

SECRETARIAT.

TRN/AVA/1 # 3

279w

No. 0270/W.

Subject.

FAKLAND ISLANDS GOVERNMENT AIR SERVICE.

ACCIDENT TO BEAVER AIRCRAFT VFFAH No. 1129.

1

Aircraft Accident Fitzroy 9/8/60.

I have discussed this with H. E.

in 1586/A Mr. Kerr will have to send a report in accordance with regulations 4 and 5 of page 375.

H. E. will have to appoint an Inspector in terms of section 7.

There appears to be no opportunity of obtaining the services of anybody with sufficient technical knowledge and it is useless to wait till the Protector comes. A non technical officer will probably have to be appointed to get what information he can from the evidence.

It is not urgent to press Mr. Kerr for his report as H. E. considers that he will have no facilities for making one now. We can wait till he comes back.

It is no use informing Crown Agents as we are definitely not insured against accidents while taxiing.

No need to inform S. of S.

B. U. on Monday.

(Intld) D.M.
11.8.60.

Ru 15/8/60.

RHDM/FH

COPY

10th August, 1960.

Public Notice.

Beaver Alpha Hotel was damaged while taxi-ing prior to take-off at Fitzroy yesterday. She sustained extensive damage to the floats and under-carriage, and the propeller was also damaged. No one was hurt.

Arrangements have been made for the 'Philomel' to go to Fitzroy, where the staff of the Air Service Department are at present engaged in dismantling the plane for loading in the 'Philomel'. It is hoped, but this is by no means certain, that it will be found possible to repair her in Stanley; and if she is to be repaired here various parts will have to be obtained from Canada.

Beaver Alpha Echo is ready for assembly after her Certificate of Airworthiness, but there will be no flying for the next three weeks. A further announcement will be made later.

Air Service Announcement.

9th August, 1960.

The Beaver Aircraft met with an accident while taxi-ing on the water at Fitzroy this afternoon.

Considerable damage was sustained but no one was hurt.

A further announcement will be made as soon as possible after the aircraft has been inspected by Falkland Islands Government Air Service engineers.

B.u. 18/8/60.

H. C. S.

I had a look at the wrecked Beaver yesterday. The fuselage is extensively damaged and cannot be repaired here. It would be an expensive business to send it to Canada for repair, and it will probably pay us to get a new one. All that is required is a shell, for all the various fittings are available here. The problem is whether we can get just the bare shell, for on the assembly-line other fittings are probably incorporated in the fuselage as it is assembled. We shall have to enquire about this, and the Air Department will be putting up a telegram to go to de Havilland's in Canada in a day or two.

TH.
Jm.

16th August 1960

Sm. 18/8/60.



Aviation Department,

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

15th August, 1960.

Aircraft Accident.


Sir,

I have the honour to report an aircraft accident in accordance with the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1959, Paragraph 5, sub-para. (2)

- (a) Beaver Seaplane, Falkland Islands, VP-FAH,
- (b) Owner, Falkland Islands Government.
- (c) In command, James Kerr.
- (d) Date, 9th August, 1960, Time: 16.20. L.M.T.
- (e) Departing Fitzroy bound for Stanley.
- (f) Position, Shell Point, South side of Fitzroy inner harbour.
- (g) No injuries sustained by passengers or crew.
- (h) Taxying Accident, aircraft grounded whilst taxying prior to take off.
- (i) Extensive damage to landing gear, propellor and airframe. Engine & engine mount shock loaded. Main-Planes and control undamaged.

2. A further report of the circumstances leading up to this accident will be submitted immediately.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,


Director of Civil Aviation,

The Honourable,
The Colonial Secretary,
STANLEY.

J.E.

The report of the accident has now come in - see
4 and an Inspector has to be appointed under
section 7 of the regulations. The regulations
are at page 377. 375 - 379 - flagged. in 1986/A

The Inspector will presumably have to go almost
entirely on evidence of the Pilot & mechanics and I
do not think it likely that there will readily be any evidence
to show what really happened.

There seems to be an idea in some quarters that,
whether or not it contributed to the accident the Pilot
had had too long a day.

However I think it will only be necessary to
refer to Inquiry to the provisions of the regulations
✓ defining his hours and duties and to the
report on the previous accident at page 81 in
0270/V which shows that ~~that~~ will show
him how the inquiry could be conducted and
what witnesses could be examined.

5.

17/7/60.

6
17.8.60.

HCS

7

An Inspector would normally be someone with
considerable flying experience. We have no one
with these qualifications. In the circumstances
we need someone who can get the facts
down clearly, and with experience of taking
evidence. I think Mr Harold Bennett is
the man.

RA. 17.8.60.



J. Kerr,

Director of Civil Aviation,
Stanley.

15th. August, 1960.

Accident Report.

Sir,

I have the honour to report, that whilst pilot in charge of Beaver VP-FAH, on tuesday 9th. August at approximately 16.20 hrs I was involved in a taxiing accident, the aircraft being run aground on Shell Point on the South side of Fitzroy inner harbour.

2. Having cleared moorings at Fitzroy I commenced taxiing to the position where my take off run would have begun, this entailed a turn through 180 degrees to Port, turning direction being without option owing to wind direction which was North Westerly. The aircraft turned normally until almost completely heading downwind, at this point I entered a Kelp bed which slowed my rate of turn as the water rudders were being lifted out of the water by the Kelp, to overcome this I increased power in an endeavour to complete the turn using my air rudder as there was insufficient manoeuvring space to Starboard to permit the aircraft to return head to wind. The power increase did not have the desired effect of turning the aircraft, only checking the tendency to swing to Starboard, it was then obvious that I would run aground. My immediate action was then to close the throttle, switch off engine and hold the aircraft tail down to reduce speed before impact.


3. My next action was to abandon the aircraft as quickly as possible, this was carried out without panic and all passengers transferred to the Fitzroy motor-boat which came immediately to my assistance. No injuries were suffered by the passengers.

4. On being landed on Fitzroy jetty I requested Doctor Slessor to report the accident to His Excellency the Governor and the Air Service engineers. I then returned to the aircraft and with the help of Fitzroy personnel I lashed the aircraft down pending the arrival of the engineers.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your Obedient Servant,


Director of Civil Aviation.

The Honourable,
The Colonial Secretary,
STANLEY.

See 4-16
5
18/8/60

News Bulletin
19/8/60

9

Secretariat News Item

Beaver Alpha Hotel which was damaged while taxi-ing prior to take-off at Fitzroy on 9th August was successfully dismantled and loaded on the "Philomel". The "Philomel" arrived safely at Stanley with the dismantled aircraft at noon on Sunday the 14th August. Inspection has shown the damage to be extensive and it is probable that we shall have to obtain from Canada an entire new fuselage though no internal fittings such as instruments, controls, seats, etc. will be required.

In accordance with the law a statutory enquiry will be held.

It is hoped that ~~if all goes well~~ Beaver Alpha Echo will be ready for airtesting in approximately 3 weeks.

RHDM/FH

Y-E.

Attachment of Inquiry for
signature please.

10

The telegram to Canada has just come up
or I might you might like to see it

J
19/3

~~St~~

19.5.60

19th August, 60.

Sir,

12 I am directed to transmit to you a letter of appointment as Inquirer into the causes and circumstances of an accident which occurred to Beaver seaplane VP-FAH on 9th August, 1960, at Shell Point in Fitzroy Inner Harbour.

