Mr. B.F.W. Tull representing the De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd. was also present.

Formation of Board.

On the 22nd February, 1958, the Acting Director of Civil Aviation reported to the Honourable the Colonial Secretary an accident to Beaver aircraft VP-FAF on taking off from the Moro, Douglas Station, Falkland Islands. Consequent upon this report, the Honourable the Colonial Secretary convened a Board of Enquiry to sit on the 10th March in the Council Chamber, Stanley to investigate the circumstances of the accident. The Board was constituted as above.

Witnesses heard by the Board.

On the 10th March, 1958 the Board met in the Council Chamber and heard the following witnesses:-

Mr. G.C. Toye, Pilot and Acting Director of Civil Aviation.
Mr. M. Smith } Aircraft Engineers.
Mr. D. Jones }
Mr. T. Reive, Hangar Assistant.
Dr. D. Emerson. }
Miss N. McLaren } Passengers in the aircraft.
Mr. B. Reive }
Mr. A. Alazia, Eye-witness.
Mr. I. Campbell, Second Pilot.
Mr. P. Canning, Chief Meteorological Officer.

The following relevant documents were called for, inspected and found by the Board to be to the best of their knowledge correct and in good order:-

Certificate of Airworthiness of De Havilland Beaver Seaplane Serial No.828, Registration No. VP-FAF dated the 14th March, 1957, valid until 13th March, 1958.

Certificate of Registration of the above aircraft dated 20th August, 1953.

Aircraft Journey Log Book.

/Engine

CONFIDENTIAL.

Engine Log Book.

Pilot's Commercial Licence No.3 valid to 2nd September, 1958 endorsed for Beaver DHC (2) aircraft in the name of G.C. Toye.

Certificate of Maintenance No.16 issued by Mr. M. Smith, valid for a period of 7 days or 10 flying hours from 0900 on the 15th February, 1958.

The President of the Board visited the hangar and inspected the aircraft.

Narrative.

At 1530 on Wednesday the 19th February, 1958, Beaver aircraft VP-FAP was commencing its take off run from the Moro, Douglas Station with 5 passengers and light baggage on board. Shortly after the pilot opened the throttle for take off the aircraft rolled to port and capsized. The aircraft adopted an inverted, nose-down attitude in the water. The pilot and all passengers escaped without injury. This take off was the eighth executed on that day by this pilot and aircraft, the aircraft having previously taken off from Port Stanley, Lively Island, Keppel Island, Roy Cove, Chartres, Port Howard and Fox Bay. In addition to the five passengers the aircraft carried baggage totalling approximately 170 lbs. and had approximately 26 gallons of fuel remaining.

The meteorological conditions obtaining at the time were as follows:-

Wind: South Westerly, gusting 20 to 35 knots with intermittent squalls.

Weather Conditions: Cloudy with good visibility except in showers.

Water Condition: Small waves with breaking tops.

Preliminary Conclusions.

After hearing the evidence of the above named witnesses and examining the aircraft the Board is agreed that the accident can only be attributed to one of the following causes:-

- (a) The aircraft became prematurely airborne owing to the conditions prevailing at the time, stalled and dropped its port wing thus causing the port float to enter the water causing the aircraft to yaw and capsize.
- (b) The port float, which was in a damaged condition, had shipped sufficient water in its foremost compartment to cause asymmetric drag on the aircraft resulting in yaw and eventual capsize.

The Board proceeded to examine these conclusions having previously in view of the evidence rejected the following two further possible causes:-

(c) The

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- (c) The port float hit an obstruction on take off causing capsize.
- (d) The port wing dropped on take off by reason of the malfunctioning of the port wing flap.

NOTE.

It is the opinion of the Board that in any event, the aircraft was not, at the time of the accident, being operated outside its normal weight limitations.

Examination of Conclusions (a) and (b).

(a) An eye-witness has stated that without doubt both floats of the aircraft left the water for a short while and evidence has been given that the weather conditions at the time were such as to lend weight to the opinion of the Board that a stall causing one wing of the aircraft to drop is a highly probably result of these conditions. This occurrence might well have been aggravated by the possible presence of water in the port float.

While the pilot states that the aircraft was, on this day, sluggish and generally reluctant to leave the water, yet Campbell states that the previous take off at Fox Bay was quite a short one and Alazia, that he was surprised at the rapidity with which the aircraft "rose".

The evidence of the pilot was throughout so confused and contradictory that it is considered that more credence can be placed on the clear and concise evidence as to fact given by Alazia when describing the chain of events leading up to the capsize and of Campbell when describing the previous take off from Fox Bay.

(b) There is no doubt that a hole which might well admit water was present on the chine of the forward water-tight compartment of the port float and that it had been known for a long time that this float was making more water than its fellow.

The pilot has stated that this float was, in his opinion, airworthy provided that:-

1. The aircraft was not on the water for too long a period at any one time.
2. Bilging was carried out daily.

It is not the opinion of the Board that either of these conditions was fulfilled in the case of this aircraft.

If the forward compartment of the float had contained a considerable amount of water then, in a choppy sea, it might well tend to dip on the aircraft beginning to move forward, and by asymmetric drag, could cause the eventual capsize of the aircraft.

/Finding.

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Finding.

It is the opinion of the Board that, had the circumstances related in (b) above obtained, then the amount of water shipped during the 1 hour 10 minutes that the aircraft was on the water at Fox Bay, as compared to the amount shipped in the 10 minutes at Douglas Station, would have caused some symptoms to be apparent to the pilot on taking off from Fox Bay; but it is stated by the pilot himself that he did, on this occasion, notice no asymmetry and by Campbell that the take off was normal and fairly short.

In view of the more direct evidence of Alazia as to the factual circumstances of the accident the Board considers that of these two possible causes, that propounded in (a) above is the more likely to have been the cause of the eventual accident but it is the opinion of the Board that no one person can be considered directly to blame for this occurrence.

Further Conclusions and Recommendations.

On the evidence presented but not considered to be a direct cause of the accident, some irregularities in defect reporting, recording and rectification have been revealed. The aeroplane in question had two recognised defects which are not recorded in any of the documents shown to the Board.

A hole in the foremost water-tight compartment of the port float had existed for between six and seven months. A considerable back history of propellor stickiness had existed for some considerable, though not entirely agreed, time.

A defect log has quite recently been instituted but on the admission of pilots and engineers defects are often reported only verbally. Regardless of the seriousness of any defect to an aircraft, the fact that such defect exists, and that the aircraft is therefore technically unserviceable must, for the information of pilots as much as for the attention of engineers, be recorded. Also a record must be kept of whether the defect has been rectified and if not whether the aircraft is considered to be in an airworthy state with the defect present. Such records and also all other maintenance tasks carried out on an aircraft must be signed for as having been either carried out or accepted. It is recommended that maintenance job sheets be provided for all aircraft maintenance and inspection and on these sheets all inspections including daily before-flight checks, for example, the operation of bilging the aircraft, must be recorded.

It is recognised that the operating of an air service in such a remote part of the world as the Falkland Islands, with the consequent lack of the usual facilities and amenities, cannot be entirely as that of a civil airline. It is thought that a definite code of regulations for the conduct of the air service should be produced in writing and known, even if such orders merely consist of the notable exception of some part or parts of existing regulations, for example, the Air Navigation Act.

/It is

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It is also considered that the pilots should be made more fully aware of their responsibilities as Captains of aircraft, particularly in the matters of serviceability and loading regulations and that before accepting the aircraft for flight they should in writing acknowledge the fact that the aircraft is serviceable, or accept the aircraft with such defects as are known to exist but which do not necessarily render the aircraft unairworthy.

None of the above implies any criticism of the actual engineering standards of the maintenance of these aircraft but it is thought that a much tighter control and a much fuller recording of routine operations should be carried out.

(Sgd.) A.G. Cornabe.

Lieutenant-Commander, Royal Navy.

JGB)
AGC) SJA

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Mr. G. C. Toye.

Q. Tell me in your own words exactly what happened?

A. I would point out to the Board that the aircraft had been on the water for a much longer period than is usual during the last two day. I had, to be quite honest, found the aircraft to be somewhat sluggish.

Q. In what way?

A. The airscrew had been giving trouble.

Q. Will you start giving the incident from five past ten?

A. I went from here to Lively Island, from there to Keppel, from Keppel to Roy Cove, then to Chartres and then to Port Howard and from Port Howard to Fox Bay, there I remained on the water for about an hour and ten minutes to have lunch and from there to Douglas Station. I suppose I should mention that I stayed at Fox Bay for an hour because it has a bearing on the accident and as I mentioned before about the sluggishness of the plane. It was due really to the fact that it was getting a little near C. of A. and because of airscrew trouble that I was experiencing I found it necessary to climb at 1,900 r.p.m.

Q. Your normal climbing revs. are 2,000?

A. There was a back history of airscrew trouble in this plane and because of this I climbed at 1,900 instead of 2,000 revs. but take-off power and revs. were normal.

Q. Do I gather from your recent remarks that the stickiness in your propellor has been experienced when decreasing r.p.m. but it will go from coarse to fine very easily?

A. Normally it will go straight into fine. I landed at Douglas in good weather conditions and 20 knot South Westerly wind, this area I would point out is well sheltered in these wind conditions. I took on board three extra passengers, making a total of six including myself, two from Fox Bay and three from Douglas.

Q. Can you tell us what baggage there was approximately in the aircraft?

A. All the four passengers would be carrying 30lbs. of luggage each. In the case of Reive he had a metal trunk with tools weighing approximately 40lbs. The Doctor was not carrying any luggage he may have had a small bag with him.

