

C.S.

SECRET.  
No. 5/8/39.

WAR/W2H/1#5

19 39.

Secretary of State.

SUBJECT. 58

19 39  
22nd March.

Previous Paper.

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN PEACE FOR THE DEFENCE  
OF SHIPPING AGAINST ENEMY ATTACK IN WAR.

1-8  
9

MINUTES.  
S. of S. Secret Circular despatch of 17th February, 1939.  
of S. telegram, No. 15 of 12/3/39  
1. Submitted of five vessels of over 500 tons registered here three which are whaling vessels here visit this Port: one vessel the "Discovery" is laid up pending sale and the other the "Discovery" is probably not likely to come here again.  
2. "Laponia" is registered in London so para. 9 does not apply to her. It does not appear then that any of the books of instructions are required here unless a set is obtained

Subsequent Paper.  
0796

for "Tilroy" in case she should be  
again commissioned.

3. With regard to para: 6  
of the despatch there is no large  
volume of important shipping on  
the T.I. Register. Presumably the  
"Tilroy" is not entered in a War  
Risks Insurance Association. Para: 6  
does not seem to apply here.

4. The vessels "Sevilla" "Coronda"  
and "Southern Empress" though registered  
here are managed and owned by  
Companies registered in the U.K.

MCH  
CS

3. 4. 39.

The reply should be that 1 copy  
will suffice Better telegraph I suppose

MCH 3/4/39

1 of 5 Secret Circulars of 22 July, 1939. 11-15.

H. Submitted. 3 copies of each publication  
mentioned in 1 of red 14 were received.

H. returned 1 copy of each and handed  
me the remaining two copies of each.

MCH  
CS

24. 10. 39.

MCH 25/x

16 Secret despatch (2) from S. of S. of 23.8.39.

17 Acknowledgement by Office in charge of W/T. Station of document mentioned in red 16

Documents mentioned in para. 2 of (16) received and placed in C.S. Safe. MCH 31. X. 39.

H. Submitted for information. MCH 31. X. 39.

1/4

18 S. of S. Secret Circular of 22/8/39  
19-24 S. of S. Secret Sp. of 6/9/39  
25 " " " 23/9/39

26-28 S. of S. Circular Despatch of 22/8/39.

Harbours Master.

To note.

MCH 25. X. 39.

Honourable Colonial Secretary

Note generally. I assume to be available in file should want close study.

1" Circular Note of 13/11/41

Receipt form signed and sent  
to the Director of Sea Transport.  
MCH

Saving Confidential Tele; from S. of S.  
14 2 40  
recd 8. 2. 40

S. of S. Secret Circular Note of 20/12/39 31  
S. of S. Secret Circular of 18/1/40. 32.

Red 32 submitted. It seems  
hardly to apply here except perhaps  
to "Lafonia" which in any case is  
proceeding to the U.K.

MCH

Ed. 13. 3. 40  
Pl. speak to Mr. Roberts about this when

~~MCH~~

13/3/40

Comment  
It will apply only  
when Lafonia is  
flying to U.K.

MCS,

I have spoken to Mr. Roberts in  
this connection and he is of the  
opinion that no action should be taken  
with regard to the provision of defensive  
armament for Lafonia.

2. In any case the despatch deals  
with vessels registered in the Colony and  
Lafonia is registered in the United Kingdom.  
The only vessel affected would be the S.S.  
and she is flying between Chile  
and the Colony only.

Ed. 2/4/40

Y.E.  
The S. of S. in (Ref 32) para + ask for an early reply.

In view of your minute 13/3/40 suggest I should prepare a despatch, draft of which I attach.

AD 5.10.40

Thanks

~~AD~~ 3/4

33. Secret Despatch to S. of S. of 9/4/40.

Y.E.

For Equator

AD 9/10/40

~~AD~~ 10/4

P. 17  
10/10/40

34-42 S. of S. Secret Circ. of 4<sup>th</sup> March, 1940

N.G. 10.

Contents of (42) probably attach you

AD 15/10/40

WCS R M h + I D.

AD 15.5.40.

S. of S. Secret Circ. Note of 4/4/40. 43.  
 " " " " (2) 19/4/40. 44-45  
 " " " " f 1/5/40. 46.  
 " " " " " 3/6/40 47.  
 " " " " " 7/8/40. 48.  
 " " " " Tel. no 17 of 8/4/41. 49.

H/E  
 Red (49) submitted

<sup>10/4/41</sup>  
 Telegram No. 48 to S. of S. of 10/4/41.

(50)  
 S. of S. Secret Circ. of 8 Febry. 1942. 51.  
 letter to Head of Military Branch Admiralty 22/4/42. 52-53.  
 S of S Secret Circ Dispatch of 31/3/42. 54-55.  
 (56)

A.C.S.  
 This memo is already on the Intelligence  
 Summary's file & the Shipping Master has  
 read it.

KB  
 31/8-

p. a.

S of S Secret Circ. disp. of 11/5/43. 57.  
 (58)

H. Can.  
 To see (57a). You can show it to Capt. Pitt. if there  
 is anything new in it. KB  
 1/9.

H. B. S.  
 seen, thank you. There is nothing in the memorandum that the  
 Master of the factory has not seen, or been notified about, already.

M.B. Master.  
 1.9.43.

pc

Closed See 0796 - destroyed in C80 fire  
 of 9/3/59.

Halliday / h  
 23/7/63

CIRCULAR

SECRET



(S)

DOWNING STREET,  
17th February, 1939.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that in 1937 a Committee was appointed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty consisting of representatives of the Board of Trade and the Admiralty and of the Shipping World (including Lloyd's and War Risks Insurance Associations), under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, to study and report on the measures that should be taken in peace for the defence of shipping against enemy attack in war, in order to minimize the dislocation which might ensue therefrom.

2. The Committee found it necessary to appoint a number of Sub-Committees to investigate particular aspects of the problems which had to be considered. In due course it submitted an interim report covering reports by five of its Sub-Committees (Nos. A-E). I enclose herewith copies of (i) a summary of the recommendations of the main Committee and (ii) summaries of the proposals recommended in the reports of the five Sub-Committees.

3. The recommendations put forward by the main Committee and its Sub-Committees have been generally accepted by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and steps are being taken to implement those recommendations in so far as ships on the United Kingdom Register are concerned. The Governments of the Dominions, India and Burma have also been informed of the nature of the measures proposed so that they may consider the desirability of taking steps in respect of vessels registered in those countries on the lines recommended by the Committee.

4. It is appreciated that, having regard to the comparatively small number of ships registered in the Colonial Dependencies, the questions reviewed by the Committee do not assume an importance in the Colonial Dependencies in any way comparable to that which they have for the authorities and shipping interests in this country. I think, therefore, that it may be helpful if I comment briefly on each of the enclosed reports in turn and indicate, in particular, how the various recommendations may affect Colonial Dependencies.

5. The report of Sub-Committee A was concerned first with the machinery for communicating confidential advice to shipowners and masters in an emergency. It will be seen that the general procedure, at any rate in the period before the Admiralty take control of ships' movements, is that warnings will normally be issued confidentially on behalf of the Admiralty by the Board of Trade through the War Risks Insurance Associations to the shipowners concerned, although in special cases they will be issued to the shipowners direct. It is the intention that these warnings would only be issued to specific ships actually in, or proceeding to, dangerous areas, and would not be of the nature of warnings to shipping generally; and it is to be made clear to War Risks Associations or shipowners that no liability can be admitted by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for any action taken as a consequence of the warnings.

The Officer Administering  
the Government of

See 59

6. I believe that the existence of the War Risks Insurance Associations is generally known in those Dependencies in which there are ships on the Colonial Registers, and that a number of ships on such Registers are already entered in Associations in this country. In such cases the confidential warnings to be issued by the Board of Trade through the War Risks Insurance Associations would, of course, apply to those ships. It is felt, therefore, that unless there is a comparatively large volume of important shipping on Colonial Registers which is not entered in War Risks Insurance Associations, it will be unnecessary to introduce a special arrangement to cover ships on Colonial Registers, but that it will suffice to rely on the channel of warning via the War Risks Insurance Associations. I should, however, be obliged for your observations on this question and, in particular, I should be glad to learn whether, so far as you can ascertain, there is any appreciable volume of shipping registered in the Dependency under your administration which is not entered in a War Risks Insurance Association and which would, therefore, not be covered by the normal warning procedure. In such cases, if the owners of the ships are unable or unwilling to join one of the War Risks Associations, the warning, if their ships were in, or proceeding to, a dangerous area, would if possible be issued direct to them.

7. It will be seen that the second task of Sub-Committee A was to consider machinery for providing the Admiralty with detailed information as to the distribution of shipping in an emergency; and that, in order to enable such machinery to be established, it has been decided that all shipowners should render fortnightly to the Board of Trade details of the present position or the projected movements of their ships, including movements which are to be expected during the ensuing fortnight. It is not considered, however, that it would be necessary either for movements of ships on Colonial Registers to be reported to the Board of Trade, or for Colonial Governments themselves to attempt to establish any card-index system similar to that which is to be maintained in the Board of Trade.

8. The report of Sub-Committee B was concerned with two subjects:—

(a) the production of printed instructions in peace-time as a guide to the masters and officers of British merchant ships to prepare them for instructions and publications which will be issued to them in war; and,

(b) an investigation of the question of signalling and W/T exercises with merchant vessels, with particular reference to the making of enemy reports.

9. As regard (a) above, I understand that two books of instruction are being prepared and will, indeed, be issued within the next few months. The first is for the information of shipowners, the second for that of masters and officers of British merchant ships. Arrangements will be made for a supply of these books, when available, to be sent to you for communication to any British shipowners having ships over 500 tons registered in the Dependency under your administration and to the masters and officers of such ships, assuming that they are British subjects. It will be convenient if I could be informed how many copies of such handbooks you would wish to have sent to you.

As regards (b) the investigation recommended has now been completed, and no action by any Colonial Government will be required.

*In one ship: 1 copy for master  
1 " " 2nd mate*

10. Sub-Committee C considered the question of paravane equipment required for merchant ships, with especial reference to the shape of stem. It will be seen that as a result of the Sub-Committee's recommendations two circulars have been sent to shipowners in this country on the above subject. I understand that the substance of both these circulars will, together with the illustrative drawing, be incorporated in the handbook for shipowners which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, will be issued shortly. In the circumstances no action by Colonial Governments will be necessary.

11. Sub-Committee D was concerned with the consideration of what provision should be made for the defensive armament and equipment of merchant ships. This question largely depends on what arrangements can be made for stiffening merchant ships in peace-time to prepare them to take a defensive armament in war. As the amount of shipbuilding (or, indeed, ship-repairing) which takes place in Colonial Dependencies is comparatively limited, this question may be of academic interest only to most Dependencies. I understand, however, that if any Company owning ships on a Colonial Register is considering having a new ship built either in this country or in any British yard in any part of the British Commonwealth, the Admiralty would be prepared to give advice and technical supervision, where possible, in regard to the stiffening required and would, in any event, desire to be informed if it is proposed to arrange for such a ship to be stiffened. It should be understood that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is unable to bear the cost of stiffening ships of new construction, contracts for which have been placed later than the 30th November, 1937. In the case of existing ships, the selection of those to be stiffened at Government expense is normally made from those on the United Kingdom Register. An exception might be made, however, in respect of ships on a Colonial Register in certain circumstances, as, for instance, in the case of a large ship normally trading to United Kingdom ports. (It is hoped that in time of war it would be possible to supply defensive armament to such stiffened ships in all cases where it appears necessary.) In this connection I enclose, for your information, a copy of a letter addressed by the Admiralty to ship-repairers in this country concerning the question whether licences under the Naval Treaties Acts 1922 and 1937 are necessary in respect of merchant ships which are being stiffened to take defensive armament. I understand that the substance of a memorandum issued by the Admiralty to shipowners in this country concerning the general arrangements for stiffening merchant ships, together with a copy of key drawings illustrating the normal requirements for fitting guns and stiffening, are being incorporated in the handbook for shipowners referred to in paragraph 9 of this despatch.

12. Sub-Committee E was concerned with the consideration of items of convoy equipment required by merchant ships; and, as will be seen, it made recommendations in regard to the provision of certain items of equipment which are regarded as essential for every merchant ship sailing in convoy. I understand that these recommendations will be contained in the handbook, which, as is mentioned above, it is proposed to issue shortly to all British shipowners. In the circumstances, no action beyond that mentioned in paragraph 9 will be required by Colonial Governments. You will be aware that model Emergency Regulations have now been prepared (and are about to be communicated to Colonial Governments) with a view to their selective issue by those Governments in times of emergency. These regulations will give Colonial Governments the power in cases of necessity to issue orders in respect of ships on Colonial Registers analogous to those mentioned in paragraph 3 (iii) of the Sub-Committee's report, i.e., requiring such ships to be equipped with prescribed apparatus.



13. Sub-Committee F was concerned with arrangements for the peace-time training of Merchant Navy personnel in war duties. Courses of instruction for Merchant Navy officers have been held, with considerable success, at certain selected home ports; and I understand that arrangements have already been made for similar courses to be held in Hong Kong and in certain of the West Indian Dependencies. (Plans for the introduction in peace-time of gunnery training for seamen and stewards are under consideration by the Admiralty.) The responsibility for initiating such courses of instruction rests with the Naval Commander-in-Chief in each area.

14. Sub-Committee G was concerned with the methods to be adopted in individual ships to ensure that they can be effectively darkened at night in time of war. The recommendations are being incorporated in the two handbooks to which I have referred in paragraph 9 above.

15. In conclusion, I would add that if you have any observations which you desire to make in regard to the questions discussed in this despatch and its enclosures, I should be glad to receive them. The reports of the Sub-Committees have already been communicated to Naval Commanders-in-Chief and to Dominion Naval Authorities; and it may therefore be possible for Colonial Governments to discuss any point in regard to which they feel uncertainty with their local Naval Authorities.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

MALCOLM MACDONALD.

7

Enclosure 1 in secret circular despatch dated 17th February, 1939.

## SHIPPING DEFENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

### Précis of Interim Report

Five Sub-Committees, A, B, C, D, and E, were appointed and their reports (attached) are endorsed.

2. Further Sub-Committees, F and G, have been appointed but have not yet reported.

3. The Committee's deliberations were based on the statement made by the Chairman that the convoy system is considered to be the most effective form of protection against surface, submarine or air attack, should the threat from these attacks be sufficiently grave or the losses so severe as to justify the delays inherent in a convoy system, and that plans for instituting convoy have been prepared for the different war areas.

4. The Committee's recommendations on the proposals of their Sub-Committees are as follows:—

*Sub-Committee A:*

That the Admiralty and Board of Trade should implement the recommendations, or where that is not yet possible should put in readiness, as far as and as early as practicable, in time of peace the measures recommended by the Sub-Committee, inviting the essential co-operation of shipowners, Lloyd's and the War Risks Associations in completing these measures.

*Sub-Committee B:*

(i) That Peace Instructions for British merchant ships, as recommended by the Sub-Committee, should be prepared and issued in time of peace to owners and masters of such ships.

(ii) That trial signal and W/T exercises between H.M. Ships and British merchant ships, as recommended by the Sub-Committee, should be arranged as early as practicable.

That, for carrying out these trials, the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom and the Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association should nominate three shipping companies, preferably those with a large number of ships passing through the Mediterranean.

(iii) That the Sub-Committee should be consulted during the compilation of the Peace Instructions for British merchant ships and on receipt of the report of the trials at (ii).

*Sub-Committee C:*

(i) That as regards new construction, shipowners, shipbuilders and the Institute of Naval Architects should be circularized now as proposed in the draft letter attached to the Sub-Committee's report.

(ii) That as regards *existing ships*, shipowners should be circularized now as proposed in the draft letter attached to the Sub-Committee's report.

*Sub-Committee D:*

(i) That the Government should be asked now to authorize expenditure from public funds on the grounds that unless defensive stiffening is paid for by the Government, very few, if any, shipowners would incorporate stiffening in their ships.

(ii) That the necessary drawings should be distributed as early as practicable in the manner proposed.

*Sub-Committee E:*

(i) That shipowners should be informed of the articles (a) to (f) and (k) in paragraph 2 of the Sub-Committee's report which should be provided *by them* in time of war.

(ii) That the Admiralty should keep in readiness at suitable ports articles (g) to (j).

(iii) That shipowners should be informed *now*:

(a) of the orders proposed to be issued in war as regards communications between bridge and engine-room,

(b) of the requirements for signal yards.