2. I would refer you to the Gazette Notice No.18A of 30th March, 1958, published in the Gazette of 1st April, 1958, relating to an enquiry held into an accident that occurred on 19th February, 1958.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd) R.H.D. Manders.

for COLONIAL SECRETARY

The Honourable

H. Bennett, J.P.,

STANLEY.

BY HIS EXCELLENCY SIR EDWIN ARROWSMITH

Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the Colony of the Falkland Islands and its Dependencies.

(L. S.)

(Sgd) E. P. Arrowsmith.

GOVERNOR

To HAROLD BENNETT, J.P.

By virtue of the powers vested in me by Section 7 (1) of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1959, I, SIR EDWIN ARROWSMITH, Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the Colony of the Falkland Islands and its Dependencies, do hereby appoint you HAROLD BENNETT, J.P., to be an Inspector for the purpose of carrying out investigations into the causes and circumstances of an accident which occurred to Beaver seaplane VP-FAM on 9th August, 1960, at Shell Point in Fitzroy Inner Harbour.

You should carry out your investigations in the manner prescribed by the said regulations and report to me in terms of regulation 9.

Given under my hand and the Public Seal of the Colony this 20th day of August, 1960.

By His Excellency's Command,

(Sgd) R. H. D. Manders.

COLONIAL SECRETARY

H.C.S.

I enclose copies of letters I am sending to Members of Ex.Co. and Leg.Co. about the Beaver, in order to keep them in the picture. When we hear from Canada it will be necessary to obtain the approval of Standing Finance Committee for the expenditure that will be involved.

Since you have not met all the Members of Leg.Co., I thought it might be easier if I were to write in the first instance, but you will be able to take it up with them when a reply is received.

I had a look at the parts in the hangar this morning, and I think it would be a good idea if you were to take Goss along there, so he can see the damage for himself. You can explain the position to him verbally, and so I have not written him a letter.

19th August 1960

14

SA

Telegram to

I will speak to Mr. Goss

8th 20/8/60

19th August 1960

SIMILAR LETTER SENT TO
THE HON. T.A. GILBERT, J.P.

Dear _____

I am sure you are anxious to know the position regarding the Beaver. All the various bits are now spread out in the hangar, and we have been able to see the real extent of the damage. The floats and struts connecting them to the fuselage, are a write-off, and the fuselage is damaged to such an extent that it is quite impossible to repair it locally. The engine sustained a shock load, and although it appears all right from the outside, a piece of metal came out when the engine was drained, and this points to some internal damage. It will have to be stripped down completely in Canada. The propeller is badly bent, and is a write-off. The wings and tail assembly are, however, undamaged.

Although the fuselage would be repairable in Canada, by the time it has been shipped there and repaired and returned, we think the cost would probably be almost as much as buying a new one. Smith and Jones can assemble an aircraft with the parts we have here if we obtain a bare fuselage with electric wiring installed, but this will, of course, take a long time. We are sending off a telegram to Canada, enquiring about the cost of a fuselage and delivery dates, and as soon as we have definite news, I shall let you know.

I have, of course, in mind what might be said if we were unfortunate enough to have a crash with the rebuilt aircraft, but Jim Kerr is completely confident of the ability of Smith and Jones to do the job, and

The Hon. N.E. Cameron, C.B.E., J.P.

./...

he believes the aircraft would be every bit as air-worthy as a new one imported complete from the factory.

We are having an enquiry in accordance with the Law, but we have, of course, no one with the technical experience of an Inspector of Accidents in somewhere like the U.K., and it will really be only a question of taking statements on the accident. It was, I fear, just one of those unfortunate occurrences which are liable to happen in our local conditions.

Yours sincerely,

Signed Edwin Arrowsmith

17

19th August 1960

Similar letter sent to:

The Hon. A.B. Monk, J.P.

Dear —

I am sure you are anxious to know the position regarding the Beaver. All the various bits are now spread out in the hangar, and we have been able to see the real extent of the damage. The floats and struts connecting them to the fuselage, are a write-off, and the fuselage is damaged to such an extent that it is quite impossible to repair it locally. The engine sustained a shock load, and although it appears all right from the outside, a piece of metal came out when the engine was drained, and this points to some internal damage. It will have to be stripped down completely in Canada. The propeller is badly bent, and is a write-off. The wings and tail assembly are, however, undamaged.

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Jim Kerr is completely confident of the ability of Smith and Jones to do the job, and he believes the aircraft would be every bit as air-worthy as a new one imported complete from the factory.

The Hon. G.C. Bonner, J.P.

Reply at 31.

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18

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Yours sincerely,

Signed Edwin Arrowsmith

19th August 1960

My dear Jim,

I am most grateful to you and your people at Fitzroy for all your help over the Beaver accident. The weather really could not have been worse at the time, and working conditions must have been extremely unpleasant.

You saw for yourself most of the damage, and I am afraid it is going to be a very long time before we have two aircraft flying again. We have had a good look at the fuselage, and quite definitely it cannot be repaired here. No doubt it would be repairable in Canada, but the cost of shipping it away and getting it back, might well be as much as the cost of a new fuselage. The wings and tail assembly are quite all right, but we are afraid the engine may be rather more damaged than appears from the outside. It will have to be sent away to be stripped down completely.

Maurice Smith and Dave Jones say that they can build an aircraft if we receive just the bare fuselage. This will, of course, take time, but we anticipate there will be a great difference in cost between a bare fuselage and one completely fitted out with instruments etc. The bare fuselage would, however, include electric wiring, for this is always rather tricky.

We will shortly be sending a telegram to Canada to get the necessary quotations, and as soon as a reply is received, we will let you and other Members of Council know what the position is.

*Yours sincerely
Signed Edwin Arrow mill*

Reply at '33

Hon. J.T. Clement

20

P.S.

I have, of course, in mind that might be said if we were unfortunate enough to have a crash with the rebuilt aircraft, but Jim Hory is completely confident of the ability of Smith and Jones to do the job, and he believes the aircraft would be every bit as air-worthy as a new one imported complete from the factory.

*There is a lot for
that*

21

GOVERNMENT TELEGRAPH SERVICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SENT

Number

Office of Origin

Words

Handed in at

Date

20.8.60.

To

GALDER MOTH TORONTO

(N.O. A/C)

BEAVER AIRCRAFT NO 1129 BADLY DAMAGED IN TAXIING ACCIDENT
 STOP PLEASE QUOTE FOR FOLLOWING (1) STRUCTURE ASSY FUSELAGE
 C2-F3-1A LESS CABIN FLOOR INST DOOR INSTS AND WINDSCREEN INST
 C2-FC-161A PLUS CABIN ROOF WIRING C2-N-2417A LOWER REAR FUSELAGE
 WIRING C2-N-1383A AND ALL FRONT FUSELAGE WIRING BUT NOT PANELS
 AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT STOP (2) FUSELAGE ASSY COMPLETE C2-F-1A
 LESS SEATS AND DOORS STOP PLEASE ADVISE DELIVERY TIME FROM
 DATE OF PLACING FIRM ORDER

Time

JK/IM

SECRETARY

Copy sent to A. H. [Signature]
 Reply at 2 [Signature]

0270/W. QR
PUBLIC NOTICE.

Enquiry into accident to Beaver Aircraft.