Q. What was your fuel load?

A. 16 gallons in the centre tank and although the front and rear tanks contained approximately 5 gallons each the gauge marked empty. I drifted back from the jetty as shown in my diagram turned the aircraft to port and taxied to the take-off position. Having completed the vital actions before take-off I opened the throttle with the aircraft pointing into wind. In the normal take-off the nose of the Beaver aircraft rises on opening throttle in this case the port float dipped into the water and the aircraft overturned to port.

/Q. Can you tell me

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Q. Can you tell me when you open the throttle and the nose rises what is the swinging tendency?

A. Very very slight with the Beaver.

Q. You are familiar with the Beaver flight manual?

A. Yes.

Q. If your propeller on opening up the throttle did not go into the fully fine condition on application of full power which way would you expect the aircraft to roll?

A. I should imagine she would go to starboard.

Q. The torque reaction will be to swing to port therefore if in your mind you consider the fact that you have just given us that the aircraft on application of power will tend to roll to starboard and you felt in an aircraft the torque reaction on the fuselage tending to rock the aircraft your natural action without thinking would have been to counter the roll to starboard?

A. Yes.

Q. You have answered the same question 100% in the reverse. The normal torque reaction of a beaver would make it roll which way?

A. I would say to port.

I seriously think we can cut down this enquiry if you consider the port float having had a large hole in it for the past 6 or 7 months. A new set of floats were ordered a year ago for this Beaver and have been in the hangar for the past six months delivered from Canada. I consider these new floats should have been fitted months ago. At the time of the accident I would point out that more water was liable to have got into the floats than in our normal operations as the plane had been on the water for at least five hours during the last two days. While the aircraft was on the water at Fox Bay I think a considerable amount of water must have entered the port float through the hole in the front of the float. A wind approximately 20 knots roughing the water and causing it to splash round the front of the floats. Not a strong wind by any means, we can fly to 30 or 40 knots at times.

Q. You told us that you reckoned on this particular day a larger quantity of water had got in to the floats. Do you base that on the fact that the aircraft had been on the water? Was it purely and simply because of the conditions, that is to say the fact that the aeroplane had spent longer in the water on this particular day that you consider that more water had entered the floats or was there any physical indication?

A. No. Purely that the aircraft had remained on this particular flight and on the day previously for a longer period than is normal. Our normal coming in and taking off and running takes 10 minutes.

Q. Presumably taking this to its extremes if you got a considerable quantity of water into one float it will produce a one wing low condition?

No. It is not noticeable.

/s. Can you put

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- Q. Can you put the pencil point on the map where you opened the throttle?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I see from the photograph of your take-off position that there would appear to be a considerable amount of kelp in the water?
- A. There is not very much kelp in that area and it is quite normal to take-off and land in heavy quantities of kelp. In the last 2,500 take-offs kelp has in no way affected the plane except for making it difficult to turn while taxiing on the water.
- Q. If on the take-off you had the circumstance of a leaky port float it might well have a considerable amount of water in the front water-tight compartment and also might have water in the other and in choppy water with the possibility of the presence of loads of kelp do you not consider it possible that if the forward end of the float dipped under and struck kelp it might have affected the aircraft tending to hold the port float back?
- A. On this point I would agree that such a case is possible but I would again say that in 2,500 take-offs in kelp it has never occurred before if it has it has never been brought to my notice. It is possible but very unlikely because I noticed as the plane went over the port float was quite clear of kelp.
- Q. Where was your take-off point before Douglas Station?
- A. Prior to this was Fox Bay.
- Q. And how long to fly from Fox Bay to Douglas Station?
- A. The take-off from Fox Bay appeared normal but somewhat sluggish I had only two passengers on board from Fox Bay and I believe that the fact of increasing my load by more than double made the condition such that the plane was then over-loaded with the three extra passengers and the considerable quantity of water which was found to be in the float.
- Q. Have you come to this decision since the event?
- A. Yes. I didn't realize that I was over-loaded before. I thought at the time of the accident that the port flap may have possibly blown up.
- Q. Between Fox Bay and Douglas Station was the plane flying on an even keel?
- A. Yes. No marked tendency.
- Q. Was there any noticeable asymmetry whilst airborne on this day?
- A. No.
- Q. Can you tell me exactly what happened. The sequence of events from opening the throttle?

/A. The aircraft

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A. The aircraft rolled quickly to port the left wing touching the water and immediately overturned. The nose being the heaviest part of the aircraft was submerged and the water entered the front of the cockpit. I shouted to the passengers to open the doors as quickly as possible. I leant over the lady passenger on the starboard side and opened her door. I pushed the lady out of the plane and scrambled out myself following her.

Q. You had very little forward motion on the plane?

A. The plane turned over so gently that my thermos flask in the front part of the aircraft was not broken.

Q. Did you get up to full power?

A. The throttle was closed by the time the aircraft had gone 45° over.

Q. You developed what was considered to be normal power?

A. Yes. The engine was behaving quite normally.

Q. Where was your pitch control in fine pitch?

A. Yes.

The starboard float of this aircraft has a dent forward of the step. I notice from instructions given on maintenance of seaplanes that this is rather dangerous as it can cause porpoising or pitching at high speed on the water. I do not know whether this may have contributed to the aircraft turning over.

Q. Earlier on in this enquiry you said that one of your first reactions was that your port flap may have blown up. However, at the time of the accident the air speed over the wing surface was very low?

A. Very low. Not more than 23 or 24 miles an hour would be the most.

Q. Do you consider that at that speed lack of the port flap would be noticeable?

A. No. I don't consider that the port flap blowing up in this aircraft at low speed would cause the plane to roll over.

Q. To Mr. Tull. What was the state of the flaps after the accident?

A. The aircraft has suffered considerable damage during the salvage operation, when both the wings were torn away from the fuselage making it impossible to ascertain the position of the flaps when the accident occurred. However, the flaps themselves have only suffered superficial damage and there is no indication that they were not operating correctly at the time.

Q. To Mr. Tove. Your impression was that the propellor was in fine pitch?

/A. It was in fine

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A. It was in fine pitch. Full boost and full revs.

Believing this accident to be due to water in the floats I enquired from Mr. Reive the hangar assistant when the floats had last been bilged. He seemed very hazy as to when they had been bilged and he said he thought that the floats had been bilged on the previous Monday on his return to work.

Q. How many days before?

A. Two days before. Monday was a non-flying day but he only thought that he had bilged them. I asked this in front of the Assistant Pilot. I again asked him this question the following Saturday in front of the Office clerk Bernard Shorey and Reive was still not positive of when he had last bilged the floats but thought the last occasion had been Monday. I would point out that Mr. Reive had been away from work from the 6th to the 16th and as he is normally the person responsible for bilging the floats I have reason to doubt that floats were never bilged from the 6th February.

Q. As a matter of course how often is bilging carried out?

A. Daily check. One or two cupfulls is the most a float should hold before bilging.

Q. Normal maintenance practice is that the floats should be inspected daily for water and Mr. Reive is responsible for bilging the floats and said that he thought it had been done two days before the accident?

A. On Wednesday the day on which the accident occurred I noticed that the aircraft was pushed out on the slip at approximately quarter to nine and in my opinion there had not been enough time to inspect it or bilge the floats.

Q. From the various remarks that you have made it would appear that you are not entirely happy as to the efficiency of the maintenance of this aircraft. If that is so is it not strange that a pilot of your very considerable experience should still accept the aircraft for the flying of passengers?

A. Provided the aircraft are bilged I consider that the aircraft would be seaworthy, providing that they did not remain on the water for more than a few hours.

Q. But on this occasion the aircraft had in your opinion been on the water for quite a long time since bilging?

A. In my opinion provided that the floats are bilged the plane is seaworthy but I feel that if the plane remains on the water for several hours the amount of water shipped by the floats will cause the plane to be unseaworthy.

Q. If there is anything wrong with the aircraft whatever, contrary to the conditions set out in the maintenance handbook on flight schedules then that aircraft should not be given a certificate of maintenance and the pilot should not accept the plane for flying?

A. In that I

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- A. In that I quite agree but in the Falklands unfortunately we accept standards much below those that I would be prepared to accept in any other part of the world. I consider the easiest way to find out the serviceability of these floats is to take them as they now are without the plane on them and tow them round in the harbour for about an hour. If the quantity of water shipped is several gallons and I am fairly certain it will be and that is multiplied by five we will have the approximate amount of water that would have been in the floats at the time of the accident.
- Q. Has the hole in the port float ever been reported on a pilot's report form?
- A. The record of defects book is kept. I don't know whether this particular snag has been recorded but on numerous occasions it has been pointed out not only by myself but by other people that there was a hole in the front of the float.
- Q. Who would normally record that in your fault book?
- A. The pilot should put it down, but sometimes he would record it verbally to the Engineer. In this instance the defect was so obvious and seen every day that it was up to the engineer to either state it was serviceable or unserviceable.
- Q. Had no effort been taken to repair this?
- A. No I think to be honest the flange on the float had been bent thereby covering this hole.
- Q. Would it not be possible to patch this hole?
- A. We have a repair kit and it has been mentioned that the hole should be repaired. I understand difficulties of patching were due to the fact that the surface round the hole must first be roughed-up. New floats were in the hangar and had conditions got too bad these would have been fitted to the plane.
- Q. You and other people have from time to time mentioned that the hole was present and that it should not be present? You now state that you consider this hole might well have admitted sufficient water to be a prior cause of the passenger accident. After each occasion of your or someone else reporting its presence and its potential danger nothing had been done?
- A. I am afraid nothing had been done.
- Q. And yet you have accepted the aircraft for flight knowing that this fault was still present?
- A. Yes and I said it was no great danger provided that bilging was carried out daily. We unfortunately for the last 6 or 7 months have been without a bilging pump. A small electric hand drill was mounted to a pump and this was used as an alternative measure to the normal bilging pump used.
- Q. Are you definitely satisfied with the standard of serviceability and maintenance of these aircraft?