(iv) That the Admiralty should take the necessary measures in peace and war as regards crows' nests and voice pipes or telephones.

5. The Committee recommend that the measures that may be approved, as a result of this report, for British merchant ships on the United Kingdom Register should be communicated to the Governments of British Dominions overseas with a suggestion that similar action should be taken as regards British merchant ships on Dominion, India and Burma Registers.

## SUB-COMMITTEE (A)

### Précis of Report

*Terms of Reference.* To consider:—

- (1) The machinery for communicating confidential advice to shipowners and masters in an emergency.
- (2) The machinery for providing the Admiralty with detailed information as to the distribution of shipping in an emergency.

#### PART I OF TERMS OF REFERENCE.

*Communication of confidential advice to shipowners and masters in an emergency.*

2. There may be two periods during which precautionary measures in anticipation of possible war may be desirable to safeguard British shipping against potential danger from enemy action:—

- (i) A first period when every effort will be made to prevent publicity being given to any step taken, or advice given by the Government.
- (ii) A second period which begins when the situation is such that H.M. Government has assumed control of the sailing and routing of British merchant shipping and issued definite instructions to British merchant ships despite the fact that such action is bound to become public.

#### FIRST PERIOD.

3. *Warnings to British merchant ships generally.*—During this period the preservation of secrecy will be of paramount importance. In fact, generally in all circumstances the question whether any action can be taken at this time will depend on the political atmosphere and economic and trading considerations. It will be necessary to assess at the moment the chances of secrecy being jeopardized and for the Government to decide accordingly what steps, if any, can be taken.

It is, however, essential that arrangements should be made to enable warnings to British shipping to be issued, should the Government so wish. The Sub-Committee are of the opinion that, in order to preserve secrecy, such warnings should be issued confidentially only to those shipowners whose vessels were in or about to go into dangerous waters. The Sub-Committee recommend that, when time permits, these warnings should be issued confidentially on behalf of the Admiralty by the Board of Trade through the War Risks Insurance Associations to the shipowners concerned. Should time not permit of this procedure, these warnings should be issued direct to the shipowners concerned (or their accredited representatives in London) in the form of advice and the War Risks Insurance Associations should be informed of the situation at this time as no owner would be likely to act without knowing that he was doing so with the approval of his War Risks Insurance Association.

4. To give effect to this procedure, the Sub-Committee recommend:—

- (a) That the Government, *i.e.*, the Board of Trade, should in time of peace keep up-to-date details of British shipowners, their accredited representatives in London with their addresses, business and private telephone numbers, together with a complete list of ships in their ownerships, giving tonnage, etc., and names of War Risks Associations in which entered.
- (b) That as far as possible all movements in time of peace of British ships, including projected movements, should be recorded at the Board of Trade.

5. To enable (b) to be carried out, the Sub-Committee recommend that all shipowners should render fortnightly to the Board of Trade details of the present position of the projected movements of their ships, including movements which are expected

to take place during the ensuing fortnight. It should thus be possible for the Board of Trade, at any moment, to send confidential notices to owners of ships through the War Risks Associations—

- (a) which are about to sail within the next 48 hours for any specified areas,
- (b) which have already sailed for such areas,
- (c) which are already in such areas,

and to confine the issue of the notices to these owners only. This would give the owners of such ships the opportunity of holding up, ostensibly for private reasons, ships about to sail for a potential danger area or of issuing special instructions of an innocent character to those under (b) and (c).

6. *Warnings to ships in ports of the United Kingdom.*—In cases of extreme urgency, the warning, as regards vessels then in ports of the United Kingdom but about to sail, might be sent confidentially direct to the Customs authorities at the ports at which these vessels are lying at the moment, the owners of such ships being informed, through the War Risks Associations, at the same time, of the nature of the warning sent.

7. *Warnings to ships in British ports abroad, ships in foreign ports, and ships at sea.*—The Sub-Committee are of opinion that the warning must be sent through the War Risks Insurance Associations to the shipowners. If for any reason owners should not wish or not be able to communicate in veiled plain language or commercial code to their agents or masters, the Admiralty would be prepared to assist by sending messages through naval or other government officers in confidential code to the agents or masters of their ships at ports abroad. In the case of ships at sea approaching a danger zone, there may be circumstances in which it would be necessary for the Admiralty to broadcast warnings. In such circumstances the fact that such messages might be intercepted by a potential enemy would have to be the principal consideration in the framing of the warnings.

#### SECOND PERIOD.

8. This period begins when the situation is such that H.M. Government has assumed control of the sailing and routing of British merchant vessels. This will be announced by the broadcast of Admiralty message "A" in plain language to all British merchant ships.

Different procedures would be required in the following different cases:—

- (i) Ships in ports of the United Kingdom.
- (ii) Ships in British ports abroad.
- (iii) Ships in foreign ports.
- (iv) Ships at sea.

9. As regards (i) *ships in ports in the United Kingdom*, (ii) *ships in British ports abroad*, and (iii) *ships in foreign ports*, in the first instance, instructions will be sent to the Customs authorities at the ports in regard to (i) and to the Naval Reporting Officers in regard to (ii) and (iii).

Special Naval Control Service Officers will be sent to all the principal ports referred to at (i) and (ii) and to certain selected ports referred to at (iii) above, and when they arrive they will take over the duty.

10. As regards (iv) *ships at sea*, the organization for the transmission of important official messages to British merchant ships is brought into operation by the W/T broadcast of Admiralty message "A."

Ships in harbour are informed of the issue of the message by the Naval Reporting Officer or Naval Control Service Officer.

The War Risks Associations should be kept advised of the action taken under (i)–(iv) above, and when possible they should be used as channels for the issue of instructions. Trade of any instructions involving large diversions of shipping.

11. *Wording of Admiralty Messages "A" and "B"* is under revision and will be promulgated shortly.

#### OUTBREAK OF WAR.

12. *Admiralty Message "C."*—On the outbreak of war, this message will be broadcast in plain language to all British ships. If Admiralty messages "A" and "B" have *not already* been issued, they will be issued immediately after Admiralty message "C."

#### ISSUE OF BOOK OF INSTRUCTIONS IN PEACE-TIME.

13. It is proposed to include in the peace-time book of instructions to masters, which is to be issued (*vide* Sub-Committee B's report), any details of the procedure detailed in paragraphs 2 to 12 above which can be made public. Copies would be supplied to masters through their owners.

#### SHIPS FITTED WITH RADIO TELEPHONY ONLY.

14. The practicability of including these vessels in the organization described in Notice to Mariners No. 3 is under consideration.

#### USE OF B.B.C. ORGANIZATION.

15. The Sub-Committee recommend that the possibility of using the B.B.C. Organization as an additional means of promulgating non-confidential general messages to British shipping should be considered.

#### SMALL SHIPS WITHOUT W/T.

16. The Sub-Committee recommend that full use should be made of Lloyd's signal stations and visual signalling from H.M. Ships for communication to these ships.

In addition, it is recommended that the book of instructions mentioned in paragraph 13 above should include a direction to the effect that vessels equipped with W/T should pass all official messages they may receive to vessels not so equipped that have not received them.

#### SPECIAL PROCEDURE, IF ANY, OTHER THAN ABOVE REQUIRED FOR SHIPS.

17. (i) *Whose masters are not British subjects.*—It is recommended that:

- (a) confidential instructions should not be given to British ships with foreign masters and they and their ships should be earmarked accordingly;
- (b) that the policies issued by War Risks Associations should include a warranty that the master of the vessel concerned should be a British subject;
- (c) when the Board of Trade licensing scheme is in force it might be practicable to withhold a licence from a British ship with a foreign master until he had been replaced by a British subject.

(ii) *Whose chief or other officers are not British subjects.*—No action can be taken.

(iii) *Whose wireless operators are not British subjects.*—As a general principle the Sub-Committee consider it most undesirable that non-British W/T operators should be employed in British ships. Confidential W/T instructions should not be issued to such operators, and for this purpose a list of these ships should be maintained by the Board of Trade and Admiralty.

18. Procedure, if required for.—(i) *Vessels under neutral flag and of nominal neutral ownership but actually under control of British companies.*—These vessels will not be covered by the Government War Risks Scheme. It will only be possible for the Admiralty to control their sailing and routing if arrangements can be made with the British controlling companies.

(ii) *Vessels under neutral flag chartered by the British Government.*—Neutral vessels taken up by the Government will be covered for war risks by the owners or alternatively by the Government on the same terms as those applicable to British requisitioned ships.

(iii) *British-registered vessels under foreign control.*—These vessels could be requisitioned failing licensing under the Board of Trade licensing scheme.

19. *Application of recommendations to British ships registered in India, Burma, Dominions or Colonies.*—Indian, Burmese and Colonial ships, if they are entered in War Risks Clubs, are already covered by the Government Reinsurance Scheme and are therefore in the same position as United Kingdom ships from the point of view of control.

Dominion ships can be covered by the scheme if a request to that effect is received from the Dominions concerned. In such a case, ships must be entered in existing clubs or in special clubs formed for the purpose. The position as regards coming into the War Risks Scheme has been explained to the Government of India and the Colonial Governments, and H.M. Governments in the Dominions have been informed of the steps taken in the United Kingdom.

20. The Sub-Committee recommend that the Dominions, India and Burma should be informed of their recommendations generally.

LEGAL EFFECT OF, OR LEGAL PROVISION REQUIRED FOR, ANY OR ALL OF ABOVE PROCEDURES.

21. It is recommended that the question of the legal effect of the above proposals under bills of lading, charter parties and insurance policies, e.g., as regards deviation, should be referred for consideration by the Organizing Committee dealing with the insurance of British shipping in time of war.

PART 2 OF TERMS OF REFERENCE.

*"The machinery for providing the Admiralty with detailed information as to distribution of shipping in an emergency."*

22. This point has already been mentioned in paragraphs 4-5 above as regards the provision of this information in time of peace.

The Sub-Committee recommend that a card-index of British merchant shipping should be maintained by the Board of Trade in time of peace and be kept up-to-date by means of Lloyd's Intelligence Service and publications and from other sources: that it should be available for meeting Government needs generally and for supplying the Admiralty in particular with information essential to defence plans. This index would include the record of movements mentioned in paragraph 4.

In time of peace, Lloyd's intelligence system would be the main and essential source of information for the card-index, and close collaboration between the Mercantile Marine Department of the Board of Trade and Lloyd's would be required. In any major war the Sub-Committee consider that it would be necessary, as in the Great War, to substitute a Government system of reporting arrivals and sailings of *British* ships. These reports would have to be sent from ports at home and abroad to London and from ports abroad to Senior Naval Officers of the local stations. The necessary arrangements between the Admiralty and Lloyd's are being made.

It has hitherto been the intention that this system, which is called the Vescar system, should come into force only in certain specified areas. At the beginning of a war, however, it might be difficult to decide in which areas to start this system and the Sub-Committee consider that it would be more satisfactory for the movements of all British merchant vessels to be communicated by Reporting Officers (using Lloyd's agents as their source of information) in all areas. The organization for doing this could then be prepared in peace-time.

The Sub-Committee recommend, however, that Lloyd's agents should continue communicating direct to London the movements of foreign merchant vessels for publication in the usual way. If the necessity arose, for any reason, Reporting Officers in specified or all areas could quickly be instructed to include these vessels in their reports.

SUB-COMMITTEE (B)

Précis of Report

*Terms of Reference.—*

- (1) To consider the production of printed instructions for issue to masters in peace and/or war.
- (2) To investigate the question of signalling (visual) and W/T exercises with merchant vessels, with particular reference to the making of enemy reports.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

(a) That a book of instructions for British merchant ships containing no secret information should be issued in peace-time as a guide to the masters and officers of British merchant ships to prepare them for the publications which will be issued to them in war.

(b) That trial signal and W/T exercises between H.M. Ships and British merchant ships, primarily with the purpose of affording Merchant Navy officers practice in drafting enemy reports, should be arranged as early as practicable. Two separate methods of enemy reporting to be tested.

## SUB-COMMITTEE (C)

### Précis of Report

*Terms of Reference.*—To investigate the question of paravane equipment of merchant ships with special reference to the shape of stem.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

2. That as regards (i) *New Construction*, shipowners, shipbuilders and the Institution of Naval Architects should be informed of the most desirable shape of bow from the paravane point of view and asked to bear this in mind when building new vessels.

(ii) *Existing ships*, shipowners should be asked to furnish to the Admiralty in respect of their ships certain information to enable the correct proportion of the various types of paravane gear to be maintained.

3. Copies of the two circulars which have been sent to shipowners in accordance with the above recommendations are attached.

*Secret.*

**Shape of stem to enable paravane equipment to be fitted to merchant ships as protection against moored mines.**

The Admiralty, in collaboration with the Shipping Defence Advisory Committee, have recently had under review the most suitable shapes of bow, in merchant vessels, to enable paravane equipment to be quickly fitted in time of war as a means of providing ships with protection against moored mines. In this connexion the following observations are offered so that shipowners, shipbuilders and naval architects may give full consideration to this matter when ordering or designing new ships. The question of existing ships is being dealt with in a separate communication to shipowners.

2. In order that shipowners and shipbuilders should have a clear idea of the matter, it is necessary to explain briefly the present methods of towing a paravane. They are three in number, as shown in the attached print—

- (a) By means of a planing shoe, which slides down the stem.
- (b) By means of chains rove through a clump which is built on to the forefoot below water.
- (c) By means of a boom which hinges on the side of the bows and carries a clump which swings into place and grips the forefoot; in some cases this may require a small bearing stop fitted to the forefoot.

*Method (a)* is the easiest and cheapest to fit and does not require that the vessel should be dry-docked, but it does require within fairly strict limits a special form of stem which is discussed below. With a suitable stem, however, the protection afforded is the maximum.

*Method (b)* necessitates the dry-docking of the ship and the amount of protection obtained depends on the amount of the "cut up." \*

*Method (c)*, while giving good protection, cannot be used at speeds exceeding 16 knots. The satisfactory working of the boom gear largely depends on a good fit between the clump on the boom and the foreside of the stem. To ensure this, it would generally be desirable to dry-dock the ship when fitting the paravane equipment, although the work might be done by divers, if available.

3. It will be seen that methods (b) and (c), whilst generally speaking not giving such good protection as method (a), have the further disadvantage of necessitating the dry-docking of the ship. This would cause serious delays in fitting the gear on the outbreak of war, as only a limited number of ships could be docked at the same time and would render ships inactive while the gear was being fitted.

4. It is, therefore, desirable from the point of view of protection of merchant ships against moored mines that as many ships as possible should have a shape of bow for which method (a)—the planing shoe—is suitable.

5. Three main factors affect the use of the planing shoe—

- (a) Amount of rake forward of stem.
- (b) Amount of "cut up" of keel.
- (c) Shape of stem section.

\* "Cut up" for the purpose of the question under consideration can be defined as the distance from the point of intersection of the keel and stem lines produced to the nearest point of the rounded forefoot.

6. (a) *Amount of rake forward of stem.* No great difficulty is foreseen in using a Planing Shoe with a stem raked up to 25° provided that care is exercised with regard to the speed of the ship when getting the paravane in or out.

7. Where the rake forward is between 15°-25°, it might be difficult to raise the Planing Shoe before getting in paravanes without a considerable reduction in the speed of the ship. Paravanes suitably fitted can be recovered at 8 knots without raising the point of tow.

8. Where the rake forward is between 0°-5°, difficulty might be experienced in lowering the Shoe, but by suitable reduction of speed, it is anticipated that the difficulty can be overcome. Further, with modern paravanes, the Shoe can be lowered before paravanes are streamed, and in these circumstances, it is unlikely to jam even on a stem whose rake is less than 5°.

9. The rake forward of stem most suitable for the fitting of a Planing Shoe is therefore between 5°-15°, but a Planing Shoe can be used with any degree of rake from 0° to 25°.

10. (b) *Amount of "cut up" of keel.* A straight stem to the underside of the keel, or with a rounded forefoot of a radius not exceeding 2 feet, is the most suitable type of stem to enable Planing Shoe equipment to be quickly fitted. (Planing Shoe equipment can, however, be fitted to vessels with a rounded forefoot, provided the "cut up" does not exceed 6 feet, but in this case, an extension piece necessitating the dry-docking of the ship would have to be fitted.)