It is hereby notified that an enquiry in private into the recent accident to the Beaver Aircraft will begin on Tuesday, the 30th August, 1960, in the Council Chamber, Stanley,

Any person who may desire to make representations concerning the circumstances or cause of the accident may do so in writing to the Colonial Secretary on or before Monday, the 29th August, 1960.

Colonial Secretary's Office,
Stanley, Falkland Islands.

25th August, 1960.

DRM/IM.

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From DeHavilland, Toronto.

To Colonial Secretary, Stanley.

Despatched : 26th August, 1960. Time : 1304.

Received : 27th August, 1960. Time : 0930.

21 Re telegram 20th.

Fuselage as per specification (2) packed at Toronto 18878 Canadian dollars delivery twelve weeks. Specification (1) more expensive and longer delivery.

DeHavilland.

Copy to D.C.A.

Sent [Signature]

P/L : IM

Reply at 2 on 1/23/60. See 25.

On 11/9/61 I discussed with the D.C.A. and the two engineers the question of action to be taken with regard to the damage to the Beaver aircraft. The most difficult question arose as a result of the fuselage having been damaged externally leaving the instruments and fittings intact. The following possibilities were discussed - firstly at one extreme it had been suggested that it might be advisable to purchase a new aircraft, it was suggested that the life of an aircraft was the life of its oldest part and that therefore it would be uneconomical to buy new parts at great expense to fit to what was left of our existing aircraft. The main considerations that apply in considering all the alternatives are -

- (1) the money aspect; and
- (2) the time factor.

As regards to the time factor the new aircraft would, it was estimated probably be ready in about twelve weeks, i.e. if the decision was taken in the middle of September it would be ready for delivery about the middle of December and would probably arrive in the Falklands in three months though perhaps less, i.e. about the middle of March and would probably be assembled ready for flight about the end of March. As regards the money side, however, it would cost twice as much as getting a new fuselage, i.e. about £24,000 as opposed to about £12,000. Furthermore the arguments about the life of the aircraft were not considered appropriate since any parts that become too old can always be replaced. The most important part of our existing aircraft were the planes which were only two years old and would last us for a long time more. If a whole new aircraft was obtained we would be left with a very large number of spares which we could never expect to use. The purchase of a new aircraft therefore to replace the old one would be very expensive and uneconomic. At the other extreme we considered the possibility of sending our fuselage to Toronto to be repaired, no estimate had been obtained for this but it was thought probable that by the time we had paid for freight to Toronto and back there would be very little saving in adopting this method. The time factor was obviously very much against it as it would probably delay the whole thing by another three months or so. It was therefore clear that the choice lay between the following two alternatives -

- (1) to obtain a new shell for the fuselage and fit it out here; or
- (2) to obtain a whole new fuselage

(and these expressions are not technically accurate but they roughly express the alternatives.) An estimate for a new fuselage had been sent it was \$18,378 ~~for the shell~~ for the shell the amount was \$15,950 which would represent a saving of \$3,000 or a little over £1,000 but, if we obtained a whole new fuselage we would be left with the instruments etc. from our own fuselage which could be used as spares. It was impossible to estimate what the value of these spares would be at all accurately, many of them were quite valuable and conceivably an occasion might arise in which some of them could be used but it was unlikely. On the other hand there were quite a lot of less valuable instruments which probably would be quite useful as spares. It was thought that one might roughly put down the value of the spares at \$1,000 to us which would bring the saving down to \$2,000. The great objection to adopting this proposal was the time factor, as in the case of the complete fuselage we could expect the shell to arrive about the middle of March, but as opposed to the period of three weeks which was estimated for assembling the fuselage the period for re-constructing the aircraft out of the shell could not be determined but it was said definitely that it would be a question not of weeks but of months.

(consideration)

2. Mr. Jones is going on leave in May so there would be one engineer working single handed. It might perhaps be estimated that it would take about six months to have the aircraft serviceable again. If this period were long exceeded we should be brought to the 15th September, when the other aircraft would again have to be overhauled so that in that case we would be left for a time without any aircraft. It must be admitted that during the six months or so between April when the aircraft would be ready if the complete fuselage was imported and August or September when we might expect it to be ready if the shell was imported, there would only be one pilot so that there could only be one flight at a time, but we should of course be in danger that if anything happened to the other aircraft during the whole of that period we would have nothing to replace it, and apart from that it was pointed out that it is always better to have a spare aircraft so that any repairs can be carried out without detracting from flying time. Taking all these things into consideration it was thought that the saving in money would not justify the extra time that would be taken if we imported only the shell, and we recommend that a new fuselage be ordered without delay.

3. As regards other parts of the aircraft, the floats have been damaged, one, it is thought, beyond repair and the other certainly cannot be repaired here; there is a pair of spare floats but they too have been damaged. It is always advisable to have a pair of spare floats, it was therefore thought better to order a new pair of floats now and when the others are repaired to keep them as spares. As regards the engine it was pointed out that the firm had previously made us a very good offer namely, that, if an engine required repairing they would send us a new one and take back ours that required repairing and allow us for it. No doubt was expressed about them giving us a fair price and this would be a great saving in time rather than sending our engine back and waiting for it to be repaired and sent out. As regards to the propellor there were two spare propellers, but it was thought best always to keep two spares, and that it would be reasonable to order another propellor now, and putting the cost down to the accident. A rough estimate of the cost is as follows:-

Fuselage	£6,664	
Floats	3,000	
New engine	3,500	(of which, however, a good portion ought subsequently to be recovered which could be credited to the fund).
Propellor	300	
Freight	about 900	

in other words the total gross cost would be just over £14,000 some of this should be recoverable. There is the sum of nearly £17,000 in the replacement fund and it is suggested that the cost should be met from this.

5th September, 1960
DM/MF

27

J.S. Herewith the notes of the discussion about the Aircraft.

Shall I now have his words into embodied in an Ex Co memo? (I suppose we can not place a firm order till after the meeting? We await a reply to ? in the interim file.

6/9/60

H.C.S.

Thank you for your full report in 25 and 26. I think the course suggested is the wisest one, and we should now go ahead and order the fuselage, floats and new engine. I feel that if we delay until Ex. Co. meets, we might lose the opportunity of getting the fuselage as quickly as possible, and I have little doubt that we shall receive backing from both Councils for the course we propose.

As far as the propeller goes, I understand that there are two new propellers in stock, and the D.C.A. thinks it unnecessary to order a new one at this stage.

7th September 1960

PA or

Copy in I/231/60

29

File for...
on Engine...
13.9.60

G.G. Report of enquiry for information. I have another copy. Page 25 deals with the appointment of the enquiry - Paragraphs 377 of the other file.

? 9 Paragraph 10? Considerable further action by you but in this case I imagine that I should take up with DCA no suggestions about not landing in difficult weather, heavy boats etc as that such part of the enquiry need not be published. I have not yet gone into it in great detail as the report is by you and I do not want to hold it back.

or

12/9/60

H.C.S.

Mr. Bennett conducted the enquiry ably.

I think the only part of the Inspector's Report which need be made public, is the conclusion reached in paragraph 8.

Please go into the recommendations with the D.C.A. as you suggest. I think it would be correct to say that our pilots do not attempt to land or take-off in adverse conditions, but there are frequently marginal conditions which are difficult to judge. The weather may also change at a place while the plane is on its way there. A power boat in attendance at difficult landing places would be a help, provided the man in charge of the boat realises that aircraft can be very easily damaged.