/s. As a pilot

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A. As a pilot I might be but as an engineer I am not satisfied that the maintenance of these aircrafts are up to the normal standards.

Q. Have you ever reported this to anybody?

A. I saw the Colonial Secretary and I pointed out that many regulations of the Air Navigation Act we were not complying with. At that time he asked me to see that they were complied with as far as possible, and that I have tried to do.

Q. He said they were to be complied with as far as possible?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add?

A. I consider the present Beaver is unserviceable by the amount of water I saw bilged from it on Saturday afternoon. Fitting the new floats would be the answer.

Mr. Alazia.

Q. You were an eye-witness of this accident?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were you at the time?

A. Standing on the jetty.

Q. Will you tell us what you saw?

A. Well the plane slipped and she drifted back down wind and then taxied round and swung into the wind off the point and I take it the throttle was opened and for something like two lengths of herself she ran and she seemed to strike a bit of a wave and lifted and then turned over.

Q. Left the water?

A. Yes.

Q. To the left or right?

A. To the left.

Q. Did you see either float leave the water first?

A. It happened so quick I would not know. But I know she was just off the water.

Q. You have seen many Beavers come in and out of this place?

A. Yes I have.

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- Q. Were the water conditions to your mind normal for the operation of an aircraft? The wind was the usual speed?
- A. Yes I have seen the Beaver take-off in far windier conditions.
- Q. And in a far rougher sea?
- A. Yes.
- Q. But you are quite clear in your mind that both floats left the water?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Is there alot of kelp in that particular piece of water?
- A. No. Not where the Beaver was at the moment.
- Q. You had not noticed anything unusual about the aircraft between the time you slipped it from the jetty and it started to take-off?
- A. No everything seemed to be perfectly normal.
- Q. Would you say the aircraft was dead into wind?
- A. Oh yes I think so.
- Q. How long in time was it between the aircraft beginning to move forward and the actual time you thought it left the water?
- A. I should think a matter of seconds that is all.
- Q. When the aircraft was drifting back from the jetty before it turned into wind did it appear to be floating level in the water?
- A. To tell the honest truth I could not tell you I was mooring the dinghy.
- Q. You were in the dinghy? Did the passengers board the aeroplane from the dinghy?
- A. Yes.
- Q. On which side?
- A. On the port side.
- Q. And when you stepped from the dinghy on to the float did the float submerge?
- A. Not more than usual.
- Q. The water was rougher out there than by the jetty?
- A. Yes.
- Q. It was low water?
- A. Yes it was low water about 8ft. of water but I am not certain

/Q. Although the wi

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- Q. Although the wind was not very strong would you say it was gusty?
- A. No it was not gusty. After the accident it increased a lot more during the next hour.
- Q. There is a fairly prevailing wind direction presumably so that Beavers normally take-off and land in that stretch of water?
- A. Yes they can take-off either way.
- Q. Please continue to describe this particular take-off?
- A. Both floats left the water and the aeroplane developed a list to port and I was surprised at the rapidity of the aircraft rising.
- Q. Did you help with the salvage?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When you actually righted the aeroplane I believe you pulled the tail over the nose?
- A. That is right on the beach.
- Q. And the tips of the floats dug into the beach?
- A. No the floats were clear of the beach.
- Q. What did the aircraft pivot on when you were hauling it over?
- A. On the nose. I made one suggestion that we turn her over from the moorings in deep water. I thought the plane would not be damaged at all in deep water. She was raised and didn't go over because the rope broke, the wings were quite solid then.

Miss N. McLaren.

Will you tell us in your own words what happened on this particular day in question from the time when the plane left the jetty at Douglas Station?

Well I don't really remember much about it. I was sitting in the front with the pilot and I was busy reading a book, the pilot thought it was a good idea to have a book to take my mind off things as it was a bit bumpy. So the aeroplane left the jetty and what happened then? I carried on reading the book and the next thing I knew we were in the water and the plane was upside down.

Can you remember that there was a time when a sudden increase of noise from the engine made you think you were taking-off?

Only when the plane increased speed.

/Q. You noticed there

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Q. You noticed there was an increase of noise?

A. Yes.

Q. Approximately how long after that would you say you found yourself in the water. Seconds or minutes?

A. Round about five minutes.

Q. You cannot clearly remember what had happened in the few seconds before the aircraft actually turned over?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember whether after the increase in noise there was a lot of bumping about?

A. No it was quite steady. She just bumps a little and goes off like that.

Q. Did the aeroplane get into the air?

A. No I don't think so.

Q. Did the bumping stop?

A. The bumping and then all I remember she just slightly turned and was no more.

Q. On the water or in the air?

A. On the water.

Q. Where did you get on the aeroplane?

A. At Fox Bay from a dinghy.

Q. When you got from the dinghy on to the aeroplane did you step on to the float first?

A. Yes.

Q. Which side?

A. The left side.

Q. Did you get your feet wet?

A. No.

Q. The water was not running over the float?

A. No.

Q. Can you remember how windy it was at Douglas, was the water very rough or not very rough?

A. It was not what I call very rough.

A. About the same as it had been at Fox Bay?

A. No it was not as rough at Douglas as at Fox Bay.

/Dr. Emerson.

Dr. Emerson.

Q. Doctor, where were you sitting in this aeroplane?

A. Right at the back.

Q. Can you tell me in your own words what happened from the time the aircraft left the jetty at Douglas Station up until the end of the accident?

A. Well we got blown out and then started off up towards the boat house. There were two quite sharp bursts and I thought we were going to take-off and we didn't but it was on the third occasion that we started to take-off and I had the impression that we turned over on the point of getting airborne.

Q. You could not be sure whether the floats left the water?

A. No I am not.

Q. Where did you board the aircraft?

A. At Douglas.

Q. By dinghy?

A. Yes it was right up against the jetty but we went out in the dinghy.

Q. Which side did you get in?

A. On the left side.

Q. And you stood on the float?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you get your feet wet?

A. No.

Q. Can you estimate how far the aircraft had moved from the time you heard these three bursts of the throttle or how fast you were going up to the moment of the accident?

A. I cannot estimate how fast we were going. I suppose we travelled about 30 or 40 yards.

Q. Was the acceleration fairly rapid?

A. It was yes.

Q. When you turned over were you thinking its just about time we got airborne?

A. Yes I was.

Q. The actual accident itself was it quite smooth or violent. Did the thing roll gently to the left or did it suddenly do that?

A. It rolled gently to the left and then went up on to its nose.

/Q. But as accidents go

- Q. But as accidents go it was quite gentle?
- A. Yes it was.
- Q. Did you see the aircraft before you boarded it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did it appear to be floating normally?
- A. Yes.
- Q. No list?
- A. No.

Mr. B. Reive.

- Q. I believe you were in this aeroplane that crashed at Douglas Station?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Where were you sitting?
- A. In the rear seat.
- Q. Can you tell us what happened from the time you slipped from the jetty until the time of the accident?
- A. We went round the point and she started to take-off I suppose she went about $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 lengths of the aircraft she seemed to tip over to port side and then the nose went down.
- Q. The wing tipped over to the left?
- A. Yes the wing seemed to be going down.
- Q. In the water or in the air?
- A. I could not very well say.
- Q. You may have felt the water was choppy and it was a bit bouncy, did it smooth out?
- A. No it didn't seem to really.
- Q. You can't be sure whether the floats left the water or not?
- A. No I can't.
- Q. Which side were you sitting on?
- A. I was more or less in the middle.
- Q. Could you see the floats from your seat?
- A. No.

/Q. But you can see

- Q. But you can see the wing tip?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When you first felt that the aircraft was rolling over was the wing tip in or out of the water?
- A. It was out then.
- Q. Dropping fast or slow?
- A. Slow very slow.
- Q. Was the roll to the left violent or very gentle?
- A. Very gentle.
- Q. You had a tool box with you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Have you any idea how much that weighs?
- A. I suppose about 50lbs.

Mr. Canning.

- Q. Would you give us a rough idea of the prevailing weather on the 19th February?
- A. I am afraid the forecast was very bleak. Wind 280 30 knots visibility 15 miles and the weather at the time was cloudy but there had been a shower of rain snow and hail in the past hour.
- Q. These conditions would be as applicable to Douglas Station as Stanley?
- A. I am never too sure about local conditions.
- Q. Was it a gusty wind?
- A. Yes fairly gusty, nothing unusual for the Falklands. It gusted about 43.
- Q. A gusty wind of about 30 knots?
- A. Rather below.
- Q. What was the barometric pressure?
- A. Mean sea level pressure 983.8 millibars.
- Q. Fairly high humidity?
- A. 80% that is moderate.
- Q. What wind from your observations here is necessary to produce white caps in a harbour, say a quarter of the size of Port Stanley?

/A. I am afraid

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- A. I am afraid I cannot answer that off hand. I should say in Stanley Harbour if I see white caps I should think the wind would be about force 6. About 20 to 25 knots.
- Q. Do the airmen obtain a Met. forecast from you before take-off?
- A. Not always. We have not a great deal to help, they go from local information and observations which we have not got at the met. office.
- Q. Would you normally expect them to have any means of knowing of such a thing as an advent of a cold front or any violent pressure system?
- A. No not unless they phone us.
- Q. Was the wind direction fairly constant?
- A. Yes it was.



Mr. Smith.