11. (c) *Shape of stem section.* In order to take a Planing Shoe, it is also necessary that the horizontal radius of curvature of the stem below the water-line at ballast draught should be less than 6 inches at any point. Above the ballast water line an extension piece can be built on to the stem to enable the Planing Shoe to slide up and down in cases where the horizontal radius of the stem would otherwise be too great to take a Planing Shoe. This would make possible the fitting of a Planing Shoe equipment to soft-nosed ships, although it would be desirable for the radius of less than 6 inches to be carried up well above the load water-line so as to avoid fitting an extension piece.

*Limits of the most desirable stem.*

12. To summarize the above it will be seen that what may be described as the "Admiralty" shape of stem should conform to the following limits:—

- (a) Rake preferably between 5° and 15°, but may be between 0° and 25°.
- (b) Stem to be straight to the underside of keel or with a rounded forefoot of radius not greater than 2 feet.
- (c) Horizontal radius of curvature of the stem below the water-line at ballast draught to be less than 6 inches at all points. It would be desirable for the radius of less than 6 inches to be carried up well above the load water-line so as to avoid fitting an extension piece.

*Efficiency of the proposed "Admiralty" stem.*

13. It is considered that in both large, fast ships and low-powered coastal vessels, the loss of efficiency in running and steering qualities when constructed with an "Admiralty" stem as compared with a rounded forefoot and large "cut up", would be negligible; nor would the cost of building be appreciably, if any, greater.

14. There is, however, understood to be a tendency to build the modern medium-sized vessels of about 400 feet length and 10½-12½ knots speed with a stem raked forward up to about 20° and to increase the amount of "cut up", which latter may prevent maximum protection before afforded. This tendency has developed in the belief that this type of bow, in these ships, conduces to less resistance, good steering and ease of construction.

15. Whilst there may be some small loss of efficiency in calm weather, estimated at not more than 2 to 3 per cent., if the "Admiralty" stem were fitted to this class of ship, it is quite possible that this would be offset by better steering qualities, particularly in a seaway or in ballast condition, which would compensate for any loss during fair weather conditions.

16. Furthermore, increased likelihood of damage by grounding to the stem of a ship with little or no "cut up" seems to be offset by the possibility of a ship with "cut up" being holed further aft, with perhaps more serious consequences, including damage to the cargo.

It is also pointed out that if the keel is run well forward beyond the collision bulkhead, i.e., with very little "cut up", the unsupported weight forward when dry-docking will be reduced.

17. As, however, the evidence on the question of efficiency is not conclusive, the suggestion is made that shipowners, shipbuilders and naval architects, when forwarding designs of new vessels of this type for test in an experimental tank, should include a design conforming to the Admiralty recommendations so as to determine, if possible, the relative efficiency between the "Admiralty" stem and whatever stem it was in mind to construct.

18. If the difference in efficiency is negligible or small, it is greatly to be desired that shipowners and shipbuilders will see their way to adopt a stem within the limits described in paragraph 12, and thereby make possible the maximum protection against moored mines which the paravane equipment can provide. Furthermore, if this is done, it will have the advantage of saving time and expense involved in dry-docking at a time when the use of the vessel in service would be of the utmost importance.

19. It is requested that the information contained in this letter may be treated as confidential.

*Secret.*

**Admiralty request for certain information from shipowners with regard to shapes of stems of vessels, etc.**

The Admiralty, in collaboration with the Shipping Defence Advisory Committee, have recently had under review the provision of paravane equipment to existing merchant vessels in time of emergency, with a view to providing them with a means of protection against moored mines.

2. Up to the present, certain reserves of gear have been built up for use in time of emergency, and it is now desired to obtain more detailed information in order that a correct proportion of the various types of gear may be maintained.

3. The different types of paravane gear which can be fitted to various types of stem were fully described in a letter dealing with the most desirable shape of stem for new construction.

4. It would be much appreciated if shipowners would furnish the Secretary of the Admiralty, Whitehall, S.W.1, with the following information in regard to their ships which have a loaded draught of 12 feet or more:—

- (1) Maximum speed of each vessel.
- (2) Type of stem, including angle of rake, shape of stem section below water-line at ballast draught and amount of "cut up" in each case.
- (3) It would be of assistance if the above particulars could be illustrated by a sketch giving profile back to the knuckle in the keel and horizontal sections through stem.

*Note.*—"Cut up" for the purpose of this enquiry, can be defined as the distance from the point of intersection of the keel and stem lines produced to the nearest point of the rounded forefoot.

5. It is requested that this letter may be treated as confidential.

## SUB-COMMITTEE (D)

### Précis of Report

*Terms of Reference.*—To consider provision for defensive armament and equipment of merchant ships.

2. The present Admiralty policy is based on the supply *in war* for defensive purposes of one low-angle and one high-angle gun to merchant vessels of 500 tons gross and upwards. In practice it may not be possible to fit more than one gun to vessels between 500–1,000 tons gross.

A reserve of guns has been maintained for these purposes.

THE MOST DESIRABLE POSITION (IN GENERAL) FOR MOUNTING (a) LOW-ANGLE GUN,  
(b) HIGH-ANGLE GUN.

3. As regards (a), the Sub-Committee are of opinion that this gun should be at the after end of the ship in order to be able to fire right astern. It should, however, be so placed as to have as good forward arcs of fire as practicable.

As regards (b), the Sub-Committee consider that the position for this gun is governed mainly by the desirability of giving it as all round an arc of fire as possible. Subject to the above consideration, the Sub-Committee recommend that this gun should be situated in the vicinity of the low-angle gun. This would permit of one crew manning both guns (since both are unlikely to be in action at once) and of one magazine storing ammunition for the two guns.

In small vessels in which it may not be possible to fit more than one gun, the gun should be suitably placed and capable of both low-angle and high-angle fire.

Each ship will have to be judged on its merits.

THE APPROXIMATE COST OF STIFFENING MERCHANT VESSELS IN PEACE-TIME TO PREPARE THEM TO TAKE A DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT.

4. (a) *If not yet contracted for*, the Sub-Committee consider that £80–£100 per gun might be accepted as reasonably accurate.

(b) *If building has started but no structural alterations would be entailed*, (c) *If already built*, the Sub-Committee consider that in these two cases the cost per ship would vary so much with each individual ship that a close estimate is not practicable.

The cost would however be much greater than under (a) above, especially in the case of (c) where it might vary from £300 to £1,200 for two guns per ship. There are, however, certain particular ships already built, such as fast liners, tankers and vessels with large refrigerated spaces, which are so valuable in supplying the necessities of this country that stiffening of them for defensive armament in peace-time is considered most desirable. This stiffening could be done when the ships are in hand for survey, a certain number of ships being stiffened annually, until all those selected were completed.

FINANCIAL PROVISION FOR STIFFENING FOR DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT.

5. *Recommendations.* (i) That the Government should pay for the incorporation of stiffening for one low-angle gun and one anti-aircraft gun in all suitable vessels of 500 tons gross and over during building.

(ii) That for such period as is necessary a further sum of money should be provided annually to pay for the cost of incorporating stiffening for one low-angle gun and one anti-aircraft gun in particular vessels already built as selected by the Admiralty, having regard to their type and age. If this proposal is concurred in, a detailed investigation into the question of which existing ships should be stiffened would be made, together with an estimate of the annual appropriation required for this purpose.

At the present time there is a large number of ships building or about to be built, and it is therefore desirable to introduce the new policy as soon as possible.

(iii) That key drawings illustrative of requirements for fitting guns and stiffening should be furnished to—

- (i) the Shipbuilding Conference, for distribution to shipbuilders,
- (ii) the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom and the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association, for distribution to owners, with particular reference to firms employing their own naval architects.

(iv) That shipowners, shipbuilders, and Naval architects should also be encouraged to confer with the Admiralty Naval Construction Department, which department would be prepared to furnish them with all details necessary before drawing up their designs.

*Note.*—H.M. Government have decided to bear the cost of stiffening vessels in the following categories:—

- (a) Selected ships of over 500 tons gross under construction on or before 30th November, 1937, the term "under construction" being construed as referring to ships for which contracts have actually been entered into.
- (b) Existing ships of over 500 tons gross selected by the Admiralty in collaboration with the owners and the Board of Trade.

In the view of H.M. Government ships to be built during the next two or three years should be stiffened during construction to carry armament at their owners' expense.

Shipowners generally have indicated their willingness to co-operate in these proposals.

## SUB-COMMITTEE (E)

### Précis of Report

*Terms of Reference.*—To consider items of convoy equipment required by merchant ships.

2. The Sub-Committee consider that the following items of equipment are essential for every merchant ship sailing in convoy:—

- (a) A board at least 6 feet long and 4 feet wide with the ship's name painted on it in letters at least 9 inches high, the reverse side to be black for communication by writing.
- (b) Two sets of International Code Flags.
- (c) One pair of semaphore hand-flags.
- (d) A portable morse flashing lamp suitably adapted for convoy work.
- (e) An oil-burning stern-light with shade arranged to limit visibility to 3 points on either side of right astern and to cast the light downwards on the water.
- (f) A zig-zag clock.
- (g) Convoy chart sets as requisite.
- (h) A table of masthead heights.
- (i) Two small strong casks for use as fog-buoys.
- (j) 300 fathoms of 1¼-inch wire hawser with reel, for towing the fog-buoy.
- (k) A line suitable for communication with other ships at sea.

#### *Recommendations.*

3. (i) That shipowners should be informed of the articles (a) to (f) and (k) above, which should be provided by them in time of war.

(ii) That the Admiralty should keep in readiness at suitable ports articles (g) to (j) above.

(iii) That on outbreak of war the Admiralty, acting under the Defence Regulations, should order all British merchant ships not already so fitted to establish an efficient means of passing orders for engine revolutions or knots from bridge to engine-room, and that shipowners should be informed in peace-time of this requirement and advised that this can best be met by telephone or voice-pipe or failing either of those, by a device such as is mentioned in the note below.

*Note.*—The Sub-Committee are in agreement that good communications between bridge and engine-room are essential for convoy work, as the bridge must be able not only to order "Half Speed" or "Full Speed", etc., but also to ask for an increase or decrease of so many knots or revolutions for purposes of station-keeping. The best method of doing this is by voice-pipe or telephone, and in ships fitted for this no further provision is necessary. Many ships, however, do not possess such communications at present, and it appears essential that these should either instal a telephone or voice-pipe or improvise some alternative means of achieving the desired result. The Sub-Committee, while recommending the telephone as the most efficient method, have considered the following alternatives:—

- (a) When the engine-room telegraph is electrically operated, a scale of revolutions could be painted on each of the telegraph dials. This, however, would not be effective when the telegraph is mechanically operated, owing to the unreliability of the mechanism to register small divisions on the dial accurately.
- (b) A system of lights might be installed in the bridge, and in the engine-room the illumination of one or more lights to indicate that an increase or decrease of a given number of knots or engine revolutions is required.



(iv) That every merchant ship would have two sets of signal halyards so placed that signals can be hoisted from the bridge or from a position close to the bridge and that shipowners should be advised accordingly.

(v) That the Admiralty should take the necessary measures in peace and war as regards crows' nests and voicepipes or telephones as recommended in (vi) below.

(vi) That a supply of voice-pipes or telephones should be maintained with the guns in peace. The best equipment for this purpose appears to be a field telephone system. Crows' nests, where not already fitted, should also be supplied by the Admiralty in emergency.

(vii) As a point of practical value, that when fog-buoys are actually in use they should have painted on them in large letters or figures a symbol to denote to which column in the convoy the ship towing the fog-buoy belongs, and the position in the column, and it is proposed to embody the suggestion in the book of advice to masters.

*Note.*—Proposals under (i) (ii) (iv) (v) and (vi) are being put before shipowners and the Government.

Admiralty, S.W.1, 25th May, 1938.

GENTLEMEN,

I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to state that they have recently had under consideration the question whether licences under the Naval Treaties Acts, 1922 and 1937, are necessary in respect of merchant ships which are being stiffened to take defensive armament.

2. Section 1 (i) of the principal Act, i.e., the Treaties of Washington Act, 1922, enacts, *inter alia*, that no person shall, without a licence from the Admiralty, alter, arm, or equip any ship so as to adapt her for use as a vessel of war, or despatch or deliver any ship which has been so altered, armed or equipped.

3. In Their Lordships' opinion, an armament of the type outlined in the typical drawings which accompanied Admiralty memorandum, dated 30th December, 1937, to shipowners on stiffening merchant ships to enable them to mount a defensive armament in time of war is not capable of use for purposes other than those of defence. Their Lordships have decided, therefore, under Section 1 (4) of the Treaties of Washington Act, 1922, that the stiffening of a merchant ship to carry such an armament does *not* constitute alteration or equipment of the ship such as would adapt her for use as a vessel of war; and there is accordingly no necessity for the firm carrying out such work to apply to the Admiralty for a licence under the Naval Treaties Acts, 1922 and 1937.

4. Should you at present have a vessel in hand for stiffening for defensive armament coming within the foregoing description for which a licence has already been granted under Section 1, sub-section 1 (a) of the principal Act, there will be no need to apply for a licence for delivery under Section 1, sub-section 1 (b) even if forms of application for the latter have already been sent to you.

I am, &c.,

S. H. PHILLIPS.

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From Secretary of State for the Colonies.

To His Excellency the Governor.

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Despatched : 12th March, 19 39 Time : 0021

Received : 13th March, 19 39 Time : 1100

*Reas 1-8*  
No. 15. Secret. My Circular despatch February 17th Secret paragraph 9. Grateful if information asked for could be furnished by telegraph or by separate air mail despatch.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

s/8/39.

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DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

*From* His Excellency the Governor.

*To* Secretary of State for the Colonies.

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*Despatched:* 3rd April, 1939. *Time:*..

*Received:*... .. 19 ... *Time:* ...

No. 23. Your telegram No. 15 Secret paragraph 9 three copies only of handbook required.

GOVERNOR.

MEMORANDUM ON DISTRIBUTION OF HANDBOOKS OF INSTRUCTION  
REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 9 OF SECRETARY OF STATE'S  
SECRET CIRCULAR DESPATCH OF 17th FEBRUARY, 1939.

1. The handbook which has been prepared for issue through ship-owners to the masters and officers of British merchant ships is in two parts, one dealing with general questions and the other with detailed instructions regarding communication questions. These publications are entitled "Defence of Merchant Shipping", Part I - Masters' and Officers' Handbook, and Part II - Signalling Instructions, and they have been prepared for issue as follows:-

Parts I and II together bound in one cover - short title "D.M.S. (1 and 2)".

Part II separate in a cover - short title "D.M.S. (2)".

The general purpose of and procedure adopted as regards the issue of these handbooks to shipping companies in this country will be clear from the annexed copy of an Admiralty letter (No. M.06171/38 of the 28th February, 1939) which is attached to this memorandum as Appendix I, and which it is suggested might be used as a basis for a letter from Colonial Governments to shipowners when these books are distributed. Attention is invited, in particular, to what is said in paragraphs 5 to 7 of that letter.

In addition to the above handbook, a separate handbook has been prepared for the information of shipowners. This book, entitled the "Shipowners' Handbook", is of a particularly confidential nature, and special care should be exercised in regard to its distribution. A written receipt should be obtained for each copy of this handbook issued, and particulars furnished in due course of the individual shipowners, etc., to whom each copy is supplied.

2. The requirements of merchant ships on Colonial registers have been considered in the light of the replies to the Secretary of State's secret circular despatch of the 17th February, 1939, and of certain other information (e.g. the replies to the Secretary of State's secret circular despatch of the 17th May, 1938). In calculating the number of books that will be supplied, the scale of distribution has been based on that indicated in the Admiralty letter mentioned above.

3. The distribution decided upon can be summarised as follows:-

(1) Aden. All the ships mentioned in the Governor's secret despatch of the 21st March, 1939, are registered either in London or in Bombay. That being so, the issue of the handbooks will be made either in London or Bombay; and, in the circumstances, no copies will be sent to Aden.

(2) Bahamas. It is understood that the two ships referred to in paragraph 4 of the Governor's secret despatch of the 10th March, 1939, are both fitted with wireless. That being so, two copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be sent to the Bahamas, one each - for the masters and officers of each ship, together with two copies of D.M.S. (2) for the wireless operators. In addition, in accordance with the arrangement indicated in paragraph 4 of the appendix to this memorandum, two additional copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be added for the use of the owners.

Two copies of the Shipowners' Handbook will also be sent.