I agree that everything possible should be done to see that passengers' seat belts are securely fastened. Some passengers are rather clumsy with their fastenings, and do not quite understand how they work, but probably if the pilot is too engaged to see about these himself, one of the more experienced passengers would always be ready to lend a hand.

12th September 1960



SAN CARLOS SHEEP FARMING CO. LTD.

(Successors to JOHN BONNER. GEORGE BONNER & CO. LTD.)

FOUNDED 1861

SAN CARLOS.

FALKLAND ISLANDS. (VIA MONTEVIDEO)

26th August 1960.

PRIVATE.

Dear Sir Edwin,

17
Thank you for your letter of the 19th. It was kind of you to write to let me know of the latest position regarding the damaged aircraft. I was extremely sorry to hear of the accident and thankful that no one was hurt. It was bad luck for Mr Manders - not a very propitious beginning to his experiences of travel in the Colony.

It was good news to hear that something can be ~~salvaged~~^{salved} from the wreck, and that it all has not to be written off. I shall be interested to hear future developments. The final decision as to what action is to be taken will I imagine be considered at the Council Meetings later this year.

Though I have no doubt of the competence of our Air Service staff to reassemble a completely airworthy machine from what parts are still usable and new components, I would be interested to know what De Havilland's estimate of the safe working life of such a composite aircraft would be. I am a complete layman as far as such matters are concerned but often the age of a machine is governed by the age of its oldest part.

I think I am right in stating our remaining aircraft is now six years' old and will presumably have to be renewed before long. With our present straitened economy, the purchase of the necessary spares to make the damaged aircraft serviceable will be a heavy drain on and considerably deplete the aircraft reserve fund. Before this money is spent therefore, I feel that we should be sure this is the best course to take, as opposed to purchasing a complete new aircraft. If the final difference in cost will not be considerable I think that this possibility should be seriously considered.

./..

It has crossed my mind also that with these taxation revisions under review and the possibility of additional revenue, it might be as well to await ordering a replacement or necessary parts, until there is more money available.

All these arguments are at best hypothetical, it may well be that the the cost of rebuilding our damaged aircraft and purchasing a complete new one do not bear comparison. Also Government may have plans to meet this extra expenditure from revenue already assured. I shall await future developments and information with interest. The Air Service, being an amenity which has special significance for the 'Camp', has, ofcourse, my especial interest. This question of financing the replacement of our damaged machine has been giving me much thought. That is why I feel that the limited funds at our disposal should be spent in the most expeditious fashion.

I hope that you do not mind my expressing my views fully but thought that they might be of interest to you.

Marguerite and I hope that you and Lady Arrowsmith will be able to spare the time to come to see us sometime this Spring or Summer.

With Best Regards from Us Both,

Yours Sincerely.

Christopher Bonner.

Fitzroy
August 29th. 1960

Dear Sir Edwin,

19.

Thank you for your letter of August 19th.

I have passed on your words of thanks to the people who helped. I am most thankful no one was hurt. We always will have these taxi-ing mishaps and the more the aircraft are in use the more likely it is to happen. It occurred to me that we may have to watch these long days when there is only one pilot on duty. There is no doubt that a man who has been flying on this type of "Bush Pilot" stuff has to put a lot into it, it is mostly take off and landings, both, as you well know, the most dangerous moments in flying. If he has not been able to stop for a decent meal at mid- day and relax for an hour then he is more likely to be accident - prone at the end of a long flight

We found when handling fast launches for long hours and making frequent approaches to flying boats, always an undertaking to be done with accuracy, that the accidents ~~take~~ generally occurred in the afternoon or evening when the coxswain was beginning to tire. There may be complaints from the public if the longer flights are curtailed while we have only one pilot but I am sure we will have a bad accident if we do not .

I hasten to add these are entirely my own conclusions and were not arrived at after conversation with Kerr. In fact I dont think I mentioned anything of this in our talks.

I think your ideas for rebuilding Alpha Hotel are probably the best under the circumstances. If the aircraft can be given a certificate of airworthiness and the pilot is confident of the machine then I ~~can~~ feel we can put her into the air again without any qualms.

Yours

Sincerely
F. Clement

Pebble Island 34
West Falkland.

6th Sept 1960

Dear Governor.

boat
17

Thank you very much
for your letter regarding the Beane accident.
I was very interested in what you had to
say. I suppose the result of an official
enquiry will be made public in due course,
I certainly hope so. There is no doubt
that everybody is very interested in the accident:
both in the cause and, what exactly happened.
There is also no doubt that there are a lot
of rumours flying about as to the cause, I think
it would be a very good thing if a formal
Statement could be issued as soon as possible,
which would deny or support the rumours which
are in circulation not complimentary to the Tin Can.
I hope

when the weather improves we shall have the
pleasure of a visit from you and Lady, Aurora and Mick.

With kind regards

Yours sincerely,

Colin Mack

Stanley, Falkland Islands.
9th September, 1960.

Sir,

Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1959.

1. I have the honour to submit the following report on the investigation into the circumstances and cause of the accident to Beaver Seaplane VP-FAH whilst taxiing on Fitzroy Harbour, Falkland Islands, on the 9th August, 1960.

2. In accordance with the provisions of regulation 7(3) of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1959, a public notice was published stating that an investigation was to be held and inviting any person who desired to make representation concerning the accident to do so in writing on or before the 29th August, 1960. No such representations were made.

3. The investigation was commenced on the 30th August, 1960, and statements were taken from the following witnesses:

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Mr. James Kerr | Director of Civil Aviation and Pilot. |
| The Hon. R.H.D. Manders | } Passengers in the aircraft. |
| The Hon. R.S. Slessor | |
| Mrs. Linda Street | |
| Mrs. W.B. Jeffery | |

and on the 2nd September, 1960, a statement was taken from Mr. M. Smith, Senior Engineer, Falkland Islands Government Air Service.

4. I visited the hangar and inspected the damaged Beaver Seaplane VP-FAH.

5. The following relevant documents were called for, inspected and found, with one exception, to the best of my knowledge correct and in good order:

- (a) Certificate of Airworthiness of De Haviland Beaver Seaplane, Serial No. 1129, Registration No. VP-FAH dated the 21st October, 1959, valid until 20th October, 1960. (Issued under the authority of the Colonial Air Navigation Order, 1949, which had been revoked some five years previous to the date of issue of the certificate.)
- (b) Weight and balance report.
- (c) Aircraft journey Log Book.
- (d) Certificate of Registration of the above aircraft dated 18th August, 1958.
- (e) Pilot's Commercial Licence No. 5 (Falkland Islands) valid to 7th January, 1961, endorsed for Tiger Moth, Auster Variant, landplanes, and DH(C) (2) Beaver Seaplane in the name of James Kerr.
- (f) Certificate of Maintenance No. 179 issued by Mr. M. Smith valid for a period of 7 days or 10 flying hours from 09.00 (L.M.T.) on the 9th August, 1960.