- Q. Can you tell us what is the system of reporting defects on your aeroplanes?
- A. They are written in a small defect report book. It is only recently it started.
- Q. How recently?
- A. About 3 months.
- Q. What was the system before?
- A. Normally the pilot reports and we get on with whatever the snag is.
- Q. Verbally?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now that the defect log which you have instituted is in being are Pilots' faults or whoever else might report on serviceability of the aircraft entered?
- A. I don't think they have all been entered. Normally it is told when the aircraft comes back and we just get on with the job.
- Q. To what standards is air maintenance run?
- A. We have done our inspections in accordance with the manufacturers manuals.
- Q. Once you have done your inspection you produce that certificate?
- A. Yes.

/Q. And what does that

SK

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Q. And what does that certificate mean?

A. It means that the aircraft is serviceable in all respects for flight.

Q. If you produce a certificate there are no snags on the aircraft and all inspections laid down in the maintenance manual have been carried out?

A. Yes.

Q. On the day of this accident the aircraft was flying on that certificate of maintenance?

A. Yes.

Q. You have therefore signed to the effect that on the day in question there were no defects to the aircraft and that all relevant inspections had been carried out in accordance with the manual?

A. Yes.

Q. How often are the floats bilged?

A. Daily.

Q. Had that been done in the 24 hours prior to this particular flight?

A. Yes.

Q. On inspection of the float before flight there were no defects on either float?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is that indication?

A. It is not indicated on that. We have had damage to the port float of the Beaver in question for some long time.

Q. Is that recorded anywhere?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Should it be?

A. I suppose officially yes.

Q. Where?

A. In the log book. The damage in question had never caused us any trouble whatsoever. The only reason I left that float in that condition firstly because we had no material to complete a repair and secondly we had carefully watched it and she didn't make water, shall I say a slight amount and on this coming C. of A. we were fitting new floats.

Q. Your C. of A. are carried out how often?

Annually.

/Q. You have a spare

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- Q. You have a spare replacement set of floats?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How long have they been here?
- A. I suppose it must have been about 4 months.
- Q. They came on the Darwin?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you agree that an aircraft can only be one of two things. Either serviceable or unserviceable?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you further agree that any aircraft which has any defect whether it is considered by a responsible person to be an unimportant defect or not is not officially serviceable?
- A. Strictly speaking yes.
- Q. And as such the aircraft should not be accepted for flight?
- A. It is slightly different here.
- Q. Since you are operating the Government airline in one of the British Colonies do you agree that your governing regulations are the British Civil Aviation Regulations?
- A. We are guided by them.
- Q. Whose jurisdiction do you come under?
- A. I think the Colonial Air Navigation Ordinance.
- Q. That is the all embracing document that says the aeroplane is serviceable for flying?
- A. Yes.
- Q. So you will agree that there was a hole in the port float and the propeller had a back history of sticking?
- A. Yes. But the float had been damaged some considerable time ago and it was carefully checked for taking water in. 1 gallon or 2 gallons of water was the most it ever took.
- Q. Are there any limits laid down?
- A. No I don't think so.
- Q. Who does the bilging?
- A. Terry Reive the Handyman.
- Q. When he is away?
- A. I do.
- Q. Who did it on this occasion?
- A. Terry Reive. I ask him every morning and he says yes.

/Q. Did you ask him on

CONFIDENTIAL

Q. Did you ask him on this occasion?

A. Yes.

Q. And he did?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there as far as you know any other defect on the aircraft apart from the hole in the port float and the sticky propellor?

A. No not that I know of.

Q. Has a distortion of the starboard float ever been reported to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you consider that to be another defect?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you ever had any complaints of sluggishness generally in the flying of this aeroplane?

A. No. I have had complaints of elevator flutter.

Q. Have either or any of the pilots ever said that this aircraft was dangerous because of the float?

A. No never.

Q. Has anybody ever suggested to you that you should put on your new set of floats for this aircraft?

A. No.

Q. Why were they ordered?

A. They were ordered to facilitate changing at the next C. of A. inspection.

Q. Since the aircraft was recovered from the water have you emptied the port float?

A. Yes.

Q. How much did you get out of it?

A. A considerable amount.

Q. Can you very briefly describe the rescue operations?

A. She was in a nose down attitude and she was on the far beach of the Moro. We tried to pull her over on to her floats, this we could not do so we left her there for the night and went back the following day, by which time the fellows in the Moro had her floating in the upside down position. We then towed the aircraft and beached her close to the jetty with nose down attitude, the tail pointing away from the beach. We just turned her over by means of tractors and lines from the shore into her floats.

Q. As she came over what was the point of pivot?

A. First her airscrew

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- A. First her airscrew and then the nose and the floats.
- Q. It is therefore possible that the floats were damaged during the salvage operation?
- A. Yes.
- Q. On inspection now would they show the position on taking off?
- A. No.
- Q. What would you consider as a normal amount of water for a float to take over night?
- A. That depends on the age of her floats.
- Q. What would you consider to be a safe amount?
- A. At a maximum about 10 gallons.
- Q. Have you any idea what the maximum out of this holed float was?
- A. I would say not more than three gallons.
- Q. Even in slightly choppy sort of water?
- A. Not more than three or four gallons.
- Q. Would I be right in saying when you checked it in the first place that though it made more water than the other float it was still in your opinion a reasonable amount?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In your opinion when you first saw the aircraft had there been any failure of controls in any way?
- A. No.
- Q. You know there was no flap failure?
- A. No definitely not. Both flaps were in take-off position and both were quite secure.
- Q. And no jacks fractured?
- A. No.
- Q. Did you notice the position of the throttle?
- A. No. I didn't.
- Q. Did you notice the propeller itself?
- A. After we turned her over it was obviously in course.

/ Mr. T. Reive.

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Mr. T. Reivo.

- Q. There is a splendid operation called bilging?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Would I be right in saying that you are responsible for doing it?
- A. Yes I do.
- Q. How often is it done as a matter of course?
- A. Pretty well every day.
- Q. Who bilged this particular aeroplane prior to this accident flight?
- A. I expect it would be me.
- Q. When was that?
- A. On the morning of the flight. I usually do.
- Q. Did you in this case?
- A. I think I had. I am not absolutely sure.
- Q. The accident occurred on a Wednesday, can you be certain you took the water out of the floats on that Wednesday morning?
- A. I am not absolutely certain. Both planes were flying that day.
- Q. When is the last day that you can be positive that you personally bilged that aeroplane?
- A. There was one bad day at the beginning of the week that we didn't fly and we went round and fuelled them up and bilged them.
- Q. You were quite positive on that day, the day you didn't fly the water was extracted from the floats, but not quite positive about the Wednesday?
- A. Not positive no.
- Q. As you do this operation daily what in rough terms would you expect the amount of water to be taken out of each float?
- A. About 1½ gallons. One seems to have more in it than the other one, the port float, that is the one with the nose busted.
- Q. Appreciably more?
- A. Yes you can notice the difference.
- Q. Twice as much?
- A. No.
- Q. Half as much again?
- A. Yes.
- /Q. Do you record

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- Q. Do you record officially the operations that you carry out on the aeroplane?
- A. No I don't.
- Q. What do you do?
- A. I just more or less help the mechanics.
- Q. You are not a licensed engineer?
- A. No.
- Q. If you have carried out some operation you would tell Mr. Smith?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Including bilging?
- A. They usually notice by the water on the floor that this has been done.

Mr. Jones.

- Q. Am I right in saying that quite recently prior to this accident you returned from leave in England?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How long had you been away?
- A. Approximately 7 months.
- Q. You are a licensed engineer?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was your impression of the state of serviceability of the two aeroplanes when you returned. Or perhaps as compared with when you left?
- A. The floats had had one or two more knocks but nothing of any effect. I had not done an inspection, but generally speaking they were the same as when I left.
- Q. Were there any defects on the plane which had this accident when you went on leave. I mean a hole in the float or that sort?
- A. The floats were damaged. I know there had been a small hole in the float because I had put a bung in it.
- Q. Which side?
- A. On the port side.
- Q. Had there been any history on that aeroplane of the port float making any more water than you might expect?

/A. Not to my

CONFIDENTIAL

- A. Not to my knowledge no.
- Q. But you had done a repair on the port float of that aeroplane before going on leave?
- A. Yes with the materials available.
- Q. No pitch troubles?
- A. On the morning the accident happened I was asked by Maurice Smith to run both aircraft check the engines and move the blades. This I did and the aircraft in question I then ran again and she changed pitch below 1,500 r.p.m. which is the mark I have always taken as being okay.
- Q. Was that a matter of routine?
- A.
- Q. On this particular aeroplane had either of the pilots complained about sticking of the propellor?
- A. Not to me because I had just come back from leave. There had been no complaint before.

Mr. Toye.

- Q. For how long have you been flying a Beaver?
- A. For nearly two years.
- Q. Do you know the stalling characteristics of a Beaver?
- A. I am pretty well acquainted with them.
- Q. What happens when you are in straight and level flight and you stall the Beaver?
- A. If there is no yaw the nose will drop.
- Q. If a yaw is not or cannot be corrected?
- A. Then the left wing will drop.
- Q. What is the minimum air speed at which a Beaver will unstick?
- A. Approximately 55 to 60 miles an hour air speed.
- Q. Am I correct in saying that the easiest conditions for taking off a float plane are with sufficient wind to produce wavelets?
- A. Yes that is correct.
- Q. Considering a hypothetical case you are about to commence take-off in a Beaver with a wind speed which is varying from 20 to 40 knots very brief gusts and the normal wind speed is 28 knots. If that happened and you had just started your take-off run and didn't move far but just sufficient to get the floats moving through the water at 15 knots which from my observations and experience does not

/take a very great

take a very great distance, then if a gust came along your minimum air speed would be in the order of 55 to 60 knots, and if when that gust came along it happened to coincide with a kick-up from a convenient wave you would then immediately have all the conditions required for take-off.

A. Yes.

Q. And when those conditions abated two things would result. Firstly the aircraft having lost flying speed would stall and secondly you would have lost the control speed necessary to correct the stall.