(3) Bermuda. In the Governor's secret telegram No. 17 of the 20th March the request was made that six copies both of the Shipowners' Handbook and of the Handbook for Masters and Officers should be forwarded to Bermuda. It appears, however, from the list of ships enclosed with the Acting Governor's despatch of the 12th September, 1938, that only two of the four ships registered at Bermuda are over 500 tons gross - the "Nerissa" and the "Castle Harbour" both belonging to the Bermuda and West Indies Company. As the "Nerissa" is over 3,000 tons gross, two copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be forwarded for the use of her master and officers, together with a copy of D.M.S. (2) for the wireless operator. One copy of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be forwarded for the "Castle Harbour", together with one copy of D.M.S. (2). In addition, one copy of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be sent for the Bermuda and West Indies Company, the owners, for whom a copy of the Shipowners' Handbook will also be included.

(4) Ceylon. (Secret despatch of the 15th March, 1939). Two copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be forwarded to Ceylon - one for the master and officers of the "Hercules" and the other for the information of the Colombo Port Commission. One copy of D.M.S. (2) will be sent for the wireless operator of the "Hercules", while a copy of the Shipowners' Handbook will be included for the Port Commission.

(5) Cyprus. In the Governor's secret telegram No. 54 of the 15th March it was stated that four copies (presumably of both handbooks) were required. In his secret despatch of the 17th March, 1939, reference was made to the fact that only four ships were now registered in Cyprus - the "Danubian", the "Har Zion", the "Evagoras" (United Kingdom ships), and the "Georghiou" (a Cyprus ship). It is noted, however, from the enclosures to Cyprus secret despatch (2) of the 7th October, 1938, that although the s.s. "Evagoras" has a British master and a British wireless operator, her owners are represented in Cyprus by Messrs. Mantovani and Sons, who are Italian subjects. The s.s. "Danubian" has a Greek master and a Rumanian wireless operator, the "Har Zion" has a German master and a Rumanian wireless operator, while the "Georghiou" has a Greek master and no wireless operator.

In view of the above facts, it is not considered advisable to send any of the handbooks to Cyprus.

(6) Falkland Islands. It was stated in the Governor's secret telegram No. 23 of the 3rd April that three copies of the handbook (i.e. presumably of each handbook) would be required.

The first enclosure to the Governor's secret despatch of the 20th October, 1938, mentions three ships as registered in the Colony - the "William Scoresby", the "Discovery II" and the "Fitzroy".

Issue of the necessary handbooks in respect of the "Discovery II" (if required) would be made in this country. In view of the fact, however, that the Government of the Falkland Islands propose to purchase the "William Scoresby" for mine-sweeping duties, one copy of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be forwarded for the use of her master and officers, and an additional copy for the information of the Falkland Islands Government. A copy of D.M.S. (2) will also be forwarded for her wireless operator. In addition, a copy of the Shipowners' Handbook will be forwarded for the Government of the Falkland Islands.

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herein  
5/8/38  
Rev 8

D. K. P. 1 -

one copy Gosh.

" " Wm S.

" " Fitzroy

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D. K. P. 2.

one copy Gosh.

" " Wm S.

" " Wm S. Op?

" " Fitzroy

" " W. Op.

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D. K. S.

S. O. H.

-

one copy - Gosh

- 7.1.00

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As regards the "Fitzroy", her owners (the Falkland Islands Company, Limited) have already received copies of the Shipowners' Handbook and of D.M.S. (1 and 2). Copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) and of D.M.S. (2) will, however, be forwarded to the Falklands for the use of the master and officers and the senior wireless operator of this ship should she be put into commission again.

(7) Fiji. In the Governor's secret despatch of the 14th March, 1939, it was stated that there were only three vessels of over 500 tons registered in the Colony - namely the "Rabaul", the "Salamua" and the "Suva". As each of these ships is over 3,000 tons gross, two copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be sent for each ship, together with one copy of D.M.S. (2) for each ship. An additional copy of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be sent for the use of Messrs. W. R. Carpenter, Shipping, Limited, of Rabaul, together with a copy of the Shipowners' Handbook. Messrs. W. R. Carpenter and Company Limited of Sidney, New South Wales will receive copies of the Shipowners' Handbook and of D.M.S. (1 and 2) from the Dominion authorities in Australia.

In paragraph 3 of the Governor's despatch the suggestion was made that the handbooks should be handed to the London agents of these companies. It is thought preferable, however, to forward all the handbooks to Fiji for communication to the ships as opportunity offers. It is regretted that it will not be possible to furnish copies of the handbooks for the use of the Customs Department of Fiji.

(8) Gibraltar. In his secret despatch of the 1st April, 1939, the Governor forwarded a list of fourteen sea-going steamers of over 500 tons registered in Gibraltar.

It is not proposed to issue any handbooks to the "Sans Peur" which is a yacht. Fourteen copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be forwarded to Gibraltar for communication to the masters and officers of the thirteen other ships given in the Governor's list, allowing for the provision of an additional copy for the masters and officers of the "Alex" which is over 3,000 tons. Six additional copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will also be forwarded for communication to Messrs. M. H. Bland and Company, Mr. McEwan, the Jenny Steamship Company, the Toussi Shipping Company, the Hector Shipping Company, Limited, and Mr. F. V. Andlaw - or their local agents. The Finchley Steamship Company have had copies both of the Shipowners' Handbook and of D.M.S. (1 and 2). Six copies of the Shipowners' Handbook will be forwarded for the firms mentioned above.

It is understood that of the ships given in the list forwarded by the Governor, only the "Gibel Deisa", the "Gibel Zerjon", the "Latymer", the "River Dart", the "River Tyne" and the "Alex" are fitted with wireless. Accordingly, six copies only of D.M.S. (2) will be sent, in respect of the above six ships.

(9) Gold Coast. The Governor's secret despatch of the 28th April was concerned with a suggestion that the handbooks required for a number of steamers (registered at Sierra Leone) belonging to Elmina Limited should be distributed by the Government of the Gold Coast. The requisite distribution in respect of these ships has, however, already been made to the parent company (United Africa Company, Limited) in England at the request of that Company.

(10) Hong Kong. Arrangements are being made, in consequence of strong representations from the Commander-in-Chief, China, regarding the necessity for one Naval distributing authority to be responsible for issuing all books to local firms in the Far East, owing to the close connection between shipping at Hong Kong and Shanghai and the peculiar difficulties at these ports, and in order to avoid

confusion and lack of security for the requisite number of copies of the handbooks to be supplied to the Commodore, Hong Kong, for issue to ships of the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company.

The question of what further distribution of handbooks should be made in respect of the other ships shown in the list enclosed with the Governor's secret despatch (2) of the 30th March, 1939, is still under consideration in the light of the observations made in paragraph 3 of that despatch and of a communication on the subject which has been received by the Admiralty from the Commander-in-Chief, China. Any further distribution will, however, be effected similarly through the Commodore, Hong Kong.

(11) Jamaica. In the Governor's secret telegram No. 54 of the 20th March a request was made for 27 copies of the Books of Instruction. It appears, however, from the enclosures to the Jamaica secret circular despatches of the 6th July, 1938, and 24th September, 1938, that there are only eight ships registered at Kingston (excluding the "Jadwiga" which is a yacht, to which vessels the books are not being supplied, and which has a German master) and one vessel of over 500 tons gross registered at the Cayman Islands, the s.s. "Husvik". It is accordingly proposed to send fourteen copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) for the master and officers of these vessels (five of which are over 3,000 tons gross and so will receive two copies each), six copies of the same publication for the owners, and eight copies of D.M.S. (2) for the wireless operators (if British). Six copies of the Shipowners' Handbook will also be forwarded.

(12) Malta. In the Governor's secret telegram No. 25 of the 13th March a request was made for forty copies of the handbooks.

It appears, however, that there are only four vessels registered at Malta of over 500 tons gross - the "Knight of Malta", the "San Gorg", the "Patris" and the "Ronwyn". As regards the "Ronwyn" however, this vessel has already been supplied in the United Kingdom with copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) and D.M.S. (2) at the request of her owners when they were supplied with books in respect of their other ships registered in the United Kingdom. The owners stated that although the "Ronwyn" was then registered at Malta, her registration would ultimately be transferred to the United Kingdom. Accordingly, three copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) are being sent to Malta for communication to the masters and officers of these ships other than the "Ronwyn", together with an additional three copies for the use of the owners of the "Knight of Malta" the "San Gorg" and the "Patris". Of the ships mentioned above, all have wireless except the "San Gorg". Accordingly, two copies of D.M.S. (2) will be forwarded for communication to the wireless officers concerned.

Three copies of the Shipowners' Handbook will be sent out for communication to the owners of the "Knight of Malta", the "San Gorg" and the "Patris".

There is some doubt as to whether the master of the "Patris" is a British subject. Until this has been verified, D.M.S. (1 and 2) should not be issued to him.

(13) Mauritius. It was pointed out in the Governor's secret despatch of the 5th April, 1939, that in addition to the Government tug "Maurice" only two steamers were on the local register, namely the "Zambesia" and the "Carabao" belonging to the Colonial Steamships Company. The tug "Maurice" is, however, under 500 tons gross. Accordingly, two copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be forwarded for



communication to the masters and officers of the "Zambesia" and the "Carabao", together with one additional copy for use by the Colonial Steamships Company. Two copies of D.M.S. (2) will be forwarded for communication to the wireless operators on the two above ships.

One copy of the Shipowners' Handbook will be forwarded for the Colonial Steamships Company.

(14) Nigeria. In the Governor's secret telegram No. 145 of the 19th April a request was made for three copies of the Handbook for masters and officers. In view, however, of the information given in the list forwarded with the Acting Governor's secret despatch of the 1st September, 1938, it is considered that handbooks should be distributed to cover the requirements of the following vessels:

"Enugu"  
"Lady Clifford"  
"Lagos Atlas"  
"Lagos Vulcan"  
"Ajasa"  
"Day Spring"  
"Robert Hughes"  
"Lagos Pathfinder"  
"Calabar"

The first seven of these boats are owned by the Government of Nigeria, the "Lagos Pathfinder" is owned by Messrs. John Holt and Company, Limited, and the "Calabar" by Messrs. Elder Dempster Lines.

Accordingly, nine copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) are being forwarded for issue to the masters and officers of the above ships, together with one additional copy for the use of the Government of Nigeria. Messrs. John Holt and Company, and Messrs. Elder Dempster Lines have already received copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) and of the Shipowners' Handbook. Accordingly one copy only of the Shipowners' Handbook will be forwarded, for the Nigerian Marine Department.

Of the ships mentioned above, only the "Ajasa", the "Day Spring", the "Robert Hughes" and the "Calabar" are fitted with wireless. Accordingly, four copies of D.M.S. (2) will be forwarded for use by the wireless operators of these ships.

(15) Sierra Leone. See under Gold Coast.

(16) Straits Settlements. (i) Enclosure No. 1 to Straits Settlements despatch secret of 7th March, 1939, has been used to calculate the requirements of these books. Accordingly, 45 copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be forwarded for issue (subject to the remarks in (ii) below) to the masters and officers of the following ships of 500 tons gross and over:-

Straits Settlements Company Limited	24 ships.	
Soon Bee Steamship Company.	2 "	
Ho Hong Steamship Company.	3 "	(All over 3,000 tons gross)
Heap Eng Moh Steamship Company.	5 "	
Burns Philp and Company.	3 "	(All over 3,000 tons gross)
Straits Settlements Colony	1 ship	
Christmas Island Phosphate Company.	1 "	

Of the above vessels, 16 are fitted with wireless, and 16 copies of D.M.S. (2) will therefore be forwarded for issue to the wireless operators if of British nationality.

An additional seven copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) and of the Shipowners' Handbook will be forwarded for issue to the shipowners above, subject to the remarks in paragraph (ii) below.

(ii) Before issuing any copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2), D.M.S. (2) or the Shipowners' Handbook to the Soon Bee Steamship Company, Ho Hong Steamship Company, or the Heap Eng Moh Steamship Company, the local Naval Authorities should be asked whether it is desirable to issue these books or whether it is considered advisable to withhold them from these firms.

(iii) No copies of any of the books will be forwarded for issue to G. L. Shaw, or in respect of the vessel owned by him, in view of the fact that he is stated to be resident in Manchuria, neither will any books be included for Thio Kim Chuan.

(17) Trinidad. It was suggested in the Acting Governor's secret telegram No. 67 of the 18th March that eight copies of the Handbook for masters and officers and three copies of the Shipowners' Handbook should be sent to Trinidad.

The ships for which handbooks are required are as follows:-

(A) The "Trinidad" and the "Tobago", which belong to the Government of Trinidad; and

(B) Two vessels registered at Trinidad belonging to Trinidad Leaseholds Limited.

Accordingly, four copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be sent for communication to the masters and officers of the above ships. One additional copy of D.M.S. (1 and 2) will be sent for retention by the Government of Trinidad, and one copy for the Trinidad Office of Trinidad Leaseholds Limited. Trinidad Leaseholds Limited have already received a copy of the Shipowners' Handbook (as well as copies of D.M.S. (1 and 2) and D.M.S. (2) for their three ships based on Trinidad but registered in this country). One copy of the Shipowners' Handbook will be sent for the use of the Government of Trinidad.

It is understood that of the four ships registered at Trinidad only the "Trinidad" has wireless. Accordingly only one copy of D.M.S. (2) will be sent for the wireless operator of that ship.

Colonial Office,

July, 1939.

Appendix

Letter from Admiralty No. M.06171/38 of 28th February, 1939.

Admiralty, S.W.1.

28th February, 1939.

Gentlemen,

I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that, in order to assist ships of the British Merchant Navy to surmount the dangers with which they may be confronted in war, the

(11)

Admiralty have prepared two books, one dealing with general questions and the other with detailed instructions regarding communication questions, which they desire should be issued in time of peace in order that the Merchant Navy may be prepared by study beforehand to meet the situations which may arise on an outbreak of war. These pre-arranged steps have been discussed, as you may be aware, on the Shipping Defence Advisory Committee, by the Admiralty and representatives of the shipping community, and have received their concurrence.

2. The above books will be entitled "Defence of Merchant Shipping", Part I - Masters' and Officers' Handbook, and Part II - Signalling Instructions, and arrangements are being made for them to be prepared for issue as follows:-

Parts I and II together bound in one cover -  
Short title D.M.S. (1 and 2).

Part II separately in a cover - Short title D.M.S. (2).

The object of the issue of a separate Part II is given in paragraph 7 below.

3. The Naval Store Officer, Royal Victoria Yard, Deptford, has accordingly been instructed to forward to you ..... copies of Parts I and II and ..... additional copies of Part II. It is estimated that this issue will allow for a re-distribution to your fleet on the following scale:-

- (i) To merchant vessels between 500 and 1,600 tons gross, if not fitted with W/T:-  
One copy of Part I and one copy of Part II (bound together in one cover).
- (ii) To merchant vessels between 500 and 3,000 tons gross if fitted with W/T:-  
One copy of Part I and two copies of Part II (i.e. one copy of Parts I and II bound together and a separate copy of Part II).
- (iii) To merchant vessels of 3,000 tons gross and over:-  
Two copies of Part I and three copies of Part II (i.e. two copies of Parts I and II bound together with a separate copy of Part II).

4. An additional copy of D.M.S. (1 and 2) is included in the above total numbers for the use of Owners.

5. It is intended that the books which are re-issued to merchant vessels in accordance with the above should be issued to the masters of the vessels, but that books should NOT be issued to masters who are not British subjects.

6. Should a British Master be relieved by one who is not a British subject, after the issue of the books has been made, all copies of the books should be withdrawn from the vessel in question.

7. The additional copies of Part II are intended for the masters to re-issue to their senior W/T operators. Should a vessel carry a senior W/T operator who is NOT a British subject, the Master should retain the additional copy of Part II until such time as a senior W/T operator who is a British subject joins his ship.

8. My Lords would be glad if you will undertake the issue of the books on the lines mentioned above as soon as they are supplied to you, returning any surplus copies or applying for additional copies if required. The distribution should be confined to sea-going ships on the United Kingdom Register as ships on the Dominions and Colonial Registers are being treated separately.

9. As the main object of the issue of these books in peace is to familiarise all officers in advance with the steps taken to safeguard merchant vessels in war, My Lords would be glad also if you would issue instructions to your masters to encourage their officers (British subjects only) to study this publication, the extra copies issue to the larger vessels (i.e. over 5,000 tons gross) being intended to facilitate this.

I am, &c.,

S. H. PHILLIPS.

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CIRCULAR

SECRET

Downing Street,

22nd July, 1939.