6. On Tuesday the 9th August, 1960, at 09.55 (L.M.T.) Beaver aircraft VP-FAH took off from Port Stanley and subsequently landed and took off, in the following sequence, at Darwin, Roy Cove, Beaver Island, New Island, Beaver Island, Port Stephens,

Fox Bay/

Fox Bay and Darwin and landed at Fitzroy at 16.10 (L.M.T.) without incident. Shortly after 16.10 (L.M.T.) preparatory to taking off the aircraft slipped moorings at Fitzroy and due to the direction of a moderate and gusty (approximately North-westerly) wind, was compelled to taxi through 180° to port in the rather confined kelp free area of Fitzroy Harbour, in order to take up position for the take-off run from outside the harbour entrance. On coming abeam of the wind the rate of turn slowed down, the aircraft drifted into a kelp patch, the kelp fouled the water rudders causing them to lift out of the water with loss of directional control resulting in the aircraft turning to starboard, by which time the aircraft was very close to the beach. The pilot increased power hoping that the torque reaction of the propeller would assist in turning the aircraft to port as it was then obvious that the aircraft would otherwise ground. The increase in power did not produce the desired turning effect, the aircraft consequently struck the rocky beach whilst travelling at an estimated speed of 15 knots, and was extensively damaged. The pilot and all passengers escaped uninjured.

7. I am satisfied that the pilot complied with the provisions of regulations 4 and 5 of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1959, which relate to the notification of accidents.

8. After hearing the evidence of the above named witnesses I formed the opinion that the accident can only be attributed to kelp fouling the water rudders aggravated by a gusty wind which rendered the aircraft difficult to control. It is also my opinion that the pilot cannot be held responsible for the accident.

9. In my view aircraft should not attempt to land or take-off in confined areas such as Fitzroy Harbour unless the pilot satisfies himself that the weather conditions prevailing at the time are suitable for manoeuvring the aircraft without any likelihood of damage to the aircraft or injury to passengers.

10. It would appear from the evidence that there is some lack of safety precautions in as much that the aircraft is not attended by a boat on taking off and landing. The accident might have been avoided had a powered boat been in attendance on the aircraft while manoeuvring prior to take-off. I would recommend that a powered boat (if available) should be present when the aircraft is taking off or landing whenever practicable.

11. I would further recommend that it is desirable that the pilot take reasonable steps before the commencement of a flight to ensure that all safety belts have been correctly fastened and that passengers have been made aware of their method of operation.

Regulations for the purpose of ensuring the safety of passengers have not been made under article 33(2)(a) of the Colonial Air Navigation Order, 1955, but in the absence of local regulations, I think article 28 of the (United Kingdom) Air Navigation Order, 1960, (which relates to the duties of the commander of an aircraft) should be followed as far as practicable.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant

H. Bennett

Inspector.

The Honourable
The Colonial Secretary,
Stanley.

Extracted

do

0 2-70/44

On the 9th August, 1960, I departed from Stanley at 09.55 (L.M.T.) in command of Beaver Seaplane, registration VP-FAH for the purpose of carrying passengers, freight and mails on the route as detailed on the certified true copy of the load sheet compiled for that particular flight (load sheet produced and marked "A"). At 16.10 (L.M.T.) I arrived at Fitzroy, picked up moorings and embarked Mrs. Jeffery and two children, who were bound for Stanley. The passenger complement on the aircraft after loading at Fitzroy was Mrs. Street from Port Stephens, Mrs. Jeffery and two children from Fitzroy, Dr. R.S. Slessor, Senior Medical Officer, and the Hon. R.H.D. Manders, Colonial Secretary. On slipping moorings at Fitzroy I turned slightly to starboard for the purpose of avoiding fouling the mooring and also to give me a larger area of clear water to complete a turn through 180° to port. On coming abeam of the wind the rate of turn slowed down but the aircraft continued to turn. Before completing the 180° turn the aircraft entered a kelp patch which fouled the water rudders by causing them to retract which in turn caused the aircraft to try to turn in the opposite direction (starboard). This condition was aggravated by the presence of a moderate wind on the starboard quarter. As there was insufficient manoeuvring area to starboard an attempt had to be made to continue turning left. I applied more power to increase the air-flow over the air-rudder to assist in completing my left-hand turn. This increase of power had the desired effect, but through a larger turning arc. At this point the aircraft again swung to starboard and was then so close to the beach that it was then impossible to steer away from the beach. I immediately closed the throttle, switched the engine off and pulled the control column to reduce speed as much as possible before grounding. On the aircraft coming to rest I released the co-pilot's door and requested the Colonial Secretary to abandon the aircraft. I then attempted to open the starboard cabin door but this was impossible. I then went to the port door which was on the low side of the aircraft and with the assistance of Dr. Slessor the remaining passengers were brought out of the aircraft and transferred to the Fitzroy motor-boat which had come to our assistance. No injuries were sustained by any person on board. I carried out an immediate inspection of the damage and formed the opinion that an on-site repair would be impossible. The port float had received extensive damage. All undercarriage struts were fractured or badly bent. The propeller blades were bent and the fuselage damaged on the under-surface and the skinning holed.

- Q. What was the condition of the beach at the point of impact ?
- A. It was a steep rocky beach, and the type of beach which provides fairly deep water close inshore.
- Q. Why did you not drift to the harbour entrance ?
- A. Because there was a jetty within 50 yards of my tail onto which I would have drifted.
- Q. Why did you not turn to starboard when you slipped moorings ?
- A. Because there was insufficient manoeuvring space to complete a turn in that direction, and also because the turning arc of the aircraft is larger to starboard due to the torque reaction of the engine.
- Q. At what speed would you say the aircraft was travelling at the time of impact ?
- A. At about 15 knots.

Q. Why did you not turn the aircraft to starboard when steering became difficult ?

A. By this time the aircraft would have had to turn back through an arc of approximately 150° and this would not have been possible owing to a headland being close on my starboard beam.

Q. Had you not increased power, what would have happened ?

A. The aircraft would have still gone aground on a rocky beach and this was what I was endeavouring to prevent.

Q. Is it normal to increase power to assist in turning ?

A. Yes, when turning to port.

Q. Why ?

A. The direction of rotation of the engine assists the turn and also the increased air-flow over the air-rudder.

Q. Was the tide high or low at the time of the accident ?

A. The tide was fairly high - about an hour from high tide.

Q. Where did you take-off before Fitzroy ?

A. Goose Green.

Q. How long did that flight take ?

A. 20 minutes - the normal time.

Q. Did the aircraft behave normally on that flight ?

A. Quite normally.

Q. Would you say the conditions were normal for flying ?

A. The wind had been fairly fresh during the day but at that time of the evening it appeared to be slackening. Violent turbulence was experienced during the earlier part of the flight.

Q. Do you consider that the steering gear was serviceable at that time ?

A. I have no doubts about the serviceability of the steering gear.

Q. Would it not have been possible to take-off in the inner harbour ?

A. With the wind direction as it was the take-off run would have been too short into wind with a fairly steep climb-out and to take-off cross-wind in a wind speed of approximately 15 knots the aircraft would swing to wind immediately on rising on the step causing a swing to starboard with the reduced take-off run.

Q. Does the presence of kelp affect the steering of an aircraft when taxiing ?

A. Yes, because it pushes the water rudders out of the water as they are only held down with very light springs, and considerable difficulty can be experienced when taxiing across wind because of the aircraft's inherent weathercock stability which tends to turn the aircraft into wind.

Q. Is there an abnormal quantity of kelp in Fitzroy harbour ?

- A. Yes, there is a large quantity of kelp in this harbour and in certain winds it causes considerable difficulty in taxiing.
- Q. Was the aircraft airborne at any time after slipping moorings ?
- A. Definitely not, the power setting was never above 1,500 r.p.m. at any one time between slipping lines and beaching.