A. Correct.

Q. Say had those conditions and those circumstances in the hypothetical case occurred on the 19th February it is possible that the result I have just described might have contributed to the accident whether or not it was the prime cause?

A. As a hypothetical case yes. But I would state that such wind conditions of at least 40 miles an hour plus a forward speed of the aircraft of 20 miles an hour would be necessary before the aircraft became airborne. In something like over 2,000 take-offs in gales, eddying aircurrents and other conditions I have never known a Beaver to come un-stuck under gusty conditions.

Q. Would you say that it was gusty at Douglas Station?

A. Not in that particular area I was sheltered and the other pilot who is a learner found no difficulty in landing there or in taking off.

Q. In your experience of flying down here you have presumably landed at this place. In that experience do you find that the waters are more sheltered than here?

A. They would more or less be the same.

Q. You told us this morning that you had found this aircraft sluggish. Would you remind me was that applicable to the aeroplane on this particular day or had you noticed it previously?

A. It was more sluggish than I had noticed it before.

Q. The take-off at Fox Bay was normal and not unduly short?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give us in terms of distance how long?

A. 300 or 400 yards.

Q. You told us this morning that you now think that the aircraft was overladen due to water in the floats?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you worked out what all that weight was?

A. Yes it was approximately 90lbs. under weight excluding the water.

/Q. Have you any

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Q. Have you any reason to suspect that your floats were out of alignment?

A. Yes because the aircraft would only turn to port it was extremely difficult to turn the aircraft to starboard.

Q. Did you however report this tendency.

A. It has been reported many times and I believe a check on the floats had been made.

Q. You are convinced that your floats never left the water?

A. I am quite convinced that my port float never left the water. I am quite clear in my mind.

Q. Once you noticed that something was going wrong with your take-off then you say your float was going under water.

A. Yes. On the occasion in question the nose did not rise but went downwards and there was a definite drag.

Q. Any idea of your approximate speed through the water?

A. Only a mile or two an hour.

Mr. I. Campbell.

Q. On the day that this accident occurred at Douglas Station were you at Fox Bay when the aircraft in question took-off?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw the take-off that Toye did?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it a long or short take-off?

A. Fairly short.

Q. Can I pin you down any more?

A. No because I was behind him but it appeared to me to be quite a short take-off.

Q. What was the wind strength at Fox Bay?

A. It would be over 20 knots.

Q. This aeroplane had you flown it recently?

A. No I should say a fortnight before.

Q. Any complaints?

A. The propellor was sticky.

Q. It didn't strike you as being a tired old aeroplane?

/A. No.

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- A. No.
- Q. Any sign of sluggishness?
- A. No.
- Q. As matter of interest how do you work out the loading of your aircraft?
- A. We have no actual loading sheets or are tied down to any specific loading rules.
- Q. Do you know the weight of your aircraft?
- A. No.
- Q. If you don't know that how can you tell whether you are within your maximum weight?
- A. (No answer)
- Q. Shortly after the accident you landed in the same place?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Can you show me on the map where you landed?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Later you took-off from where?
- A. About there.
- Q. What were the weather conditions then?
- A. There was 25 knots of wind when we landed and took off. It was squally.
- Q. From your knowledge of this place would you expect the wind and squalls to be on the decline when you got there?
- A. Yes it was dying out. The weather had been generally squally all day but by the time I landed the squalls were starting to die out but the wind I should say was about the same.
- Q. Have you experienced any difficulties with kelp?
- A. Only taxiing difficulties because the kelp ruins you water rudder and in drifting back if you do not get your rudders up in time the kelp anchors you on the rudders.
- Q. But you have never experienced any trouble taking off or landing?
- A. No not in kelp.
- Q. You saw the Beaver taxi out from Fox Bay?
- A. Yes he taxied past me.
- Q. Did he have a list in any way?
- A. Not that I noticed.

/Mr. Fore.

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Mr. Toyo.

Q. I gather you would like to add something to your statement?

A. As I consider the whole question is whether or not the floats were bilged on the day that the accident occurred, as I consider it so important to know whether they were or were not bilged because I think on that must rest the whole case. It is either that the pilot made some error in his judgement or there may have been some technical fault which so far we haven't discovered or the fact that there was water in the floats due to the lack of bilging that may have been the cause of the accident.

After consideration, as the fact that considerable doubt exists as to the date of the last bilging prior to the accident, no further evidence is considered by the Board to be necessary and the point is appreciated.

CONFIDENTIAL

14th March, 58.

To: Acting Director of Civil Aviation

From: Colonial Secretary,

STANLEY.Enquiry into Accident to Beaver Aircraft VP-FAF.

Government is now considering the Report and Recommendations of the Chief Inspector of Accidents and Inspector of Accidents arising out of the recent accident to the Beaver Aircraft VP-FAF.

2. Pending the outcome of this consideration, a number of steps should be taken immediately to tighten up control and improve documentation of maintenance and repair work on the aircraft:-

- (a) All defects must, without fail, be entered into the defects log by the pilot when the Beaver aircraft return to the hangar. Each entry should be signed by the pilot and countersigned by the Senior Engineer on duty.
- (b) If a defect entered into the defects log is accepted by both pilots and engineers as "an acceptable defect" for flying purposes, an entry to that effect must be made and signed by both the pilot concerned and the Senior Engineer.
- (c) Steps must be taken to ensure that the floats are pumped out regularly every day when flying has taken place. A special log should be kept for this purpose and the fact that the floats have been pumped out should be recorded daily in the log by the person responsible for the work and and it should be countersigned by the Senior Engineer on duty.
- (d) Before the aircraft leaves the hangar for flying operations it must be certified by the responsible engineer as being serviceable and accepted by the pilot concerned as being serviceable. An entry to that effect should be made in a log kept for the purpose and signed by both engineer and pilot.
- (e) Particular attention should be paid to the question of loading the aircraft. As you are aware, this is a matter which, in the particular circumstances of the Falkland Islands, must depend very largely on the pilot's judgement. The aircraft must, however, under no circumstances carry more weight than she is intended to do having regard to the quantity of fuel being carried. In this connection, particular attention should be paid to awkward, bulky and potentially dangerous items of freight. These should not be carried if, in the opinion of the pilot, they constitute any danger to the aircraft. A record should be kept of "take off weights" on every flight.

3. Steps should be taken to provide for closer documentation of maintenance and repair work. Mr. Tull, De Havilland's Chief Engineering Representative for Latin America, has undertaken to provide this Government with the documentation used by a commercial airline operating Beaver aircraft. In the meantime and in conjunction with the Senior Engineer, you should take steps to ensure that temporary documentation is provided and that all maintenance work is signed and countersigned as having been carried out.

4. Although this is a matter that does not arise from the recent accident to the Beaver and the enquiry, I am to draw attention to the fact that strict instructions have been issued that no person whatsoever (other than the pilots, or, when the need arises, the aircraft engineers) must fly the aircraft or handle any controls. This instruction must be implicitly obeyed and a very serious view indeed will be taken of its contravention.

John J. ...
COLONIAL SECRETARY.

AGDT/SJA

Copy to the Senior Aircraft Engineer.

15th March, 58.

To: Acting Director of Civil Aviation,

From: Colonial Secretary.

STANLEY.

Accident to Beaver Aircraft VP-FAF.

I am directed to enclose for your information five copies of the Report of the Chief Inspector of Accidents and the Inspector of Accidents on the recent accident to Beaver aircraft VP-FAF.

2. One copy should be retained on the Departmental files, one copy should be retained by you and the remaining three copies should be handed to the engineers and the second pilot, Mr. Campbell for their information.

3. This is a confidential document which should not be discussed with the general public until it is released by Government for general information.

(Sgd.) A.G. Denton-Thompson.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

17th March, 1958.

Sir,

I have been directed by His Excellency the Governor to convey to you Government's appreciation of the assistance rendered by Lieut. Commander A.G. Cornabe, R.N., Lieutenant J.G. Brigham, R.N. and Aircraft Artificer Second Class J.P. Norley in connection with the recent enquiry into the accident that occurred at Douglas Station to Beaver Aircraft VP-FAT on the 19th February.

2. Government has found the Report submitted by these Officers to be most constructive and helpful. The necessary action to implement their recommendations is being taken by Government.

72. 3. Individual letters of appreciation have been addressed to Lieut. Commander A.G. Cornabe, R.N., Lieutenant J.G. Brigham, R.N. and Aircraft Artificer Second Class J.P. Norley.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) A.G. Denton-Thompson.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

the Commanding Officer,
H.M.S. PROTECTOR,
at STANLEY.

DT/SJA

17th March, 1958.

Sir,

I have been directed by His Excellency the Governor to convey to you Government's appreciation of the very valuable assistance you rendered in connection with the enquiry into the accident to Beaver Aircraft VP-FAF which crashed on take off at Douglas Station on the 19th February.

2. The Report submitted to Government by the Officers who carried out the enquiry has been found to be most constructive and helpful and action is being taken to implement the recommendations made in that Report.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) A.G. Denton-Thompson.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Lieutenant-Commander A.G. Cornabe, R.N.,
H.M.S. PROTECTOR,
at STANLEY.

GD/T/SJA

Same letter to: Lt. J.G. Brigham, R.N.
Aircraft Artificer 2nd Class J.P. Norley.

0270/U

17th March, 1958.

D/O

I am writing to thank you for all the trouble you have taken and all the help and assistance you have given us with regard to the damage to our Beaver aircraft and the enquiry that was held into the circumstances and cause of the accident.

We particularly appreciate the fact that you so readily changed your plans and came down to the Falklands, at considerable inconvenience, in answer to our request for assistance and advice. I need hardly add that your visit has been most useful and helpful to us and it gives us great satisfaction to know that, isolated as we are, we are able to rely on such co-operation from the De Havilland representatives.