Sir,

*Reas 1-8.*  
I have the honour to refer to paragraph 9 of my secret circular despatch of the 17th February, 1939, and to inform you that copies of the handbooks mentioned in that paragraph are now available for issue to Colonial Governments in respect of ships on Colonial registers.

2. The arrangements to be made for the distribution of these handbooks have been discussed with the Admiralty in the light of the replies received to my circular despatch and of certain other information. The distribution decided upon is set out in the enclosed memorandum, which gives the number of handbooks which will be sent to each Dependency concerned and indicates the proposed recipients. The appropriate number of books are being sent to you under separate cover and I have to request that you will arrange for their distribution in accordance with what is said in the memorandum.

3. I have to ask that when copies of these handbooks are distributed to the recipients attention should be drawn to their confidential nature. In particular, much of the information given in the

The Officer Administering  
the Government of

handbook for Owners is of a particularly confidential character. If, in any given case, doubt is felt as to the propriety of communicating any of the handbooks to the proposed recipients, it will be desirable that reference should be made to me before distribution is made to the firm or firms concerned so that the Admiralty can be consulted in the matter.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

*Malcolm MacDonald*

5/8/39 (16)

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

DOWLING STREET.

SECRET. (2)

23 AUG 1939 August, 1939.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you copy No. 5325 of Admiralty document "Defence of Merchant Shipping - Confidential Appendix B to Part II, Signalling Instructions", and to request that in emergency it may be handed to the Officer-in-Charge of the Wireless Telegraph Station at Stanley.

"Defence of Merchant Shipping"

2. I also enclose, for your retention, copies Nos. 27-34 of Admiralty document O.R. 04024 - "Mercantile Convoy Instructions, 1939".

C.B. 04024 - Copies 27-34.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,

(Signature)

GVERNOR

SIR HERBERT HENDRIKSE BRATON, F.C.M.G.,

etc., etc., etc.

5/8/39.

Received from the Colonial Secretary copy No.  
5825 of Admiralty document "Defence of Merchant  
Shipping - Confidential Appendix B to Part II,  
Signalling Instructions".

*J. M. C.*  
Ag. Supervisor ~~Electrical~~ and  
Telegraphs Dept.

Stanley, October 28th 1939.



S/8/39.

CIRCULAR

SECRET

Downing Street,

22nd August, 1939.

Sir,

With reference to my circular despatch of even date enclosing copies of Board of Trade Notice No. M.169 to Shipowners and Shipmasters dealing with passive defence against air attack, I have the honour to invite attention to my secret circular despatch of the 17th February, 1939, which dealt generally with measures for the protection of merchant shipping in war.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

*Waldron Woodward*

The Officer Administering

the Government of

5/8/39

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SECRET.

The Under Secretary of State for the Colonias presents his compliments to the Colonial Secretary of the Falkland Islands, and, with reference to the Secretary of State's Secret Circular despatch of the 22nd July is directed to transmit copies of the following additional circulars for the Shipowners' Handbook :-

Red 15'

Red 1. 19-23  
inserted in Handbook.

- Circular 19. Painting of ships in time of war.
- Circular 20. Protection of personnel against machine gun attack.
- Circular 21. Provision of trained personnel to serve as guns' crews in defensively equipped merchant ships in war.

2. It is requested that these circulars may be inserted in the correct sections of the Shipowners' Handbook, the Contents Sheet being amended accordingly.

Downing Street,

6th September, 1939.

6214/63A/39.

SECRET.

The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies presents his compliments to the Colonial Secretary of the Falkland Islands and, with reference to his third personal note of the 6th September, is directed to transmit a copy of the following additional circular for the Shipowners' Handbook:-

Circular 22 Zig Zag Course Indicator.

2. It is requested that this circular may be inserted in the correct section of the Shipowners' Handbook, the Contents Sheet being amended accordingly.

*Red (24)*  

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*Inserted  
at G.H.*

Downing Street,

23 September, 1939.

CIRCULAR

Downing Street,

22nd August, 1939.



Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you, for your information, copies of Board of Trade Notice No. M.169 to Shipowners and Shipmasters on the subject of the protection of merchant shipping against air attack, together with copies of Air Raid Precautions Handbook No. 7 referred to therein.

2. This Notice, the main purpose of which is to indicate those measures which owners and masters of merchant vessels should take in peace time, in order to enable their ships to reach a home or base port with minimum risk of damage from air attack, has been prepared by the Board of Trade in consultation with the Air Raid Precautions Department of the Home Office, the Admiralty, the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Transport, as well as with the Shipping Federation and the Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool.

3. Further copies of the Notice could be sent to you should you wish to have them.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

*Malcolm MacDonald*

The Officer Administering  
the Government of

CIRCULAR NOTE.

SECRET.



Red (15)

The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies presents his compliments to the Officer Administering the Government of Falkland Islands and, with reference to the Secretary of State's secret circular despatch of the 22nd July, is directed to transmit, for distribution to recipients of the Shipowners' Handbook Copy No. 494 of a Handbook relating to the Control of Merchant Shipping to be exercised by the Board of Trade (Ministry of Shipping) in time of war.

The receipt form, duly completed, should be detached from the Handbook, and returned to the Director of Sea Transport.

Colonial Office,  
 Downing Street, S.W. 1.  
 13 November, 1939.

DECODE.

Circular

TELEGRAM. Saving.

(30)

From Secretary of State, London,

To His Excellency The Governor, Falkland Islands.

Despatched: 7th December 19 39 Time:

Received: 8th February 19 40 Time:

Saving Confidential. Decision has been taken to admit, at the request of their masters, neutral vessels to British Convoy.

2. Application from Masters of neutral ships will be accepted provided that it is made clear to them that the Admiralty accepts no responsibility for any damage sustained by such ships due to their inclusion in a British convoy and subject to provisos that (a) ships are trading with or for the British Empire or France and (b) that no allied ship is thereby excluded.

3. Consular Officers in neutral countries are being instructed to give the above information to any bona fides enquirer but it is not desired that any Press publicity should be given to the arrangement since this might embarrass neutral Governments in their relations with the German Government. You should take parallel action.

Received by mail of 8<sup>th</sup> February.

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5/8/39

CIRCULAR NOTE.

SECRET



The Secretary of State for the Colonies presents his compliments to the Officer Administering the Government of **FALELAND ISLANDS** and, with reference to his third personal note of the 6th September, is directed to transmit a copy of Amendments and Additions No. 1 to ~~copies~~ the Shipowners' Handbook.

Red 24  
Inverkeithing

Colonial Office,

Downing Street, S.W.1.

20th December, 1939.

CIRCULAR

SECRET



Downing Street,

18th January, 1940.

Sir,

*Red (S)*

With reference to paragraph 11 of my secret circular despatch of the 17th February, 1939, I have the honour to inform you that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have had under consideration, in connection with questions relating to the defensive equipment of merchant ships, the special position of ships registered not in the United Kingdom but in ports of the Dominions, India, Burma and the Colonial Empire. It appears to be desirable that such ships, when engaged in trade with the United Kingdom or in any capacity which brings them into a danger zone, should be provided with defensive armament, and the Admiralty are prepared to lend the necessary guns and mountings free of charge to the Colonial Governments concerned.

2. There are, however, certain other expenses involved in the defensive equipment of merchant ships, particularly the cost of:-

- (a) stiffening of the ship to receive the gun or guns,
- (b) fitting the gun or guns in the ship,
- (c) ammunition and other stores,

which would appear to be a proper charge upon either the owners of the ship concerned or the Colonial Government in whose territory the ship is registered.

The Officer Administering  
the Government of



3. For ships of United Kingdom registry the cost of stiffening is paid for out of Navy Votes, except for ships ordered subsequently to the 30th November, 1937. By that date United Kingdom shipowners had been made aware that it was desirable that merchant ships should be stiffened to receive guns and were encouraged to have provision made in the design of new ships laid down; this need involve little, if any, additional expenditure. It is proposed to recover the cost of fitting from the owners up to a maximum of some £300 in the case of a ship fitted with two guns, or some £150 for a ship fitted with one gun. Ammunition and other stores are supplied from Admiralty stocks and the cost is met from Navy Votes. As a general rule, defensive equipment is not supplied to ships of less than 500 tons gross.

4. I should be grateful if you would inform me whether any of the vessels of 500 tons gross and over registered in the territory with which you are concerned should, in your opinion, be stiffened and armed in accordance with the policy outlined in paragraph 1 of this despatch. If so, I should be obliged if you would indicate whether your Administration would be prepared to meet the costs described in paragraph 2 of this despatch, recovering as much as may be thought fit from the owners in the case of vessels that are not Government-owned. The matter is one of considerable urgency, and I should be grateful if a very early reply could be returned.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

Walton MacDonald



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General.

Experience gained in the last War indicates that Germany will try to organise sabotage on as large a scale as possible against all shipping trading with those countries opposed to her. This sabotage may occur at any time in any port, whether friendly or neutral, and every effort should be made to ensure that opportunities of interfering with shipping or shipping facilities in ports are reduced to a minimum.

The attention of British shipmasters is drawn to section 5 of Confidential Appendix A to D.M.S. Part 1, which deals generally with sabotage. This memorandum amplifies the information given in the above book, but as conditions at every port vary it is essential that the Master of a British ship on arrival at a foreign port should immediately get in touch with the British Consular Authorities to obtain the latest advice the Consul may be able to give as to any special local precautions which should be taken against sabotage.

TYPES OF SABOTAGE.

In order to assist officers concerned to understand the reasons for the precautions recommended, the types of sabotage that may be attempted against ships are outlined below.

Delay Action Bombs.

The principal weapons of the saboteur will probably be high explosive and incendiary bombs fitted with delay action fuses. These fuses may be arranged to fire after any interval from one hour to one week. They will probably be quite silent in operation so that they cannot be located by sound in the same way, for example, that a clock can be located by listening for the ticking. Clockwork may, however, be used and, if ticking is heard from a suspicious place, steps should at once be taken to locate it.

Bombs, either incendiary or high explosive, are unlikely to be of large size as in general they will have to be carried by the saboteur without arousing suspicion.

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Either an incendiary or a high explosive bomb weighing not more than 1-lb. will do considerable damage if exploded in the right place at the right time.

Mines.

Attempts may be made to attach mines to ships at anchor or alongside. For example,

- (a) delay action mines may be floated downstream so as to become caught across the ship's stem;
- (b) mines may be attached to the rudder and arranged to explode after the rudder has made a certain number of reversals.

These mines might well be no larger than a football, yet be sufficiently powerful to damage the ship seriously.

The mines would presumably be "laid" at night-time from a small boat or launch, or hooked to the ship from the dockside. They may well be camouflaged to look like old packing cases or kerosine cans or fenders or, in fact, any object that may normally be found drifting about in the port in question.

Interference with Machinery.

Opportunity might arise for damaging machinery especially if any overhaul or repairs are made in a foreign port. Various methods might be employed, a favourite one being to tamper with the lubrication system. One method is simply to block one part of the system so that damage is done before it is noticed; a second is to adulterate the lubricant by adding an abrasive such as emery or carborundum powder, a third is to "lubricate" bearings with an oil can full of mercury. This latter causes the white metal lining to run and ruins the bearing.

The feed water system may be tampered with to cause priming or bad deposits in the boiler, or the steering engine might be damaged or interfered with in some way so that it jams, particularly when the ship is navigating in narrow channels,

Where electricity or refrigeration is important for the safety of the ship or cargo, an attempt may be made to damage the dynamos or dynamo engines or refrigerating machinery.

Thermal Bombs.

Bombs can be made which will explode when raised to the temperature of hot water, and such bombs may be concealed about the furnaces or boilers (including the boiler mountings) or steam pipes or, in fact, in any place which reaches the temperature of 160°F. (70°C) or more when the ship is at sea.

Bombs of this type may also be camouflaged to look like lumps of coal and thrown into the bunkers or wherever fuel is found.

Poisons and Germs.

Attempts may be made to contaminate the drinking water supply of a ship or to introduce on board germs or pests which will attack the officers, men, passengers or cargo.

Precautions to be Taken.

From the foregoing paragraphs officers will gather the type of precautions to take in order to minimise risk of attack by saboteurs, but for their guidance the more important types are enumerated.

Keeping suspicious persons out.

It is, of course, important to have only trustworthy men in the crew.

No unauthorised persons should ever be allowed on board. For this purpose reliance should not be placed on guards stationed by the port authority to prevent access to docks, quays, etc., as cases have occurred where unauthorised persons have obtained entrance and got on board ships that were insufficiently guarded. Watch should be kept on all those who approach the ship either on the dock side or in boats, or from lighters placed alongside, particularly at night.

Buoys between ship and quayside should be used when possible as they will be found to simplify vigilance over communication between ship and shore.

The decks and stern of the ship should be illuminated as fully as possible throughout hours of darkness and if the ship is unable to provide adequate lighting through lack of necessary

equipment/

equipment, arrangements should be made to secure additional equipment from shore.

Supervision of persons allowed on board.

When men, not being trustworthy members of the crew, do come aboard they should be allowed only into such parts of the ship as their duties necessitate and be kept under supervision.

Access to engine and boiler rooms should be limited to one door on deck which can be kept under observation, and these rooms, as well as steering compartments, propeller shaft passages, auxiliary machine rooms, wireless rooms (including all electrical storage battery spaces), compass compartments, inflammable stores and the like should be closed to all except trustworthy persons. If unknown workmen must enter such spaces they should be accompanied by a trustworthy man and their equipment should be examined to see whether it contains any sabotage materials.

Special supervision of machinery which has been opened up for overhaul should be carried out (particularly in respect of cylinders when covers are replaced), and after overhaul engines should always be turned by means of their 'turning gear' before turning them under power.

Precautions when loading or unloading cargo.

When loading and unloading cargo no men should be allowed to bring any object on board, whether it purports to be food, parcels or any apparently innocent object without, if possible, the object being searched to see whether it contains sabotage materials. In addition, responsible members of the crew should be on duty continuously in each hold or compartment with the stevedores while cargo is being worked.

The cargo coming aboard either from lighters or the quay-side should, as far as possible, be watched or examined to ensure that bombs or other harmful devices are not concealed in it, and steps should be taken to ensure that lighters leave the vessel's side as soon as operations between ship and lighter are completed.

In

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In ships carrying inflammable cargoes or explosives, special precautions should be taken to see that no incendiary materials are concealed in the holds.

Examination on leaving port, etc.

On leaving port, careful search should be made of all spaces where bombs may be concealed, not neglecting such places as pipes for sounding the bilges down which bombs may be pushed.

The outside of the hull of the ship should also be examined to see whether any foreign objects are entangled around the bows or stern or are caught alongside.

In armed merchant ships care should be taken to see that no unauthorised persons approach the armament or ammunition.

General Remarks.

Every officer, whatever his sphere of duties should be able to visualise for himself the places in the ship vulnerable to sabotage that lie in his particular field. He should put himself in the place of a saboteur and determine at what points sabotage would be possible, and then take immediate steps to see that such points are guarded. In many places the mere fitting of a lock and key will be sufficient; in other places more elaborate safeguards may be necessary, but in every case all possible steps should be taken to discourage the saboteur by making his task difficult and dangerous.

All officers are advised to read the first-hand account of sabotage against shipping at New York during the last war in Captain von Rintelen's book "The Dark Invader", published by Penguin Books, Ltd., at 6d.

Shipmasters should guard against any attempt by an armed gang disguised as passengers or crew to seize control of the ship and should invariably keep revolvers on board in order to deal with such an attempt.

In the event of bombs being found or an attempt at sabotage being discovered, an immediate report should be made following the procedure laid down in the Annex to this memorandum.

Ship masters are strongly advised to arrange when in harbour for one officer always to be on duty as guard security officer of the ship for the special purpose of seeing that all necessary precautions against sabotage are being taken.

SAFEGUARDING OF CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

Books or instructions labelled "Secret" or "Confidential" when not in use are invariably to be kept locked up in a safe place the keys of which should be carried on the person of the officer responsible.

It is the direct responsibility of Masters of ships that the contents of secret or confidential documents or instructions are only disclosed to those whose duties are such that they must have knowledge of them. The fewer who have this knowledge the less is the likelihood of leakage.

Agents of unfriendly powers are to be found in all neutral ports, and they are likely to frequent those places ashore where officers and men of our shipping mainly congregate. They may be acting as waiters, bar-tenders, ladies of easy virtue, etc., or they may actually be hidden. They may also be passengers on board. Therefore it cannot be too strongly stressed that confidential instructions or information must never form the topic of conversation in any public place.