I would like to add that on completing the inspection of the damage, I proceeded to Fitzroy jetty to collect ropes etc. for the purpose of lashing the aircraft down pending the arrival of the salvage crew. I then requested Dr. Slessor to report the accident to His Excellency the Governor in accordance with the provisions of regulation 5 of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) (Falkland Islands) Regulations, 1959. This I confirmed in writing when I returned to Stanley.

(Sgd.) J. Kerr
30.8.60.

J. Kerr
P.C.#.

30/8/60 40

AIRCRAFT LOAD SHEET.

Captain J. KERR Crew & Duty N/A
 A/c Type BEAVER Registration VP-EAH Max. A.U.W. 5090
 Flight No. 1951 Basic Weight 3320
 Route STANLEY : DARWIN : ROY COVE : BEAVER IS : NEW IS : BEAVER IS :
PORT STEPHENS : FOX BAY : AJAX BAY : DARWIN : FITZROY : STANLEY.

Departing	Fuel & Oil		Passengers		Luggage Wt.	Freight Wt.	Mail Wt.	A.U.W. at Take Off
	Gallons	Weight	No.	Weight				
STANLEY	58 4.5	412 45	5	860	90	94½	40	5027½
DARWIN	47 4.5	341 45	4	680	90	94½	39	4769½
ROY COVE	33 4.5	237 45	2	360	60	94½	29	4405½
BEAVER IS.	22 4.5	159 45	1	180	30	94½	28	4016½
NEW ISLAND.	18 4.5	129 45	-	-	-	-	26	3680
BEAVER IS.	16 4.5	115 45	1	180	30	-	26	3876
PORT STEPHENS.	14 4.5	101 45	3	500	90	-	20	4236
FOX BAY.	28 4.5	202 45	3	500	90	-	12	4329
AJAX BAY.	18 4.5	129 45	2	320	60	-	12	4046
DARWIN.	16 4.5	115 45	3	500	60	-	12	4212
FITZROY.	12 4.5	26 45	4 + 2x½	760	90	-	12	4473

THIS FLIGHT TERMINATED AT FITZROY. AIRCRAFT INVOLVED
 IN TAXYING ACCIDENT.

44
Leave with : Mr & Mrs Hawkins, Dr Slessor, Colonial Secretary & Davis.

DARWIN : drop Colonial Secretary.

ROY COVE : drop Mr & Mrs Hawkins.

BEAVER IS: drop Dr Slessor.

NEW IS : drop Davis.

BEAVER IS: lift Dr Slessor.

PT. STEPHENS: lift Mrs Street & Mr Kivell.

FOX BAY : drop Kivell.
lift Geo. Porter (also AVGAS).

AJAX BAY : drop Porter.


DARWIN : lift Colonial Secretary.

FITZROY : lift Mrs Jeffray & 2 children.

Return to Stanley.

ROUGH SKETCH.

Not to Scale



Richard Henry David Manders - Colonial Secretary - states -

I was in the Beaver aircraft on the 9th August, 1960, at Fitzroy. We left the moorings at Fitzroy and were proceeding along the water presumably to get into position for our take-off. We had been proceeding at a very slow speed and then the engine revved up a bit and then I saw the rocky shore on our starboard side and I saw we were not going to clear it, and then we grated onto the rocks. The pilot opened the door near me and I got out in case the pilot wanted to get everyone out quickly. Then it was obvious that the plane was not going on fire and then the motor boat came along and everyone evacuated out into the boat without any trouble. The pilot then went off to make all possible arrangements for the safety of the aircraft until help came, and Dr. Slessor informed the Governor and arrangements were made to send out the mechanics the next day. The impact as felt in the fuselage was not violent.

Q. by Mr. Kerr. Did the turn appear to slow up just prior to opening the throttle ?

A. As far as I could judge I think it did. I don't think it would have been at all possible to avoid the land by turning to starboard at any stage.

Q. by Mr. Kerr. Did you notice much kelp in Fitzroy harbour ?

A. Yes, I did notice some there.

Q. by Mr. Kerr. Would you consider that the action of kelp on the water-rudders would affect the steering of and aircraft ?

A. Kelp would presumably affect the action of the rudders of an aircraft.

Q. Was the wind gusty ?

A. I think it was gusty.

(Sgd.) R.H.D. Manders
30.8.60.

Robert Stewart Slessor -Senior Medical Officer - states -

I was in the Beaver aircraft on the 9th August, 1960, at Fitzroy. I was sitting in the seat behind the pilot. We left the motor-boat moorings, we went ahead towards the North shore, then turned to the left with the engine just ticking over, then we started to turn towards the narrows. The South shore seemed to come close quickly and the plane went faster. I looked away and when I looked up again the rocks were much closer and I sensed we must hit. The plane did hit the rocks but the nose was well up by this time. The impact was not sufficient to throw me off my seat.

- Q. by Mr. Kerr. Do you think the wind in Fitzroy was excessive ?
- A. No. There was no difficulty for the passengers boarding the plane.
- Q. by Mr. Kerr. Do you think the presence of kelp would aggravate the position we were in ?
- A. I know it does but I cannot say that kelp was there as I did not look out.
- Q. by Mr. Kerr. Would you consider it an impossibility to have allowed the aircraft to have turned to starboard without hitting the beach ?
- A. Impossible, once we had turned towards the narrows (I cannot say how near we had turned towards the narrows as I could not see ahead). I would say that we could not have turned to starboard again without going ashore. It was my impression that the plane's nose turned in towards the South shore when she was going faster and I sensed that a crash was then inevitable.

(Sgd.) R. Stewart Slessor.
30.8.60.

Linda Street - housewife - states -

I was in the Beaver aircraft on the 9th August, 1960, at Fitzroy. I was a passenger on my way from Port Stephens to Stanley. I was sitting behind the co-pilot on the right hand side of the aircraft by the cabin door. We left the moorings and turned to the left, we then seemed to glide along. I passed a child over to the rear seat. I looked out and saw the beach just as we struck it. We were not travelling very fast, but I cannot say what the actual speed would be. I think it would have been impossible for the pilot to turn to the right before we struck the beach. The wind seemed to be very gusty and as we were gliding a gust seemed to catch us just before we hit the beach.

Q. Was the actual impact itself smooth or violent ?

A. I was not thrown out of my seat. I was jolted just a little.

(Sgd.) Linda Street.
30.8.60.

Wilhelmina Blanche Jeffery - housewife - states -

I was in the Beaver aircraft on the 9th August, 1960, at Fitzroy. I was a passenger on my way from Fitzroy to Stanley. I was sitting in the rear seat on the left-hand side. I am rather afraid of aircraft and I do not pay particular attention to what is happening outside. I was not thrown from my seat when the aircraft hit the beach. I was not using a safety belt at the time.

Q. by Mr. Kerr. Did the engine appear to be making sufficient noise for an aircraft attempting to take off ?

A. I don't really know, I was not paying attention.

Q. Is there very much kelp in Fitzroy harbour ?

A. There is quite a lot around the beach.

(Sgd.) W.B. Jeffery
30.8.60.

Maurice Smith - Senior Engineer, Falkland Islands Government Air Service - states -

I carried out a preliminary visual inspection of Beaver Seaplane VP-FAH serial No. 1129, which was involved in a taxiing accident on 9th August, 1960, at Fitzroy. I found the aircraft to be very extensively damaged.

Fuselage.