I am sending a copy of this letter to De Havilland's Head Office.

A.G.D.T.

B.F.W. Tull Esq.,
Julio Herrera y Obes 1405,
MONTEVIDEO.

AGDT/SJA

Copy to De Havilland's Head Office,
Hatfield,
Herts.

No. _____

MEMORANDUM.

It is requested that, in any reference to this memorandum the above number and date should be quoted.


From: Atg. Director of Civil
Aviation,
Stanley, Falkland Islands.

17
1958.
To: The Honourable,
The Colonial Secretary,
STANLEY.

SUBJECT :-

Interview.

I have the honour to request that I may be granted an interview with His Excellency the Governor, for the purpose of discussing the findings of the enquirey into the accident to Beaver Aircraft VP-TAF.



Acting Director of Civil Aviation.

MCTH TORONTO.

Please advise whether possible Beaver Seaplane could capsize
circumstances:- Water-topped nose compartment port float STOP.
Excessive water in entire compartment starboard float. Throttle
opened aircraft moved twice own length STOP Full load not over loaded
Aircraft not airborne. wind 20 knots in fairly sheltered bay.

Please advise amount of water allowed in floats for safe
operation.

See

73c.

A/DCA has expressed dissatisfaction at the
Board's findings & requests:-

- (a) an interview with J.E.
- (b) permission to despatch the above telegram
to De Havilland of Canada.


19358

MEMORANDUM

It is requested that in any reference to this memorandum the above number and date should be quoted.

19th March, 1958.

From:- Atg. Director of Civil
Aviation.
Stanley, Falkland Islands.

To: The Honourable,
The Colonial Secretary,
STANLEY.

SUBJECT:- Enquiry into Accident to Beaver Aircraft VP-FAE.

With reference to your memorandum dated 14th March, 1958, regarding the actions to be taken to control and improve the documentation of maintenance and repair work on the aircraft. 68.

- (a) During the past five months a Record of Defects Book has been kept. It is regretted that some obvious defects such as:- failure of propeller to move into coarse pitch and a hole in the port float were not recorded. These defects were known by all concerned and so obvious, that no entry was made. In future all defects will be recorded.
 - (b) I feel we shall have to pay more attention with regard to flying with "an acceptable defect". It may be quite safe to fly with a minor defect but a definite period of time should be stated, depending on the nature of the defect. As an example of what may occur:- Air Test VP-FAE 15/1/58 Entry made in defects book No 1. "Prop. Sluggish". Engineer's comments:- "Left for 10 hours to work free (new prop)". We now know that the defect was, in fact, not due to propeller trouble and, after flying 73 hours the aircraft is grounded as unserviceable. In view of this we must take action to ensure that rectification is carried out at the time stated in the Defects Book.
 - (c) Steps will be taken to keep a special log for the purpose of certifying that the floats have been bilged before flights. I would point out that Certificate of Maintenance is all that is normally required. An engineer signs to the effect that "Maintenance and inspection of aircraft, instruments and equipment" (this includes floats, under-carriage, etc.) has been carried out. A Maintenance Certificate was in force on the day of the accident, however, as a safety measure bilging log will be kept in future.
 - (d) There are two columns in the Journey and Aircraft Log Book in which the engineers and pilots certify the aircraft as airworthy and, in the case of the pilots, the total authorized weight ~~is~~ not exceeded. The pilots column has in the past been signed, unfortunately, the engineers have only signed after a 50 hour inspection.
 - (e) Strict attention has been paid to the question of loading. The aircraft departs from Stanley with four passengers and their luggage, and full fuel tanks. A fifth passenger is normally not carried until the amount of fuel consumed permits the additional passenger to be carried, without exceeding the authorized weight limit. I suggest that scales should be available at the hanger in order to check the weight of individual passengers, their luggage and various items of freight.
- (2) Steps will be taken to provide for closer documentation of maintenance. The documentation that Mr Tull has kindly offered to send, is presumably used on a Canadian or South American Airline. The Falkland Islands is British Colony, therefore, I would suggest that a Maintenance Schedule ~~should~~

/2. should

2. should be submitted for approval to the Air Registration Board, London. This will be necessary if we are to operate in accordance with the Air Navigation Order, for although a Maintenance Schedule issued by another country may be excellent, and close to the British Standards, it is still necessary to obtain A.R.B. approval for Colonial Registered aircraft. In order to obtain a British Certificate of Airworthiness I suggest that the Government should approach:-

The Chief Surveyor,
Air Registration Board,
82/84 Frederick Street,
Port of Spain, Trinidad, B.W.I.

advice from this source would, no doubt, prove to be most useful in improving the efficient operations of the Falkland Islands Government Air Service.



Acting Director of Civil Aviation.

GOL/BWS

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF MEETING OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

HELD ON 19th and 20th March, 1958.

0270/U.

.....
7. REPORT OF THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF ACCIDENTS ON THE
ACCIDENT TO BEAVER AIRCRAFT VP-FAF 828. (Memo. No. 17)

The Chief Inspector's report was noted and it was decided to publish the findings of the Board of Enquiry in the Gazette and circulate to members of the Legislative Council.

*Done as
76 as BIA.
§*

.....

Clerk of Executive Council.

21st March,

58.

Sir,

17
I am directed to forward for your information the enclosed summary of the proceedings and findings of the enquiry held into the accident that occurred to the Beaver Aircraft on take off from the Moro, Douglas Station, on the 19th February.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) A.G. Deaton-Thompson.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

e Hon. Mr. A.L. Hardy, B.E.M., J.P.,
STANLEY.

Same letter to: The Hon. Mr. M.G. Creece, J.P.
" " Mr. T.A. Gilruth, J.P.
" " Mr. S. Miller, J.P.
" " Mr. H.C. Harding, O.B.E., J.P.
" " Mr. J.T. Clement.
" " Mr. A. Mercer, O.B.E.

1/SJA

SUMMARY.

An enquiry has been held into the accident that occurred to the Beaver Aircraft on take off from the Moro, Douglas Station, on the 19th February, as a result of which the aircraft capsized without, however, loss of life or injury to pilot or passengers.

2. The enquiry was conducted by:-

Lieut. Commander A.G. Corasbe, R.N.

and

Lieutenant J.G. Brigham, R.N.

assisted by

Mr. S.F.W. Tall of the De Havilland Aircraft Co. Ltd.

and

Aircraft Artificer 2nd. Class J.P. Norley of H.M.S. PROTECTOR

Lieut. Commander A.G. Corasbe and Lieutenant J.G. Brigham were appointed Chief Inspector of Accidents and Inspector of Accidents respectively for the purpose of the enquiry.

3. Having considered the evidence presented by the pilot (Mr. G.C. Toye), the Aircraft Engineers (Mr. M. Smith and Mr. D. Jones), passengers in the aircraft, Mr. A. Alasia, who was an eye-witness to the accident and others, the Board of Enquiry has expressed the opinion that the accident could only be attributed to one of the following causes:-

(a) The aircraft became prematurely airborne owing to the conditions prevailing at the time, stalled and dropped its port wing thus causing the port float to enter the water causing the aircraft to yaw and capsize.

(b) The port float, which was in a damaged condition had shipped sufficient water in its foremost compartment to cause asymmetric drag on the aircraft resulting in yaw and eventual capsize.

4. They have ~~there~~ expressed the view that the most likely of these two possibilities was the first, namely, that the aircraft became prematurely airborne owing to the conditions prevailing at the time, stalled and dropped its port wing.

5. The Board of Enquiry has stated that in its view, no ~~one~~ person can be considered directly to blame for this occurrence and that the aircraft was not, at the time of the accident, being operated outside its normal weight capacity.

6. The aircraft was salvaged from the Moro and brought into Stanley. Unfortunately, however, Government have been advised that the repairs necessary to make it airworthy again would be so extensive and costly that repair would not be an economic proposition.

22nd March, 1958.

From: Acting Director of Civil Aviation.

To: The Honourable, The Colonial Secretary, STANLEY.

Sir,

I do not agree with the findings of the Board of Inquiry into the accident to Beaver Aircraft VP-FAF.

The theory that "the aircraft became prematurely airborne owing to conditions prevailing at the at the time, stalled and dropped its port wing" is not in accordance with the facts.

The Beaver Seaplane is 32' 9" in length, and as it is neither a helicopter nor a vertical take off aircraft it is impossible for this type of aircraft to become airborne in twice its own length, i.e. 22 yards.

As the aircraft was overloaded due to the presence of water in both floats, a distance of some 200 yards and an airspeed of 65-70 m.p.h. would be required before becoming airborne. Nothing in the conditions prevailing at the time could cause the aircraft to "rise" quickly out of the water.

When the eye-witness saw the aircraft rising out of the water, this was, no doubt, when the aircraft was in the motion of capsizing.

On file

Reference is made in the Preliminary Conclusions to the fact that the port float may have shipped sufficient water in its foremost compartment to cause asymmetric drag on the aircraft resulting in yaw and eventual capsize. No mention is made of the fact that the centre compartment of the starboard float was also leaking badly.

~~I~~ I produced a manual on the operating and maintaining of seaplanes, which clearly states that if more than a cupful or two of water is found in a float after a period of twelve hours on the water, the leak should be located and repaired. This vital evidence was received with a "shrug" and the comment that "one cannot go by the Instruction Book".

The Board states that the aircraft was not, at the time of the accident, being operated outside its normal weight limitations. This is not true, as with five passengers and their luggage, plus a considerable amount of water the aircraft must be overloaded, and this fact caused the accident. Water weighs 10 lbs per gallon.

/It.