The following instances show the vital importance of this warning:-

- (1) Certain information of a secret nature that had been imparted to masters of British ships during the crisis of September 1938, was in a short time common knowledge the length of the East Coast of South America. This leakage was traced to conversation at table aboard one of the ships.
- (2) During the same period two masters of British ships were overheard by a German Agent at Santos while discussing on shore the question of "Alternative routeing."

Masters of ships should bring this warning to the notice of all those on board whose duties necessitate their knowledge of confidential matters.

M.O.17637/39.

1st January, 1940.



ANNEX.

Reporting Bombs found or sabotage attempts discovered.

Should any sort of bomb ever be found on board, a report should at once be drawn up giving as full details as possible on the following lines:-

Name of Ship .....

Voyage From..... To.....

Position of Ship at time of discovery. days out from.....

.....

Date of finding Bomb. .....

Time of finding Bomb. .....

Position of Bomb. .....

Size of Bomb. .....

Shape of Bomb. .....

Colour of Bomb. .....

Any other details. .....

Do any of crew normally have access to position where bomb was found and, if so, are any of them open to suspicion?  
.....

What persons had access to the position where bomb was found at the last port of call? Are any of these persons possible saboteurs?  
.....

If the attempted sabotage which has been discovered consists of tampering with the ship or the crew in any way whatsoever, a similar type of report should be drawn up, care being exercised to include every possible detail, however irrelevant it may appear, so that all possible means may be taken to discover the saboteurs and prevent recurrences of the attacks.

These reports when completed should be handed to the British Consular Authority at the port where the ship is lying (or at the next port of call if she should be at sea) for forwarding to the Admiralty.

42

CIRCULAR

SECRET

Downing Street,

4th March, 1940.



Sir,

Red 15  
JNH

With reference to my secret circular despatch of the 22nd July, 1939, I have the honour to transmit to you copies of a memorandum prepared in the Admiralty on anti-sabotage precautions, giving details of the various types of sabotage that may be attempted by the enemy.

2. I should be glad if the contents of the memorandum could be brought confidentially to the notice of owners and, if you consider it desirable, to masters of ships registered in ports in the territory or territories with which you are concerned.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

Walter Macdonald

The Officer Administering  
the Government of

43



CIRCULAR NOTE.

SECRET.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies presents his compliments to the Officer Administering the Government of the Falkland Islands and, with reference to his third personal note of the 20th December, 1939, begs to transmit copy No. 53 of Circulars Nos. 25-32 for insertion in Section VIII of the Shipowners' Handbook.

Red (31)  
inserted  
in copy to 5324

Colonial Office,  
Downing Street, S.W.1.

9 April, 1940.

APPENDIX TO THE MEMORANDUM ON ANTI-SABOTAGE PRECAUTIONS.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MASTERS AND CONSULAR OFFICERS.

The following instructions in respect of anti-sabotage precautions are to be carefully noted and appended to the Memorandum on Anti-Sabotage Precautions already issued.

- (1) It is of the greatest importance in the prevention of sabotage that there should be the closest co-operation between the masters of ships when in foreign ports and the British Consular Officers resident there. The dangers from sabotage are likely to vary in nature according to the locality and the most valuable information in this respect is available only from the local Consular Representative. The master, therefore, in addition to carrying out the instructions contained in the Memorandum on Anti-Sabotage Precautions and in D.M.S.A. must, immediately upon arrival at a foreign port and before attending to any other business, attend at the Consul's office to obtain advice as to the precautions particularly desirable in that port.
- (2) Since it is essential that those engaged in reducing the dangers from sabotage in foreign ports should be in possession of all information connected therewith, the master must report to the Consul at once, in full, and on every occasion any suspicious incident attending the stay of his vessel in port, whether or not such an incident is accompanied by damage to his vessel. Prompt and circumstantial reports of this nature may be of great assistance to the local British authorities, in the light of their specialised knowledge, in their endeavours to check sabotage activities.
- (3) All evidence of sabotage in the nature of parts of bombs, foreign matter in the engine, etc., should be carefully preserved and handed to the Consul for despatch to this country, or, if the vessel is homeward bound, kept to be given to the authorities when she reaches port.

SECRET

5/8/39

42

Circular Note (2)

FALKLAND ISLANDS



Transmitted with the compliments of the  
Secretary of State for the Colonies, for information and  
distribution, with reference to his **SECRET**  
circular **DISPATCH** of the 4 MAR 1940

Recd (42)

Colonial Office,

Downing Street,

19 APR 1940

46



CIRCULAR NOTE.

SECRET.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies presents his compliments to the Officer Administering the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ and, with reference to his third personal note of the 9th April, begs to transmit *copy no 554.* of circulars Nos. 33 and 34 for insertion in the Shipowners' Handbook.

*Recd 30*

*Inserted in copy no. 534.*

Colonial Office,  
 Downing Street, S.W.1.  
 1st May, 1940.

5/8/39

47



CIRCULAR NOTE.

SECRET.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies presents his compliments to the Officer Administering the Government of the Falkland Islands and, with reference to his third personal note of the 1st May, begs to transmit copy No. 554 of circular No. 35 for insertion in the Shipowners' Handbook.

*Recd*

*WLL*

*Inserted in  
copy no. 554*

Colonial Office,

Downing Street, S.W.1.

3rd June, 1940.

48



CIRCULAR NOTE.

SECRET.

Red 47

The Secretary of State for the Colonies presents his compliments to the Officer Administering the Government of the Falkland Islands and, with reference to his third personal note of the 3rd June, begs to transmit <sup>copy no</sup> 574 of Circular No. 36 and new Contents Sheet dated May, 1940 (cancelling Contents Sheets dated October, 1938 and September, 1939) for insertion in the Shipowners' Handbook.

*Necessary action taken.*

*A.S.  
31/10/40*

Colonial Office,  
Downing Street, S.W.1.  
7th August, 1940.



DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From Secretary of State for the Colonies.

To His Excellency the Governor.

Despatched : 4th April, 1941. Time 0225.

Received : 9th April, 1941. Time 1600.

Maritime Circular No. 17. Secret. Security Service here have recently drawn attention to vital importance fully adequately security measures relating to shipping in Colonial Ports more especially measures prevention of damage to cargoes or leakage of information of shipping movements.

Evidence is available that enemy secures valuable intelligence about convoys, their contents, dates of sailing, and their arrival at intermediate ports and final destinations and will make maximum damage this information.

The following are examples of security measures considered essential at sea and air ports (a) espionage keep a thorough check on all passengers including arrivals and departures and full investigation in any cases which in effect afford grounds for suspicion (2) Check on crews and care in allowing shore leave especially to Aliens (3) examination and censorship of coolies papers or documents carried by passengers or crews on departure as well as on entry (4) continuous investigations as to reliability of labour employed at ports (5) restricting telegraphed information by Foreign Consuls (6) prohibit photography and sketching (7) shipping agents etc. should be warned against any unnecessary careless disclosures of detail of shipping movements to unauthorised persons. Steps should be taken to see such warning is strictly observed.

(b) Sabotage (1) recommendations anti-sabotage memorandum enclosed in my Despatch March 4th 1940 Secret should be put into practice by all masters and supplemented whenever possible by local authorities (2) constant watch attempts to suborn crews to leave their ships or to stir up trouble of any kind for this delay of ships (3) guarding of merchant ships in port an system of passes to visit exclusion of all unauthorised persons from the dock premises wharves and warehousing areas. Maritime particularly vital points to be kept under watch especially after dark (4) immediate investigation of cases of suspected sabotage. Full reports should be sent to me at once and watch should be kept on all casualties to shipping other than those resulting from enemy action even if sabotage is not suggested with a view of ensuring that sabotage can be definitely ruled out.

The vital importance of measures to ensure the maximum security of shipping and dock facilities does not require emphasis and I assume close co-operation with fighting forces is maintained. In connection with measures of this kind it is particularly important actual theatre of War should not be allowed to reduce perseverance of vigilance since security of ships and their contents and utmost possible efforts to avoid mention of their movements is of vital importance in all ports.

Please telegraph if you are satisfied that all possible measures have been taken to ensure co-operation with the various services concerned and indicate briefly what measures are in operation or are proposed to meet these dangers.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

I.D.C.O.

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

*From* His Excellency the Governor, .....

*To* Secretary of State for the Colonies.

*Despatched* : 10th April, 19 41. *Time* : ...

*Received* : ... .. 19 ... *Time* : ...

No. 48. Your Maritime Circular No. 17 Secret. I am satisfied. Only Port of entry and departure during war is Port Stanley where no vessels other than local running ships can tie up alongside.

Connection between ship and shore ~~must~~ vigorously controlled. Any stranger who may come ashore is in this very small place automatically under close observation and there are no means of going inland without police knowledge. Boats or other vessels for hire are not available.

Co-operation between services and inter-departmental is excellent and unauthorised movements in or around harbour or docks virtually impossible.

GOVERNOR.

I.D.C.O.

Red 49.

CIRCULAR

SECRET



Downing Street,

8th February, 1942.

Sir,

Red (15)

With reference to Mr. MacDonald's secret circular despatch of the 22nd of July, 1939 and subsequent correspondence, I have the honour to inform you that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have decided that as the contents of Admiralty publication "Defence of Merchant Shipping - Shipowners' Handbook" - short title "D.M.S. (S.O.H.)" are now largely obsolete, the handbook shall be withdrawn.

2. I have to request that you will arrange for the copies of this handbook forwarded to you for distribution in accordance with the memorandum enclosed in the despatch under reference to be destroyed and for signed certificates of destruction to be sent to the Head of Military Branch (Books), Admiralty, Trafalgar Quarters, Park Row, Greenwich, S.E.10.

3. I have to add that the contents of Circular 14, Section 5, concerning convoy equipment have been brought up to date and issued as an Admiralty Merchant Shipping Instruction (A.M.S.I.).

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

Moyne

The Officer Administering  
the Government of

FALKLAND ISLANDS

(52)

Colonial Secretary's Office,  
Stanley, Falkland Islands,  
22nd April, 1942.

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

S E C R E T.

CERTIFICATE OF DESTRUCTION.

I hereby certify that Copy No. 554 of Admiralty publication "DEFENCE OF MERCHANT SHIPPING - SHIPOWNERS' HANDBOOK" - short title "D.M.S. (S.O.H.) was destroyed by fire on the 22nd of April, 1942.



for Colonial Secretary.

s/8/39.

22nd April,

42.

Sir,

With reference to the Secretary of State's Secret Circular despatch of the 8th of February, 1942, I am directed by the Governor to forward herewith a Certificate of Destruction in respect of Admiralty publication "Defence of Merchant Shipping - Shipowners' Handbook" - short title "D.M.S. (S.O.M.)", Copy No. 554.

I am,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant,



for Colonial Secretary.

The Head of Military Branch (Books),  
Admiralty,  
Trafalgar Quarters,  
Park Row,  
GREENWICH, S.E. 10.

5/19/39

CIRCULAR

SECRET

Downing Street,

31st March, 1942.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to Mr. MacDonald's circular despatch of the 4th of March 1940, and Lord Moyne's circular telegram of the 7th of April 1941, and to enclose a copy of a further memorandum relating to precautions against the sabotage of merchant ships.

2. You will see that this memorandum was prepared for the use of His Majesty's Consuls in neutral ports and was not intended, like that enclosed in Mr. MacDonald's circular despatch under reference, for distribution to Masters of British and Allied ships. The intention was that His Majesty's Consuls should use such sections of the memorandum as they considered suitable or applicable to the local conditions with which they were concerned, in advising Masters about anti-sabotage precautions.

3. It appears to me that the memorandum might, nevertheless, be useful to Harbour Masters, Marine Superintendents and other officials in Colonial ports whose work may require them to advise Masters of British and Allied ships on this subject, and I should accordingly be obliged if you would bring the memorandum to the notice of any such officials in the territory with which you are concerned. It is appreciated that conditions in neutral ports where enemy agents can often attain easy access to docks, are very different from those in British ports and that the precautions recommended in this memorandum may therefore be somewhat over-stringent in some Colonial ports. The general principles of anti-sabotage measures, which the memorandum reformulates in convenient form can however be applied, with suitable modification, to varying local conditions.

4. Copies of the memorandum have been sent by the Security Service direct to its representatives in the Colonial Dependencies, who may, no doubt, already have made its contents available to some of those concerned.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

*Cranborne.*

The Officer Administering  
the Government of

FALKLAND ISLANDS

ENCLOSURE.

Secret.

**COUNTER-SABOTAGE (MERCHANT SHIPS).**

THE enemy have made several attempts to sabotage our merchant ships and there is reason to believe that these attempts will be intensified in the near future. The incidence of shipping sabotage is so far much less than in the last war and there is no doubt that one of the main reasons for this is the increased care that Masters of ships take about the security of their vessels.

This memorandum is not meant for circulation to all Masters of ships as it is too long and too technical. It has been prepared with a view to showing what methods of sabotage the Security Service has found the enemy have used or are contemplating; it indicates on the one hand certain broad counter-sabotage principles, while on the other it provides the means of identifying and investigating sabotage after it has occurred.

It is suggested that, if anti-sabotage recommendations are prepared for Masters, one of the main considerations should be that Masters and crew should be put to the minimum of inconvenience and labour, for everyone is well aware of the difficult lives that Masters have and nobody wishes to add to their burdens.

SUMMARY

The most important anti-sabotage precautions can be summarised quite shortly:—

1. An efficient and reliable guard should be placed on every ship.
2. All methods for preventing the development of "natural" fires should be encouraged. Ships should be fitted with a means of closing off the air supply in a very short space of time via the ventilators. To combat incendiary devices or even lighted matches and cigarette ends being thrown down ventilators, a strong wire netting structure should be fitted over the ventilator intakes.
3. The best methods of committing sabotage to ships' engines are in general those that can be mistaken for "natural" breakdowns due to carelessness or so-called technical deficiencies. We recommend, therefore, that greater care should be taken in seeing that lubricating oil systems are kept clean and that proper lubricants are supplied; further, that care should be taken to turn the machinery carefully with the turning gear after the engines have been standing or after overhauling. Such recommendations are a good engine room routine apart from being a counter-sabotage precaution.
4. The best way to guard against sabotage of any kind is to give a ship all the care that is its due.

The four points enumerated above may be considered sufficient for distribution to Masters. The detailed analyses and suggested precautions enumerated below are to be distributed according to requirements and security.

## SABOTAGE METHODS

There are four main methods of sabotaging ships:—

1. Direct damage to ship and its machinery.
2. Incendiary devices and explosives in the cargo (including Mails) and coal—
  - (a) Placed in cargo during or after loading.
  - (b) Placed in cargo during packing, transit or previous to loading.
3. Interference with the ship's drinking water or stores.
4. Infernal machines placed in the ship's magazine or ammunition stores.

### External.

Methods 1 and 2 can be considered together.\* Mines can be fixed to the sides of ships by the use of magnetic material; they can also be attached to rudders, where arrangements can be made for the mines to explode after the rudder has made a certain number of reverses. In general the "delay" can vary between almost immediate explosion and six weeks. The technical methods of effecting the delay need not be gone into in great detail here, though it may be mentioned that the acid-metal (corrosion) and the time-clock are the two simplest forms of effecting delay.

Cases have been known where mines were floated downstream at night so as to come across the ship's stern. Mines have also been towed across ships by small boats.

Explosives have been fitted to the sides of ships by divers and other workmen ostensibly effecting repairs.

All infernal machines and mines of the types mentioned above can easily be camouflaged to look like petrol tins or packing cases. The question of precautions will be gone into further later, but here it may be mentioned that flood-lighting on the outside of the ship and careful examination before leaving port are all that can be done.

### Internal.

Inside a ship, the time bomb, either explosive or incendiary, is the ideal weapon. Such bombs are unlikely to be bigger than a parcel or attaché case which a sailor or stevedore might bring on board, but, even with this amount of material, vital damage can be done to ships' engines if the bomb is placed in a suitable position; 10 lbs. of T.N.T., which is easily carried in a small attaché case, is sufficient to blow a large hole in a ship's side, and a much smaller amount would seriously damage an engine condenser or cylinder.

The camouflage of such bombs may take a variety of forms. Thermos flasks, workmen's mess tins, parcels, attaché cases, baskets of food and tea canteens are known to be used by the Germans as "covers" for infernal machines.