Very badly damaged on starboard side at station 160.00. Skin torn and fuselage frame damaged. Skin badly wrinkled at station 76.00 and frame damaged. Underside skin and frame at station 49.00 badly damaged on starboard side. Side skin and frame at station 49.00 port side very badly damaged and rear cabin floor section port side torn away. Lower half of front bulkhead station 41.58 badly damaged port side and front underside panels and oil cooler shroud damaged. Fuselage front section frame badly damaged at front undercarriage pick-up point port side.

Fin and rudder. Undamaged.

The tail plane. Top skin wrinkled.

Elevators. Undamaged.

Flaps. Undamaged.

Ailerons. Undamaged.

Port float. A complete write-off.

Starboard float. Very badly damaged and I suspect beyond local repair.

Main planes. Undamaged.

Undercarriage. The undercarriage struts, spreaders and bracing wires a complete write-off.

The engine, bearer and ancillary equipment.

Engine was stopped under power by airscrew striking rock and nose section of port float. Gear tooth found in engine sump suspect from camshaft gear front cover. No other visible damage to engine, bearers and engine ancillaries.

Airscrew.

Both blades very badly damaged.

(Sgd.) M. Smith
2.9.60.

35
47

H. C. S.

You will be interested to see the attached letter from Adrian Monk which I received this morning. In my minute to you on the enquiry, I said that it would be sufficient to make public only the findings of the Inspector, but in view of the rumours which are apparently flying round the West, it may be a good thing to say some more. Would you please draft a brief account of the circumstances which led up to the accident, and conclude with the Inspector's findings.

I am afraid that when an accident like this happens, certain people are only too ready to criticize. They do not realize how very fortunate we have been to have had so few incidents in the very difficult flying conditions that prevail locally.

I also enclose a letter from Jim Clement, and the letter from Christopher Bonner, which you have already seen. These can now go on the file. I replied to Jim Clement to say that I thought he was quite right on the question of fatigue, and that I had asked Jim Kerr to draft some "pilots orders", which, among other things, would limit the number of take-offs and landings on any one flight.

1000 1000 0270/x

20

14th September 1960

John [unclear]

Y. E.

I thought that the following could go in tomorrow's news bulletin and we could copy it into the Monthly Review. I think that apart from the first portion which I have marked (a) the rest ought also to go into the Gazette:-

(a) { In the news bulletin of the 19th August an announcement was made about the accident to the Beaver aircraft which was damaged on the 9th August. In that announcement it was stated that a statutory enquiry would be held. This enquiry has now been completed and a report made to His Excellency the Governor and it is now, therefore, possible to give the full facts.

We can then copy out paragraph 6 of the Inspectors report in full and carry on as follows -

On the 20th August His Excellency appointed Mr. Harold Bennett, J.P. to carry out the statutory investigations prescribed by the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, 1959. Mr. Bennett commenced his investigations on the 30th August, and took statements from the following witnesses (as in paragraph 3 of the report and as in paragraph 4 of the report). Mr. Bennett also inspected the relevant documents. After hearing the evidence Mr. Bennett formed the opinion that the accident could only be attributed to kelp fouling the water rudders aggravated by a gusty wind which rendered the aircraft difficult to control. It was also his opinion that the pilot could not be held responsible for the accident. This report has been accepted.

Gazette notification might be headed "Accident to Aircraft"

x I could also add to the news bulletin part which in Gazette be latest mention about the repair of the aircraft

15th September, 1960
DM/MF

16

~~37~~ 49

HCS

I agree. With reference to x above, I think until we have told members of Council what we have done, it would be sufficient to say that delivery of the parts ordered from Canada is expected to be further weeks.

16.9.6

~~170~~
2

SECRETARIAT NEWS

In the news bulletin of the 19th August an announcement was made about the accident to the Beaver aircraft which was damaged on the 9th August. In that announcement it was stated that a statutory enquiry would be held. This enquiry has now been completed and a report made to His Excellency the Governor and it is now, therefore, possible to give the full facts.

On Tuesday the 9th August, 1960, at 09.55 (L.M.T.) Beaver Aircraft VP-FAH took off from Port Stanley and subsequently landed and took off, in the following sequence, at Darwin, Roy Cove, Beaver Island, New Island, Beaver Island, Port Stephens, Fox Bay and Darwin and landed at Fitzroy at 16.10 (L.M.T.) without incident. Shortly after 16.10 (L.M.T.) preparatory to taking off the aircraft slipped moorings at Fitzroy and due to the direction of a moderate and gusty (approximately North-westerly) wind, was compelled to taxi through 180° to port in the rather confined kelp free area of Fitzroy Harbour, in order to take up position for the take-off run from outside the harbour entrance. On coming abeam of the wind the rate of turn slowed down, the aircraft drifted into a kelp patch, the kelp fouled the water rudders causing them to lift out of the water with loss of directional control resulting in the aircraft turning to starboard, by which time the aircraft was very close to the beach. The pilot increased power hoping that the torque reaction of the propeller would assist in turning the aircraft to port as it was then obvious that the aircraft would otherwise ground. The increase in power did not produce the desired turning effect, the aircraft consequently struck the rocky beach whilst travelling at an estimated speed of 15 knots, and was extensively damaged. The pilot and all passengers escaped uninjured.

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Mr. James Kerr	-	Director of Civil Aviation and Pilot
The Hon. R.H.D. Manders	}	Passengers in the aircraft
The Hon. R.S. Slessor		
Mrs. Linda Street		
Mrs. W. B. Jeffery		

Mr. Bennett/.....

53
~~47~~

Mr. Bennett visited the hangar and inspected the damaged Beaver Seaplane VP-FAH and also inspected the relevant documents. After hearing the evidence Mr. Bennett formed the opinion that the accident could only be attributed to kelp fouling the water rudders aggravated by a gusty wind which rendered the aircraft difficult to control. It was also his opinion that the pilot could not be held responsible for the accident. This report has been accepted.

Delivery of the parts necessary to repair the aircraft will take twelve weeks.

RHDM/FH

54

G A Z E T T E N O T I C E

No. 47.

Colonial Secretary's Office,
Stanley, Falkland Islands.

17th September, 1960.

Accident to Aircraft

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
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3. Mr. Bennett visited the hangar and inspected the damaged Beaver Seaplane VP-FAH and also inspected the relevant documents. After hearing the evidence Mr. Bennett formed the opinion that the accident could only be attributed to kelp fouling the water rudders aggravated by a gusty wind which rendered the aircraft difficult to control. It was also his opinion that the pilot could not be held responsible for the accident. This report has been accepted.

4. Delivery of the parts necessary to repair the aircraft will take twelve weeks.

By Command,



COLONIAL SECRETARY

DCA

Cops of Inquiry report for open files.
Please see the Inquiry recommendations which
we discussed. You will be including some of the
recommendations of the Inquiry in "Pilot's notes"
also I have your report on writing on the
Inquiry's recommendations for submission to G.L.

To be done & see w/c 11/10/60
MPT.

to be typed and sent and office copy kept.

Copy sent to D.C.A today - 14.10.60.

28.10.60.
Bee

0270/K

7th October, 60

Sir,

In continuation of my letter C604/A of 17th September and with reference to your complaints with regard to the Air Service; the complaints might I think be summarized under four headings -

- (1) There was avoidable delay in re-conditioning the aircraft AE;
- (2) No progress reports were made on the re-conditioning of AE up till the 9th August when the accident occurred to the other aircraft;
- (3) Even after the accident to the other aircraft no report would have been made with regard to the progress on the re-conditioning of AE had not a 'westers' message been sent;
- (4) Information was given that the aircraft AE would be ready in three weeks and a week later information was given that it would be ready in a further three weeks, the information given being inconsistent.