It is the opinion of the Board that the amount of water shipped during the 1 hour 10 minutes the aircraft was on the water at Fox Bay, as compared to the amount shipped in 10 minutes at Douglas Station, would have caused some symptoms to be apparent to the pilot, in stating this, they completely ignore the fact that the aircraft was only carrying two passengers when taking off from Fox Bay, compared with five passengers at Douglas Station.

In my opinion a change in weights and moments due to the overload, caused by the additional passengers and their luggage at Douglas, was sufficient to give a C. of G. position beyond permitted limits to exist, by reason of water moving in the two floats when the throttle was opened.

I am confident that had an A.R.B. Surveyor been on the Board, he would not only have fully investigated the seaworthiness of the floats, but would have gone more deeply into the important question of just when the floats were last bilged.


The fact that a Certificate of Maintenance had been issued, when no evidence of recent routine bilging could be shown, would not have been so lightly passed over, and the final comments of the Board would have been very different.

In my opinion the aircraft was airworthy but not seaworthy, and this would have been the conclusion of anyone searching for the true cause of the accident.

Finally, if the Board can find that no one person can be considered to be directly to blame for this occurrence, then I suggest that the wording of the report is most unfortunate.

I am,
Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Acting Director of Civil Aviation.

6274/v

THE DE HAVILLAND AIRCRAFT COMPANY LIMITED



AVIONES
MOTORES
TURBINAS
HELICES

PRINCIPALES FABRICAS EN
INGLATERRA
CANADA
AUSTRALIA
NUEVA ZELANDIA

CORONEL A. MACDOUGALL

GERENTE PARA AMERICA CENTRAL Y AMERICA DEL SUD

TELEF. 889 42
CABLES "GOBLIN"

J. HERRERA Y OBES 1405 MONTEVIDEO
URUGUAY

18th March 1958

A.G. Denton Thompson, Esq.,
Port Stanley,
Falkland Islands.

Dear D.T.,

Before going on to the more serious subject of your Beaver engine troubles I should like to let you know that I arrived back here safe and sound on Sunday morning after a most enjoyable voyage with such good company as Ray Adie and Hernan Cubillos not to mention the others on board.

I should like to thank both you and your wife for your kindness to me during my stay with you and tell you how much I really enjoyed it in spite of the preoccupations we had with the aircraft. Of course your tolerance and understanding of my very latin habits helped and I am quite sure you will be campaigning during your next leave in England for the abolition of D.O.R.A. who, I believe, was responsible for those ridiculous licencing laws.

I received your two cables, one to the Darwin and one here in Monte, re the Beaver. I am very sorry that, to date, I can make no further suggestions. The Pratt and Whitney chap is missing from this area just now as he is away on leave so I have cabled the whole story to Canada and asked if they can cable any suggestions they may have. John Trill, our engineer here, arrived this morning and I immediately tackled him on the subject but he cannot see how the trouble can be happening. Our only suggestion is that you must have another dud engine as the only way the prop. can behave as it is doing is through an internal leak in the engine.

I hope that before you receive this letter I shall have had a reply from Canada to my cable and shall be able to cable some helpful information of suggestions. I have got an urgent message in to the Pratt and Whitney office for them to contact me as soon as possible and have cancelled my travel plans from here until your problems have been solved.

Once again my regards and sincere thanks to you and fam for a most enjoyable stay.

Yours

Sincerely
Bill D. L.

J.E.

We shall have to send a follow up to J.E. and I attach a draft Savings
(at h.c.) for consideration.

I wonder whether we might not just send the report and not the verbatim evidence.
In that case we would include the words "together with a copy of the record of evidence
taken" from the Savings.

P.J. 17-7
25/3/58

81

HCS

I'd send the lot if you have
Enough copies.

RA

25 3 58

817

G A Z E T T E N O T I C E .

No. 18A.

Colonial Secretary's Office,
Stanley, Falkland Islands.

30th March, 1958.

A Summary of the proceedings and findings of the enquiry held into the accident that occurred to the Beaver Aircraft, is published for information:-

1. The accident occurred on take off from the Moro, Douglas Station on 19th February, 1958, as a result of which the aircraft capsized without loss of life or injury to pilot or passengers.

2. The enquiry was conducted by:-

Lieutenant Commander A. G. Cornabe, R.N.

and

Lieutenant J. G. Brigham, R.N.

assisted by

Mr. B. F. W. Tull of the De Havilland Aircraft Co. Ltd.

and

Aircraft Artificer 2nd. Class J. P. Norley of H.M.S. PROTECTOR.

Lieut. Commander A. G. Cornabe and Lieutenant J. G. Brigham were appointed Chief Inspector of Accidents and Inspector of Accidents respectively for the purpose of the enquiry.

3. Having considered the evidence presented by the pilot (Mr. G. C. Toye), the Aircraft Engineers (Mr. M. Smith and Mr. D. Jones), passengers in the aircraft, Mr. A. Alazia, who was an eye-witness to the accident and others, the Board of Enquiry has expressed the opinion that the accident could only be attributed to one of the following causes:-

(a) The aircraft became prematurely airborne owing to the conditions prevailing at the time, stalled and dropped its port wing thus causing the port float to enter the water causing the aircraft to yaw and capsize.

(b) The port float, which was in a damaged condition had shipped sufficient water in its foremost compartment to cause asymmetric drag on the aircraft resulting in yaw and eventual capsize.

4. They have expressed the view that the most likely of these two possibilities was the first, namely, that the aircraft became prematurely airborne owing to the conditions prevailing at the time, stalled and dropped its port wing.

5. The Board of Enquiry has stated that in its view, no person can be considered directly to blame for this occurrence and that the aircraft was not, at the time of the accident, being operated outside its normal weight capacity.

6. The aircraft was salvaged from the Moro and brought into Stanley. Unfortunately, however, Government have been advised that the repairs necessary to make it airworthy again would be so extensive and costly that repair would not be an economic proposition.

By Command,


ACTING COLONIAL SECRETARY

Ref:0270/U

JB/MC

F. I. ref 0270/U

C. O. ref:

SAVING TELEGRAM.*From:* The Officer Administering the Government of the Falkland Islands.*To:* The Secretary of State for the Colonies.*Date:* 31st March, 1958.No 60. SAVING. COLONY

15. My Colony Savinggram No. 37 of the 28th February.
Accident to Beaver Aircraft VP-FAF.

3 copies 35-39 I enclose for your information copies of the Report of the Chief Inspector of Accidents and the Inspector of Accidents who conducted an enquiry into the accident that occurred on take off to Beaver Aircraft VP-FAF on the 19th February, 1958, together with a copy of the record of evidence taken. I should add that both Lieutenant-Commander A.G. Cornabe, R.N. and Lieutenant J. G. Brigham, R.N. are experienced Fleet Air Arm pilots who are at present serving on H.M.S. Protector.

2. Steps have been taken to implement the recommendations made by the Officers holding the enquiry with regard to the tightening up of the documentation of maintenance and repairs.

GOVERNOR.

AGDT/MC

7.E.

Legislative Council, then in Select Committee on the Estimates, agreed that a new Blaine aircraft should be purchased, less floats which we already have and floats that were salvaged from the crashed plane. The cost is as follows:

Initial cost	\$17,324
Freight	1,640
Add 2 1/2% for incidental expenses	472
	<hr/>
	\$19,436.

A draft file to Sops requesting approval to issue a Special Demand is at bc. We asked for \$20,000 to be on the safe side.

11-21-58

RA

3-4-58

DECODE.

TELEGRAM SENT.

From GOVERNOR to SECRETARY OF STATE

Despatched: 8. 4. 58. Time: 1015. Received:..... Time:

NO. 51. Purchase of Beaver Aircraft.

The Legislature has agreed to the purchase of a new Beaver aircraft from Canada to replace the one that was lost in the recent accident reported in my telegram No. 32 of the 24th February.

2. I should be grateful for your approval to issue a Special Warrant for the year of account 1957/58 under Head 4, Special Expenditure, Purchase of Beaver Aircraft, £20,000.

New Beavers ordered from file 0270/3/11.

GOVERNOR.

~~Reply at 11.~~

Reply at 157 in 0270/3/11.

P/L: FH

Copy filed in 0270/3/11

85

See

We have read to Coyette the summary
of findings of the Board of Enquiry into
the accident to the Bears - a draft
C. N. is therefore o. f. c. at l. c.

8

86. 9/4/58.

Office
4/15

Some part of the words deleted in 77.

'filed at SIA.

10/15/58

10/14/58

DECODE.

TELEGRAM SENT.

From SECRETARY OF STATE to GOVERNOR

Despatched: 20.4.58. Time: 1900 Received: 21.4.58. Time: ~~09~~1000

is

No: 36. Your savingram Colony No: 37. Accident to Beaver seaplane.

at back
Cover.
No
#6.

I cannot trace 1951 Falkland Island Accident Regulations referred to. Are you perhaps referring to United Kingdom Regulations? If so, have these been legalised in the Falkland Islands?

SECEP.

GTC : PT

88

Reply at 90

22/4/58

Y.E.

¶ 87. The U.K. Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regs, 1951, have not been applied here but we use them as a procedure & guide for the Census enquiry.

Draft reply to S of S is submitted as bc.

A-13/5/58

89

21

13.5.58

13/5/58

DECODE.

TELEGRAM SENT.

From GOVERNOR to SECRETARY OF STATE

Despatched: 14. 5. 58. Time: 1100. Received: ::::: Time: :::::

8) No.76. Your telegram No.36. Accident to Beaver Seaplane.

15 Savingram No. 37. United Kingdom Regulations were referred to in my
They have not been applied to the Colony but
were used as a guide to procedure.

GOVERNOR.

GTC:FH

90

122

No. FIGAS/A.