Such bombs can be left in inconspicuous places on the ship, such as sounding pipes to bilges or tanks, and the only way of dealing with this problem is by carefully searching the ship before leaving port. Bombs may also be placed in ventilators or thrown in portholes and hatches, either from the deck or from the shore. Another type of bomb which has been used is one which explodes when hot; it can be placed in the coal or near furnaces or boilers.

## DAMAGE TO MACHINERY.

The following methods of damaging machinery are known to have been considered by the enemy and in certain cases to have been effected with success:—

- (a) Foreign bodies placed in the machinery (the conventional spanner in the works).
- (b) Interference with the lubricating system by blocking part of the system with corks or other obstacles and by placing an abrasive such as carborundum in the lubricating system.

\* Excluding sabotage to cargo before the cargo arrives at the ship.

- (c) The feed water system may be interfered with, causing bad deposits and consequent damage to the boiler.
- (d) The steering engine may be damaged or deranged, causing it to operate dangerously when navigating narrow channels.
- (e) Dynamos, dynamo engines or refrigerating machinery may be damaged, and such damage may interfere with the degaussing gear or may ruin the cargo in cases where the cargo is of a perishable nature.
- (f) The degaussing gear itself may be damaged.

## COUNTER-SABOTAGE PRECAUTIONS.

1. *The Crew.*—Serious damage, such as firing or blowing up a ship, while at sea, will rarely be undertaken by any of the ship's complement unless the saboteur member of the crew deserts just before the ship goes to sea. If such a desertion takes place, the ship should be searched with special care.

It has been suggested that a sailor might do sabotage on one ship, then desert and join another. Masters should, therefore, be on their guard not to engage a man whose discharge papers are not in order.

Minor damage and delaying tactics are easily committed by members of a ship's crew and are difficult to guard against. Damage is often inflicted maliciously as the result of dissatisfaction regarding leave, and cases of damage to a ship, which are not due to technical deficiencies, should be investigated from this point of view.

Crews should not be allowed to bring parcels or other objects on board without examination. Authority should, therefore, be given to certain persons to examine parcels. Such persons would be the seamen on guard, who should be authorised to ascertain the contents of any parcels, attaché cases or other objects carried on board by the crew. (The same principle applies, if it is possible to implement, with stevedores.)

2. *Stevedores.*—Ships' agents should attempt to ensure that all stevedore labour employed is approved by the stevedore contractors. It is realised that this is a very difficult measure to enforce. A further precaution which might be of some, though not of great, value would be to arrange that a responsible member of each stevedore gang should be paid as an anti-sabotage agent. It is evident that if such a proposal were adopted it is vitally necessary to see that the person in question is above suspicion, as in a privileged position an enemy saboteur would be able to do untold damage. In general, the only effective precaution is constant supervision; some responsible person should always be in the holds during loading. In the loading of grain, wire mesh nets can be used for covering hatchways, preventing objects already in the grain from passing into the holds.

3. *Workmen.*—Workmen engaged on repairs of the hull or machinery have ample opportunities to commit sabotage and the only precautionary measures that can be taken are constant supervision, the locking up of all possible places on the ship, and the fitting of wire doors across parts of the ship to prevent unauthorised people from entering. This type of precaution particularly applies to the engine room, which should always be locked or guarded.

It is most important that all ventilators are able to be closed rapidly in order to prevent air circulating in case of fire. This is the most effective way of preventing a fire from spreading.

If workmen have left, places to which they have had access should be searched and any object likely to contain a bomb and which does not appear to have any useful function on board should be thrown overboard. It is not advisable for Masters or other members of the crew to attempt to examine or dismantle parcels that they think may contain bombs. This has already been done in this war and serious accidents have occurred, as is inevitable when inexpert examination is carried out.

Strong wire netting should be placed over ventilators and other apertures through which bombs can be dropped, while all unnecessary hatches should be kept shut.



As mentioned earlier on, engines should be carefully turned one complete revolution and observed by a person in authority before the machinery is started.

Before leaving port a thorough search should be made of the ship for bombs. All likely places should be examined and the outside of the hull should be examined for foreign bodies entangled round the bows or stern and also for bombs attached to the hull.

4. *Passes.*—No one should be allowed on board the ship without a pass. Passes with photographs should be issued to ships' agents, doctors, chandlers, &c. Such passes could be issued by His Majesty's Consul after consultation with other appropriate authorities.

5. *Guards.*—To enforce the pass system and for the other conditions previously mentioned, there must be a continuous guard on board the ship. This is particularly necessary on the day of arrival. It is here that the greatest laxity occurs on merchant ships. The seriousness of the guard's duties must be clearly emphasised to each person, and it may be that the provision of some form of distinguishing uniform, belt and revolver would make this rather arduous duty more attractive. This would help the guard to command respect and also serve to remind him of his responsibilities. In this connexion care should be taken that there is only one means of access to or exit from the ship, at which point the guard should be posted. The guard should also, of course, make tours of inspection round the ship from time to time.

A small ship's company may find difficulty in providing personnel for continuous guards after a long voyage at sea. In such special cases, guards should be provided from the shore, though the same conditions should apply to their guarding the ship as if they were members of the crew.

6. *Illumination.*—It is important that adequate flood-lighting of ships should be possible and furthermore that a movable flood-light should be available to examine any boat which approaches the ship at night. If a boat has approached the ship an examination should be made as mentioned earlier on. The points of access to a ship should be illuminated and in those cases where blackout is necessary special lighting must be provided. The necessary equipment should be kept by His Majesty's Consul or other appropriate authorities in ports to provide those ships which have not got the necessary lighting equipment.

7. *Access.*—Ships should be moored in such a position that means of access are limited as much as is possible.

Quayside guards should be arranged wherever possible in foreign countries.

Barriers should be erected on the wharf covering the full length of the ship and only authorised persons should be allowed inside such barriers.

No unauthorised ship should be allowed to tie up alongside an allied ship.

8. *Passengers.*—No passengers should be allowed on board unless they have special passes to establish their *bona fides*. Even genuine passengers should have their luggage searched. No passengers' friends should be allowed on board. The agents of passenger-carrying vessels should bear the responsibility of seeing that all their passengers' documents are in order.

9. *Cargo.*—One of the most difficult types of sabotage to counter is that where a bomb is placed in a packing case amongst the cargo. Bombs can be placed in packing cases in factories; packing cases can be tampered with in warehouses or quaysides; or apparently similar packing cases can be substituted for those waiting to be loaded. The only precautionary measures that can be taken are the adequate protection of the cargo before and during loading.

No restrictions can be placed on the hours of loading, but it may be advisable to stipulate that when loading is carried out at night the pathway to both the holds and the bridges and the receptacles from which the cargo is being transferred must be supervised with particular care. In general, loading should only be carried on at night when absolutely necessary, and then with adequate lighting and supervision.

10. *Ammunition.*—Ships' ammunition should be guarded or kept locked and examined when leaving port and at least once a day during a voyage.

11. *Coal.*—Particular care must be taken when bunkering coal vessels and whenever possible coal should be watched as it enters or when it leaves the chute, preferably by the stoker or fireman, who are most concerned. Firemen and coal trimmers should be warned to be on the look-out for objects of a suspicious nature in the coal.

12. *Oil.*—One of the commonest forms of sabotage is through the introduction of abrasive metals or particles into the lubricant system or the various bearings which require lubrication. As a precautionary measure, particular care should be taken to make frequent examinations of all oil filters, and drains should be taken from the bottom of oil sumps at frequent intervals and examined for the presence of abnormal dirt.

Just previous to leaving port, and while filling up hand-fed bearings, a little extra care should be taken to ensure that no sand or abrasives are present.

An uncommon form of sabotage is to contaminate oil with a substance which causes the oil to emulsify and thus jam the pipes. This can occur very readily if salt water is present in the oil or if compounded oil is used. If a mineral oil is used and care is taken to prevent the inclusion of salt water, the emulsifying agent is rendered comparatively ineffective. In certain cases, considerable quantities of iron oxide scale have been found in sumps and sump tanks, giving the impression that sabotage has been carried out. In most cases, however, it was established that the fault was due to the presence of salt water, and, in the case of new vessels, magnetic iron oxide is of a sufficiently hard and gritty nature to cause serious troubles in the bearings.

*Turn the machine over carefully by hand before setting it into full motion.*

If the normal precautions are observed with regard to preparing the ship's machinery before leaving port, such as a turn on the steering wheel, and examination of the oil supply and feeds, any attempt at sabotage in this direction will invariably be discovered.

54



CIRCULAR  
SECRET.

Downing Street,  
11th May, 1943.

Red 55.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to Lord Cranborne's Secret circular despatch of the 31st March, 1942, and to enclose a copy of a later memorandum on the same subject entitled "Counter Sabotage: Ships".

2. As in the case of the previous memorandum, it is not suggested that the whole of the new version should be brought to the attention of ships' masters. Action in this respect is left to your discretion. Doubtless, however, you will wish as before to bring this new document to the notice of Harbour Masters, Marine Superintendents and other officials whose work may require them to advise Masters of ships on this subject.

3. Copies of this memorandum have been sent by the Security Service direct to its representatives in the Colonial Dependencies.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your most obedient, humble servant,

OLIVER STANLEY.

The Officer Administering  
the Government of

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Handwritten notes and stamps at the bottom of the page.

54A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# COUNTER-SABOTAGE : SHIPS

## COUNTER-SABOTAGE: SHIPS

Shipping is at the moment the main target of the German Sabotage Service in their activities against this country. This will continue even if important military operations are started against us, though when this happens, more sabotage of the operational type will occur.

One of the least profitable activities in which a Security Officer can indulge is to invent methods of sabotage which the enemy might use and to take precautions against such hypothetical attacks. To give an example, it would be a simple matter to impregnate workmen's clothing with a chemical so that the clothing bursts into flame after a period of time. Precautions to see that no clothing in any factories is so impregnated would hardly be practicable, and as there is no evidence whatsoever that the German Sabotage Service has even considered this method of incendiarism, no precautions should be taken to counter it.

The position is not quite so simple in the shipping world. First of all, merchant ships are so vulnerable to sabotage and so vital to the allied war effort, that precautions against hypothetical methods of sabotage, which might be unnecessary in industry, must be considered. The reason for this is that there are certain parts of a merchant ship which are so obviously susceptible to sabotage that even if there is no evidence that the enemy has considered attacking them, precautions must be taken to obviate future attempts. Furthermore, even though certain of the methods described in this note have not been attempted in this war, there is reason to think that they may have been in the last and may be in the future.

Another reason for taking special care about shipping is the rather paradoxical fact that the German Sabotage Service has so far been so stereotyped in methods of attack against merchant shipping that it is not difficult to be lulled into a sense of security by a knowledge of the simple precautions that need be imposed. In Spanish ports, where the main sabotage effort is being made at the moment, these precautions are:—

No one will be permitted to bring anything on board a ship which might be a bomb.

The hull of the ship will be searched just before she sails and any bombs attached will be removed.

In view of the intense activities of enemy saboteurs in ports in Spain and Spanish Morocco, a special counter-sabotage squad, the members of which have received an elementary training in counter-sabotage, is based at Gibraltar. Two members of this squad are placed on each Allied ship going to Spanish ports, and their sole function is to prevent sabotage while the ships are in port. While on board they are temporary additions to the ship's complement for special duties. They have no secret or police duties on board other than those concerned with counter-sabotage. Their terms of reference are:—

"To make persons boarding merchant ships in port satisfy them personally that nothing they are bringing on board is a bomb. In the event of the counter-sabotage squad not being satisfied, to refuse to allow the person on board unless he leaves the suspected object on shore. In the event of a man being discovered on board with a bomb, the man is to be detained and the master informed.

To search merchant ships just before they leave port and to throw overboard any object not positively identifiable as belonging to a member of the ship's crew or as part of the ship's equipment.

To keep watch while merchant ships are in port with a view to preventing unauthorized swimmers or small boats coming alongside and attaching infernal machines to the hull. In the event of such unauthorized persons refusing to halt, to fire a warning revolver shot with intent to cause the unauthorized person to halt but not with intent to hit him. If the unauthorized person persists in approaching the ship, to fire at him. This last step is only to be taken in the last possible resort.

To examine as far as possible the hull of ship before leaving port and in the event of any object being suspected of being attached, to refer this to the master and request him to get in touch with the Consul immediately.

The counter-sabotage men are to have no Security or Police functions on board of any sort other than that referred to above. Men will not wear armlets."

These precautions are simple to impose provided that personnel and certain equipment are available, and rigid attention is paid to detail. Had these precautions been strictly enforced throughout the war, however, sabotage or malicious damage of a serious

nature would still have occurred on merchant ships. It would not in all probability have been due to the German Secret Service; but it would have been due to disgruntled or disloyal crew-members; and in merchant shipping the work of a disgruntled man is always serious, though this is more rarely the case in industry.

One example of what a disgruntled member of a crew can do may be mentioned. Earlier in the war the demolition charge in the Asdic room of an anti-submarine trawler consisted of some 300 lb. of high explosive set off by a fuze taking 12 minutes to burn. A member of the crew of an anti-submarine trawler at a port in the United Kingdom did not wish to sail with the ship, and thinking that the demolition charge would merely break the Asdic apparatus and thus delay the ship's sailing, lit the fuze. The result was that the whole ship was blown up and another member of the crew was killed. The security lesson to be learnt from this episode is that no member of the crew should have been able to get at the demolition charge.

It may be convenient for the reader to classify shipping sabotage as follows:—

- Destruction of ship.
- Destruction of cargo (or making cargo unusable).
- Damage to ship's machinery.
- Damage to ship's food or drinking water.
- Immobilization of ship in harbour, dock or river to interfere with shipping operations.

*Destruction of ship.*—The German Sabotage Service and Italian saboteurs have used the following methods to destroy merchant ships:—

- Putting bomb in ship's magazine.
- Attaching bombs to ships' sides or bottoms.
- Attaching pneumatic bombs to ships' bottoms.
- Clamping bombs to bilge keels.

One British merchant ship has been sunk this war by a bomb placed in its magazine. There are three security measures which should have prevented this happening and should always prevent any recurrence. They are:—

It should not be possible for anybody to get into the magazine to put a bomb there.

It should not be possible for a person to bring a bomb on board a merchant ship to put it into the magazine or anywhere else.

A ship should be searched before it leaves port and anything which might be a bomb should be thrown overboard unexamined.

If several magnetic or pneumatic bombs are attached to a merchant ship, sufficient damage is likely to be done to make the ship sink or necessitate its being beached. This has happened.

The most valuable counter-measures to prevent saboteurs attaching bombs or mines to the hulls of ships below the water line are:—

Periodic inspection of ships' hulls below the water line by divers equipped with light diving suits.

The irregular discharge of reduced depth charges (containing about 5 lb. of high explosive).

It is to be specially noted that both these counter-measures require the provision of special equipment. Therefore, if it is considered desirable to impose them in any particular part of the world, preparations must be made well in advance.

Very rigid precautions, such as the prevention of anybody coming on board a merchant ship with anything that might be a bomb, the search of the ship's hull before leaving port and the search of the inside of the ship before leaving port, are precautions which it is not necessary to take in every port in the British Empire. Such precautions should, however, be taken in as many neutral ports as possible, for the German Secret Service can clearly operate better in neutral ports; in those British ports which are near battle zones or are likely to be near battle zones in the near future; or where specific intelligence is available that sabotage attempts are to be expected. A typical example of a British port where these precautions should be adopted with the greatest stringency is Gibraltar. The only reason for not carrying out these measures in all British ports is because they tend to impede normal shipping business.

One of the most vulnerable parts of a merchant ship is its degaussing gear, and this can be interfered with in such a way that it not only fails to protect a ship from magnetic mines, but actually makes it more susceptible to them. The usual routine degaussing gear tests may not necessarily be sufficient to show that some interference

has taken place. But any sabotage of the degaussing equipment will invariably produce irregularities in the ship's compass. Whenever inexplicable compass irregularities are reported, the advice of local degaussing experts should immediately be obtained. Furthermore, masters should be encouraged to pay special attention to compass irregularities and to report them without fail before sailing.

It is obvious that at every port there must be the closest co-operation between the Naval and Security authorities. In order to make quite certain that the Naval and Security authorities have identical interests, this note has been approved by the Admiralty, London, before issue, and copies have been sent to all Naval authorities. In addition the Admiralty have issued C.B. 3000 C/42 to S.O.(I)s, pointing out the necessity for close co-operation between the local Naval Authorities and the Security Service. Security Service representatives have been asked to make it their business to be as closely associated with the Naval and Ministry of War Transport officials at each port as is possible. As in many other branches of counter-sabotage and security work, it is not possible to allot special functions to Security, Naval and Ministry of War Transport officials at each port. Their functions must and should overlap to a considerable extent.