2. The first allegation is incorrect; there is no fixed time taken on re-conditioning aircraft because it is not known what will have to be carried out until a complete strip down has been completed and the older the machine the more exacting the inspection must be and consequently the longer the work will take. As regards your second allegation it is quite true that no progress reports were issued on the weekly news bulletin, with regard to the progress of aircraft AE before the accident of August 9th. I do not think that the public in general would have been very much interested, but had you desired information it would have readily been furnished. It is true that no report was made regarding long delays; the reason for this was a simple one, there were no long delays on which the report could be made. As regards the third and fourth complaints it is not correct to say that it took a 'westers' message to obtain any information on the subject. On the day following the accident the following announcement was made:-

"Beaver Alfa Echo is ready for assembly after her Certificate of Airworthiness but there will be no flying for the next three weeks, a further announcement will be made later".

/3. On the.....

S. Miller, Esq., J.P.,
ROY COVE

RDK/AF

Copy filed in 0270/K

3. On the 19th August it was announced that it was hoped that Beaver Alfa Echo would be ready for air testing in approximately three weeks and in fact it was exactly three weeks after that, that the aircraft was air tested. It will be observed that there was no real inconsistency between the two messages. At the time the first one was made it was not possible to say definitely when the aircraft AE would be ready but it was stated that there would be no flying for the next three weeks which was true. You will of course realize that it is not possible to state definitely when an aircraft undergoing re-conditioning will be ready until the examination has been completed which in fact will be a very short time before she is actually ready. On August 10th it was not possible to state exactly when the aircraft would be ready but a rough indication was given. Your complaint that the information given was inaccurate amounts in fact to the complaint that information was given too soon. It might conceivably be argued that no information on these subjects should be given until the date on which the aircraft will be ready is definitely known, but such argument would be exactly the opposite to the rest of your complaint.

4. I think you will agree when looking into the matter further that all that can be said is as follows - the aircraft AE most unfortunately crashed, it was unfortunate also that this happened before the re-conditioning of the aircraft AE was completed but on the other hand it was fortunate that it happened only a month before the other aircraft was ready for service. The fact that the Colony was for about a month left without an air service and that for during a large part of that period nobody could say for certain when the air service would be resumed was unfortunate but was nobody's fault. The importance of keeping the West as far as possible in touch with current events is realised and I can assure you it will always be kept in mind by me.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

7. 11. 60
Rm. 28/10/60

D. C. A.

59

Copy of Inquirers report for your files. Please see the Inquirers recommendations which we discussed. You will be including some of the recommendations of the Inquirer in "Pilots Orders". Could I have your report in writing on the Inquirers recommendations for submission to H.E.

11.10.60

13

DM/MF

H. C. S.

I have read and given much thought to the views and recommendations as submitted in the Inquirers report on the accident to Beaver VP-FAH.

Views expressed at para. 9 are always uppermost in a Pilot's mind when approaching to land at any landing ground, however this will be included in Local Pilot's Orders.

The Recommendation submitted at para. 10 is very sound but I am afraid not very practicle in the Falkland Islands where the landing grounds are privately owned, and mooring facilities and boats are provided by the farms concerned, at settlements where motor boats are stationed it is not always convenient for the farm to man the boat. When the Harbour and Aviation Dept. was divided it was agreed that the launch Alert would be available to assist the aircraft as and when required, and that the Air Service would have first call on that that launch, for some time now even the Alert has not been available because the Coxswain has been serving on the Philomel, and I understand that the new Coxswain will be required to do 'stand in' duties as seaman on Philomel. If we can not gaurntee motor launch assistance at our own base, then I can not see how we can even ask the private farms to provide such assistance.

In a recent letter from the S. of S. it was advised that consideration was being given to re-writing the Col. Air Nav. Order to bring it into line with the new U.K. Order, however until this has been done and the new order applied to the Colony, the recommendation will be included in the Local Pilot's Orders.

D.C.A. 16-11-60.

61.

G.E. re re 36 para 9-11 a 60

→ ✓ Para 9 dealt with. Perhaps G.E. would like to see the Pilot's orders.

✓ Para 10. I do not think we can ensure that however boats are in attendance.

As regard the Alert H.M. says that it is not correct to say that it is not available. However (can go into this further.
P10

Extracted to 0270/x.

Extracted to 0270/x

Extracted to 0270/x.

62.

→ Para 11 This will be embodied in Pilot's orders

The only thing that we might add is that it seems desirable to expedite the ~~writing~~ writing of Pilot's orders & until they are written any obvious agreed points should be covered verbally to the other Pilot & agreed on by both

^r 28/4/60.

63

HCS.

DCA was awaiting the return of his Campbell before writing Pilot's Orders, and no doubt he is getting on with them.

~~PA~~ 30.11.60

Extracted

to

0270/x

64

H.N. I believe it would be correct to say write to DCA & say that his assumption that he will be unavailable is incorrect & that as before he can be made available if notice is given. (to his papers)

^r 30/4/60

No.

It is requested that, in any reference to this memorandum the above number and date should be quoted.

MEMORANDUM.

65
2nd December 1960

To The Director of Civil

Aviation,

Stanley.

From The Harbour Master.

Stanley, Falkland Islands.

SUBJECT :-

Services of "Alert".

My attention has been drawn to your Minute at folio 60 in Secretariat file O270/W in which you have recorded, incorrectly, that the Government Launch "Alert" has not been available to assist the aircraft because the Coxswain has been employed on the "Philomel".

The Launch has always been available and as before she can be made available to the Air Service if notice is given to me.

Since the amalgamation of the Customs & Harbour Department, I can only recall one occasion that the Air Service have ever asked for the service of the "Alert", and she was immediately placed at your disposal.

In conclusion I would like to make it quite clear that the Harbour Department is always willing to assist the Air Service any time providing you give notice of your requirements.

A. J. Morrison

Harbour Master.

OK

66

H.C.S.

Rever is a copy of memo I prepared to forward to D.C.A.

A.H.
2.12.60

See
or 2/12/60

~~Handwritten signature~~

BU 15.1, 61 1CW 63

67

J.C.A.

Any progress with Pilot's Orders p.e.?

17.1.61

trafficed
2/27/4.

68.

A.E.S.

copies of all orders issued to date at R.C.

3/2/61

~~It will be, D.A.~~

~~no need to ...~~

There is only one small suggestion I would make
among Flyers to (6) I imagine that his
contemplates a case over to Senior Pilot DCA or Senior Pilot
to Stanley one who at his office at Hangan. Should not be
junior Pilot try to contact him? 1670
memo I will read. Should - received he should

ated to
0/4.

to

endeavour to contact Lt DCA Cif --- 70

Senior Pilot before deciding to fly or to DCA on

Senior Pilot may decide that flying shall not

take place.

now it rather looks as if, if he can get away
unnoticed all have to his elbow but if Lt

DCA happens to appear he has had it!

2
1

71

Extracted
to
0270/x

DCA

69-70 for yr. observations pl.

12

9.2.61

H.C.S. Reply in 0270/x.

9/10/2/61.

fo.