It is requested that, in any reference to this memorandum the above number and date be quoted.

MEMORANDUM

91

29th. July, 19 70.

To: Acting Colonial Secretary,

From: Director of Civil Aviation,

PORT STANLEY.

Stanley, Falkland Islands.



ll
lu
30/7/70

SUBJECT :- Aircraft Incident.

I regret to inform you that VP-FAL, commanded by Mr. B.J.Conchie, struck a rock or reef whilst landing at NORTH ARM yesterday, July 28th. 1970.


2. The port float was extensively damaged and the starboard float received minor damage, full extent of damage can not be ascertained until the undercarriage has been removed and a complete "heavy landing" check carried out, this check is carried out to determine whether the shock load has been transmitted through the airframe and mainplane structures.

3. From a superficial inspection it is almost certain that the port float has been damaged beyond repair.

4. There were no passengers onboard the aircraft on landing at NORTH ARM, the pilot was not injured.

5. A further report will be made when the full extent of damage is known and whether an accident report to S.ofS. will be necessary.

Note: The aircraft returned to Stanley under its own power. L.C.


(J. KERR).
Director of Civil Aviation.


30/7/70
Pa

92

No. FIGAS/A.

MEMORANDUM

It is requested that, in any reference to this memorandum the above number and date should be quoted.



26th November, 1970.

TO: - Colonial Secretary,

From: Director of Civil Aviation,

PORT STANLEY.

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

SUBJECT: - Board of Survey - Aircraft Float.

I have to request that a board of survey be carried out on the float damaged at NORTH ARM on 28th July, 1970.

See 93

(J. KERR.)

Director of Civil Aviation.

s/c

Re. appoint SLE with R.J. Clarke

27.11.70

30th November 70

To: Mr E.C. Gutteridge, J.P.,

From: The Colonial Secretary,

STANLEYCopies to: Mr R.J. Clarke u.f.s. S/W
D.C.A.Board of Survey - Aircraft Float

I am to inform you that you have been appointed Chairman of a Board of Survey to inspect and submit recommendations regarding an aircraft float damaged at North Arm on the 28th July 1970.

2. You will be assisted by Mr R.J. Clarke of the Public Works Department.

(H.L. Bound)
for COLONIAL SECRETARY

reply 24

By 18.12.70.
(r)

No.

It is requested that, in any reference to this memorandum the above number and date should be quoted.

MEMORANDUM

94

15th December, 1970.


The Colonial Secretary,

Secretariat,

STANLEY.

Messrs. E.C. Gutteridge. R.J. Clarke.

Stanley, Falkland Islands.



SUBJECT:- Board of Survey-Aircraft Float.

We refer to your memorandum O270/U. dated 30th November, 1970. regarding the subject above and report accordingly;

Inspection.

Port "EDO" Float. Model 58-4580. The Float has suffered major damage in the area of the step. Other damage consistent with use is evident throughout the length of the Float. We understand the Service Manual damage category to be No.3. i.e. Major damage but repairable.

Factors to be considered.

The Float was manufactured in 1958. It arrived here having been refurbished, fitted to one of the two Beaver aircraft. It was therefore second hand. We understand that production of these floats had ceased at that time and new floats were not obtainable.

The previous cost for a refurbished pair of floats fitted with under carriage fitments was, 9,800 Canadian dollars.

The current Staff are qualified and able to repair affectively the damaged Float.

Replacement Staff may not necessarily be so qualified.

Costs of materials and specialist tooling that would be required to effect a repair are not known, but it can be said that they would be relatively small compared to a replacement float.

If the work is to be carried out locally it can only be done piecemeal and in consequence will take considerable time.

Observations.

With the above factors in mind we considered three alternatives, none are completely satisfactory.

(a) It is assumed that replacement staff will be able to effect satisfactory and acceptable repairs. Then to purchase the necessary materials and tooling as advised by the FIGAS. Engineers.

(b) The damaged Float is returned to Maker's for repair.

(c) An endeavour is made if funds are made available to obtain a single refurbished float.

93

2.

Recommendation

Subject to comment from D.C.A. we would recommend the adoption of our observation at (a) above, that is; That the necessary materials and tooling are purchased for the repair to be effected locally, on the assumption that the replacement staff are sufficiently qualified and skilled to carry out the repair.

Chairman *[Signature]*

Member. *R. J. Clarke.*

Tooling & parts required to repair damaged Float,
as advised by Mr K. Luke, FIGAS.

Tooling. One air drill. £38.

<u>Parts.</u>	<u>Part No.</u>
Bottom skin.	Sta. 9-11.
Bottom skin step.	Step to Sta.9.
Bottom skin.	Sta. 5 to step.
Bottom skin.	Forward Right Hand.
Bottom skin.	Forward Left Hand.
Keel bar.	
Keel shoe.	
Skeg.	
Step.	
Frame.	Sta-6.
Keelson	Forward 5 feet.
Keelson.	Aft 5 feet.

D.C.A.
To withdraw copy from b.c. pl.
and for your observations.

§ - C.S.
18.12.70.

C.S.

copy withdrawn.

To me there are only two alternatives, firstly return to D.H. for repair or secondly "write off" and purchase replacement; we can not assume that the next Eng. will be prepared to tackle the repair, let alone be able to do it.

Should a Civil licensed Eng. become available he would require a "B" endorsement to carry out this work.

[Signature]
E.C.A. 2/12/70.

97

D.C.A.

x | Please provide me with an estimate of the
cost of your two alternatives.

J. H. /

COL. SEC.

To provide anything of an accurate estimate
it will be necessary to seek the advice of D.H.
CANADA.

At B.C. I have attached a draft cable and
would be grateful if it could be dispatched to
BOHANNAND.

J.C.A. 27/1/71.

1/16

Please ask W Johnston of ESRO (which has
regular communications via its network with N. Amundsen)
if it would be possible for tel. at b.o.f. to be passed
through his net to De Havenlands, Canada.

J. H. /
1/23/71

0270/W 98

FFFF
RR LCHT
DE LALK 3119
27/1430Z
FM: JOHNSTON
TO: TELEPRINTER OPERATOR

CAN YOU PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING ON TELEX FROM COLONIAL SECRETARY. FULL ADDRESS IS DE HAVILLAND AIRCRAFT OF CANADA LTD DOWNSVIEW ONTARIO. REGRET DO NOT HAVE TELEX NUMBER HERE, BUT CABLE ADDRESS IS LFT NOTH TORONTO.

REQUEST COST EDO 58-4580 PORT FLOAT NEW OR RECONDITIONED ALSO REPAIR CHARGE COMPLETE REPLACEMENT BOTTOM SKINS KEELSONS STEP AND SKEG SHOE.

COLONIAL SECRETARY
STANLEY FALKLAND ISLANDS

27/1444Z JAN LALK

FFFF

D.E.A.

Have you received anything further on this, pl?

§

23.3.71.

20.3.71
By ~~16.3.71~~ (r)

C.S.O.

Nothing received to date

J.P.C.H. 24/3/71. By 24th Mar 71. (initials)

99.

D.C.A.

We have received nothing on this one.
Have you pl? If not, we will have to
send a chaser?

J J C.S.
29. 4. 71.

COH. SEC.

I have received no information
to date.

J. E.A.
29/4/71.

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SENT

PZ P4776/32/4013SI 500 11/66 R. Ward 843

Number	Office of Origin	Words	Handed in at	Date
	STANLEY			3.5.71
To	LTF MOTH TORONTO			HO A/C

Grateful early reply mytel 27th January reading quote request
 cost EDO 58-4580 port float new or reconditioned also repair
 charge complete replacement bottom skins keelsons step and skeg
 shoe unquote

COLONIAL SECRETARY

Time

JE

by 17.5.71 (r)

TELEGRAM.

From R. MONTGOMERY BOTH 3761

To COLONIAL SECRETARY PORT STANLEY

Despatched :	12th May	19 71	Time : 2304
Received :	13th May	19 71	Time : 1156

Attention Colonial Secretary ref your tel P/N 58-4580 standard beaver floats not available. Following are applicable parts bottom skins keelsons step and skeg shoe:-

P/N		U/P	Dollars
58-A-137	bottom skin	LH	108.80
58-A-146	bottom skin	STA5	104.58
58-A-159	bottom skin	STA9	81.52
58-A-134	bottom skin	STA9-11	66.50
58-K-205	sister keelson	fwd	60.83
58-K-200	sister keelson	fwd	55.26
58-K-206	sister keelson	aft	44.95
58-K-201	sister keelson	aft	42.64
58-B-110	step		57.06
58-K-020-901	keel shoe and skeg	assy	75.79

All available from stock except 58-A-146 subject prior sales

R. MONTGOMERY BOTH 3761

PL: JE

Copy to D.C.A.

Ag. D.C.A.

To see from 94 pt.

What is the present position?

Can you now reply to x/ on 97?

Pl. withdraw your copy of 101.

C.S.
13.5.71.

copy 101 withdrawn

Thank you

[Signature]
18/5/71

C.S.

From 94, I have spoken to the Ag. D.C.A. about this. The damaged float is being repaired here (the job is about 2/3rds completed).

A.f.a. in that connection? However, in doing this work, stocks of certain repairs

material have been largely exhausted, and it will be for the mechanics through the D.C.A. to place an indent (J&L at 101 provides useful information for estimating the cost).

§
19.5.71.

Ag. Acc. M.D.

∴ The volume 2 can be done the better so as to enable us to reply to tel. p. 101

Ag. D.C.A.,

to note recent minutes on this file pt. and arrange for action to be taken as indicated.

§
f.c.s.
20.5.71.

noted Charbon, is an awaiting a list of spaces needed from mechanics

fcc 25/5/71.

By: 15.6.71. (KIV)

lit