*Destruction of Cargo.*—If a loaded ship sinks, the cargo is clearly a total loss. But there are many ways of rendering all or part of a cargo unusable. If this is done at the end of a voyage rather than at the beginning, it has the additional advantage from the enemy's point of view of wasting the whole of the ship's voyage.

An incendiary bomb will damage a cargo to a degree proportional to the combustibility of the cargo and its liability to be damaged by water, for the water which is used to put out a fire is often more destructive than the fire itself. This applies to such cargoes as sisal which, though liable to spontaneous combustion, does not burn with ease. Sisal is, however, very susceptible to water and when wet will swell and burst its bales. A fire occurred recently in a ship carrying sisal. Though the fire was severe, only part of the cargo was damaged. The remainder of the sisal was so badly damaged by water that almost all of it had to be jettisoned.

During the war there have been numerous cases of cigarettes being left in holds during loading, or dropped into ventilators leading to the holds. The cargo often smoulders for some time before discovery, by which time the effect may be widespread. Prevention of smoking in holds during loading is an important security measure. Infringements of regulations prohibiting smoking on or near merchant ships are dealt with far more severely in certain countries than in the British Empire. It should be useful on occasions to mention that the Security Service has received reports that persons smoking against regulations during loading and unloading merchant ships at Russian ports have been shot on the spot.

Interference with a ship's refrigerating machinery, though not necessarily serious in itself, can render an edible cargo entirely unfit for human consumption by the time it arrives at its destination. Any defect in refrigerating machinery, particularly when it is of a type which is not immediately noticed, can be very serious and special care should be taken in the way of testing refrigerating plant before leaving port.

If valves or bilge boards are interfered with, scupper or bilge pipes holed, or if the ship's side valves are defective, sea water will seep into the cargo, damaging that part with which it comes in contact. The chances are that the leakage will not be noticed until the cargo is unloaded.

It is known that the enemy have considered the introduction of incendiary and high explosive bombs into cargoes by means of ventilators, sounding pipes, temperature pipes and other openings. This can be done either by someone on board, or if the ship is alongside the shore at low tide, by someone on the quay. The precautions to obviate this form of attack are the wiring of the apertures of ventilators, sounding pipes, etc., and it is hoped that, even though instructions have been given to have this done in the United Kingdom, the Security Service representatives will make efforts to have it done when cases of omission come to their notice abroad.

*Sabotage to Machinery.*—There are innumerable ways in which machinery and engines can be sabotaged, and as a rule, owing to the number of persons concerned in overhauls, repairs and replacements, it is difficult to trace the culprit. When an act of sabotage to ship's machinery has been committed, repairs themselves may only take a few days or even hours, but the danger always exists that by this time the ship will have missed a convoy and may be delayed several days for another one. A further consideration is the difficulty of obtaining replacement parts, particularly if the engine is of foreign construction and design. When there is only one part upon which the whole engine is dependent, special care should be taken so that no one has the opportunity of damaging it. The immobilization of the camshaft driving gear or the scavenge air pump in a Diesel engine would put the entire engine out of action. In the case of a reciprocating steam engine the equivalent vital mechanisms are the feed pumps.

The most vulnerable part of a geared turbine installation is the reduction gear and a serious case of sabotage occurred earlier in the war when a file was put into the gearing through the inspection doors. This was done by a member or members of the ship's company who had a grudge against the Commanding Officer. The perpetrators had no idea of the seriousness of their action and merely wished to cause nuisance. But the ship was put out of commission for a considerable time.

Any apparatus peculiar to certain ships and which cannot easily be replaced should be given special security attention. For example, some vessels are fitted with special heavy loading derricks for loading and unloading tanks. If these are put out of action in a port where heavy cranes are not available on the shore, the unloading of tanks is indefinitely held up until the ship's derricks can be repaired.

A minor form of sabotage or accident which is very common is the placing of nuts, bolts or small objects in various parts of the engines, cylinders, steering engine and air pumps. There is a constant danger of these objects being accidentally or intentionally left in the engines by ship repairers. More will be said about precautions to prevent this and neutralize the effects later.

*Food and Drinking Water.*—No case of deliberate contamination of ships' drinking water or food has so far occurred, although a number of suspected cases have been investigated. This form of sabotage has great possibilities and may well have been considered by the enemy. It is, therefore, necessary to take all possible precautions against this form of attack, the most important being the chlorination of the ship's drinking water supply. This is difficult to impose because of the dislike that everyone has for drinking chlorinated water. But apart from preventing the danger of bacterial attack, there are other advantages of a purely sanitary nature in chlorinating ship's drinking water.

*Sabotage in Port.*—Petty damage to a ship in port has often been found to be the work of members of the crew who are unwilling to sail and wish to delay the ship. The reasons that members of crews wish to delay a ship sailing have been found to be of a variety of personal and understandable forms. One case has already been mentioned where fear was the predominant motive. Other cases have been due to the presence of a new girl friend in port. On other occasions, a domineering, tactless or unduly severe master has been responsible for disaffection among the crew. This type of case is particularly hard to investigate because the malicious damage is often the result of what one might almost describe as a conference between various members of the crew. Thus the person who thought of committing the damage, and therefore the person who had the motive, is often not the person who actually committed the act. Such circumstances make investigation difficult. A case of this type occurred on board a destroyer earlier in the war. The crew were given shore leave, having been away from the United Kingdom for some time, and unfortunately took their leave during a period of very bad air raids. Almost all the crew were late back owing to transport difficulties, and were severely punished. Subsequently, serious damage was done to the destroyer's engines, an obstruction having been placed in the main gear wheel. (It is not quite clear whether this damage would have occurred or at any rate would have been so serious had Instruction 20 in the Summarized Precautions at the end of this chapter been carried out.) Investigation indicated that this act of sabotage was not the work of one man but indubitably had been thought out and discussed by three or four members of the crew, only one of whom probably placed the obstruction in position.

Greek crews have given rise to suspicion in respect of delaying ships' sailing, and trouble has sometimes been experienced with Danish, Norwegian and Dutch crews, though not to a great extent.

Ship repairers, boiler cleaners and fumigation firms are a constant source of anxiety to the Security Service. It is clearly impossible to keep all employees of a ship-repairing firm under observation while on board, and they therefore have almost unlimited opportunities of committing sabotage, by placing bombs on vulnerable points inside the ship, by opening valves to let in sea water, by the contamination of lubricating oil, or by the usual methods of placing nuts, bolt and spanners in places where they can cause damage when the engines are started up. Fumigators invariably have the run of the whole ship, for the crew are unable to remain on board during fumigation, owing to the fumes. The only way of countering possible sabotage by such persons is by the thorough examination of the ship after they have left. In the case of fumigation companies, the opportunities for ill-disposed employees to commit sabotage are so great that it is advisable to stipulate that only trusted members of reliable firms should be allowed on board. Counter-sabotage measures with regard to fumigation companies must take the form of normal Security Service investigation into the bona fides and reliability of the firm and its employees. In the United Kingdom particulars of the directors or owners of the firm would be obtained and enquiries would be made to find

out whether they had adverse records. Attempts would be made to obtain the co-operation of one or more reliable persons in the firm who could act as informants about other members. Such methods are particularly necessary with fumigation firms, apart from the reasons mentioned above, as the Germans have considerable interest in and control of the fumigation business all over the world.

If proper precautions are taken, it should not be easy for a saboteur to tamper with a ship's cargo during loading or while it is in the ship's hold. But it is frequently found that supervision of goods in warehouses or before they arrive at the port of loading is slack and ample sabotage opportunities are available.

As a general rule, consignors or their employees at a factory are unlikely to pack time bombs among the goods destined for a ship, as there is no absolute guarantee that the goods will get on to the ship within a pre-determined time. This pre-determined time would at present be most likely to be 21 days, which is the maximum delay that can be obtained with the standard German delay mechanism. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the goods will be placed in an advantageous position in the hold from the point of view of an explosion; that is, against the ship's sides. The goods may be interfered with, however, during transit to the port of loading, or while at the dock waiting to be placed on board, bombs being inserted into the packing cases or bales, or carefully prepared packing cases or bales containing bombs may be substituted for those about to be loaded. A substitution of this sort occurred on a ship coming from the Far East, when a tin containing an incendiary mixture of aluminium dust and gypsum with the standard German delay mechanism incorporated was substituted for a tin of liquid Chinese eggs. The tin was obviously one specially prepared by the local German sabotage organization at Shanghai; it had the same dimensions as the ordinary tins of eggs, and the cardboard packing round it was identical with the packing round the genuine ones.

The insertion of bombs in packing cases on the consignor's premises is a problem with which the Security Service representative looking after shipping security cannot be concerned. This again is a matter for normal Security Service investigation, or if neutral ports are considered, for soliciting the assistance of the Secret Service.

Damage to the steering gear, which becomes apparent after the ship has weighed anchor, has been successfully carried out since the war began and has caused great delays, while interference with the steering while a narrow channel or lock of a busy port is being navigated is an obvious and convenient method of sabotage which causes no danger to the saboteur himself. A merchant ship recently rammed the lock gates of a port in the United Kingdom through the incompetence of an engineer on board. The results showed how very successful sabotage of this type could be, for the port was put out of action to all ships except medium sized ones for several months.

This note ends with a list of recommendations based on experience in many ports since the outbreak of war. It is not suggested that it would be possible or practicable to implement all these recommendations at all ports at all times. The turn-round of ships would be unduly retarded. All the recommendations should, however, be enforced with great strictness in time of emergency. A time of emergency is when intelligence has been received that outbreaks of sabotage are imminent. Such outbreaks may be due to an imminent military operation or to the fact that the port or area in question has come into the zone of long range operations planned by the German Sabotage Service; that is, sabotage to vital targets not of immediate operational value, but the destruction of which seriously affects the prosecution of the war.

It may be found of assistance in enforcing the various security measures which are recommended to arrange for the appointment of a Security Officer or at any rate a security link in repairing and stevedoring firms engaged in work on British and allied ships. This principle is adopted in many factories and all utility undertakings in the United Kingdom. The Security officer is a trusted member of the firm who is taken a good deal into the confidence of the Security Service.

THE BEST WAY TO GUARD AGAINST ATTEMPTS AT SABOTAGE AND TROUBLE OF ALL KINDS IS TO GIVE A SHIP ALL THE CARE THAT IS ITS DUE.

#### SUMMARIZED PRECAUTIONS†

1. *Mooring.*—Vessel to be so moored as to limit means of access as much as possible. Pontoons to be placed between ship and quayside wherever practical.

2. *Guards and watchmen.*—A 24-hour watch to be set. Guards (armed if possible) to be posted fore, aft and at gangway, and not to leave their posts unless relieved. An officer to be on duty day and night and to check frequently that all watchmen are

† These precautions are similar to an excellent set prepared by Security Co-ordination, New York.

at their posts. A responsible crew member to be stationed at the gangway throughout the vessel's stay in port. Watchmen to be provided with whistles and torches. Arrangements to be made wherever possible for the provision of quayside guards and barriers. IMPORTANT: Exact scope of guards' and watchmen's authority must be clearly defined to them.

3. *Crew passes.*—Officers and crew to be in possession of a ship's pass before leaving the vessel. Crew-member at gangway to verify that persons holding crew-passes are actually members of crew. Any crew-member returning without his pass to be closely questioned as to its loss, and immediate steps taken to prevent the lost pass being used by an unauthorized person to get aboard, by changing form of pass.

4. *Visitors.*—Nobody to be allowed aboard without an approved pass, adequate identification and legitimate ship's business. Books or sheets to be kept at the gangway and every visitor to sign when boarding and leaving vessel, giving time and business affiliations.

5. *Harbour craft and lighters.*—To be challenged on approaching the vessel and not allowed to remain alongside without legitimate reason. Lighters required for working cargo or stores not to remain alongside at night-time unless absolutely necessary, in which case they are to be inspected by a ship's officer and thereafter kept under close watch.

6. *Stevedores and shore workmen.*—To be carefully checked and if possible searched at gangway and not allowed to carry unexamined packages aboard.

7. *Packages.*—All packages brought aboard to be examined at gangway. This includes passengers' luggage and objects brought aboard by members of the crew.

8. *Hoses.*—To be rigged, ready for immediate use. Extinguishers and sand always to be available throughout the vessel.

9. *Guns and ammunition.*—Gunners to maintain 24-hour watch and not to allow unauthorized persons in guns' vicinity. Ammunition to be under lock and key and examined daily.

10. *Bridge, companionways, etc.*—To be roped off to protect compass and other navigating instruments. Chartroom, wheelhouse, wireless-room, etc., to be securely locked when not occupied.

11. *Engine and boiler-room.*—One entrance only to be in use, this to be kept under close watch. The inspection doors of the main gearing to be locked whenever possible.

12. *Cabins.*—To be locked when not in use.

13. *Ventilators and skylights.*—To be covered by stout wire-netting (mesh half-inch max.). If the ship's ventilators, etc., are not fitted with wire-netting, this should be remedied as soon as possible. Covers (canvas or wood) to be kept handily accessible for closing ventilator-shafts in case of fire.

14. *Portholes.*—To be closed or barred, especially if easily accessible from outside.

15. *Holds and hatch-covers.*—Each hold to be examined for suspicious objects or leaks before loading begins. Smoking to be forbidden in the holds during loading, and this measure to be strictly enforced. A crew-member to be in each hold while working cargo, particularly when native labour is employed. Holds to be carefully inspected by an officer before being closed. Hatch-covers to be replaced immediately work ceases. If for any reason this is not possible, the hatches should be kept under close observation to prevent unauthorized access, or the throwing in of parcels and packages. Bunker hatches especially to be kept closed whenever possible. Loose cargoes such as grain to be loaded through wire mesh nets to prevent any object falling into the hold with the cargo.

16. *Goose necks to tanks.*—To be protected by stout gauze or other effective covering.

17. *Sounding pipes, etc.*—Caps of sounding pipes to fresh-water tanks to be tightly screwed down and sealed in order to prevent poison, etc., being injected into the water. The same care is to be taken with sounding pipes leading to bilges and tanks, especially to tanks containing water intended for use in boilers.

18. *Repairs.*—Especially welding and burning to be done under close supervision. Fire extinguishers, hoses (rigged) and sand always to be within reach.

19. *Oil filters and drains.*—To be checked frequently against abrasives.

20. *Turning machinery.*—The main engines to be carefully turned over with the turning-gear once before starting.

21. *Degaussing equipment.*—To be frequently tested, especially before sailing, particulars of tests to be entered in ship's Log. To be examined with special care when unexplainable compass defects are reported. The Master should always report such compass defects.

22. *Lifeboats.*—To be frequently examined, especially before sailing, with particular reference to jackets, stores, search for small objects and packages, and the lifeboat itself. Particulars of examinations to be entered in ship's Log.

23. *Oil and coal.*—Bunker and/or lubricating oil, if taken, to be sampled before use. Careful scrutiny to be given to bunker-coal as taken aboard.

24. *Gas-cylinders for refrigeration.*—Any gas-cylinders bought locally to be examined and tested before use.

25. *Search of ship.*—The ship should be carefully examined after ship repairers have been aboard and before sailing. Any suspicious object or any article found which cannot be identified as belonging to a member of the crew (fountain pen, thermos flask, attaché case, oil cans not of the type normally on board, etc.) should be thrown overboard *without* examination. Sounding pipes and other openings should be carefully inspected to ensure that no bombs have been placed in them. Oil boxes should be examined for leakages or the presence of abrasives. Note of search to be entered in ship's Log.

26. *Examination of hull.*—The hull should be examined as far as possible before sailing. Facilities for doing this vary in each port. A wire hawser drawn underneath the ship may reveal mines attached to the hull. If the hawser catches some obstruction it should *not* be pulled, and arrangements should be made at once for a diver to investigate.



GOVERNMENT HOUSE,  
FALKLAND ISLANDS.

Documents destroyed 20.7.63.

Ref. file S/8/39

Defence of Merchant Shipping.

D.M.S. (1 and 2)

comprising

Part I. Masters & Officers Handbook

Part II. Signalling Instructions.

D.M.S. (2)

comprising

Part II. Signalling Instructions.

November 1938.

*Esna Breda*  
Private Secretary.

*Int. pl.*