Smourable Colonial Leculary. Nona thank you. 2. I have discussed the four Losh Signal Open from "Exeter" a he feels we have like to concern us on this form here. 20 ×11. 39 The Submitted.
System does not called for here. her intercept appear Inch 20. XII. 19. lisk Supervior pl. of he ausidees it finite for illicil temsuis run here without W'T spolling it 1.1. by internees Supervin Selenaples Dept. accordingly please. 21. XII c/g. Hon Col Sex. . It is possible I am certain for such transmissions to tak place from S. Georgia with out the Gout Station being able to detect it but any illicit transmission in Falklend would he spatted. AM. Sup Est 21.12.39

Sheet 1 Submitted. met! 21. XII. 59. Please send lity am I the hapitali vaying that is is great without to prevent any minue of writers telepathy hanswissin sels ask hen whether he considers that there is any with of the kind i . Serfie and say that he should wanter the sheled posible entrel wer unauthor yet use 1000 27/12/19 3. Selepram from S. of S. of 21. XII. 4. Telegram No. 74 to elbagistrate, S. Georgia of 29/12/39. No real has been received to

of 12/1/40 (6). Telegram hom Yr. Submitted. Plean Send the plearing: - Secret wort 1: 117 secret and your desferit 14: Ochber wireles any illicit Kansminin i Coly und be debeledo magitale Suth Georgie is unable to find endence is that dependency any such Kans wissin O I do with acquisition of any obesid apparelis po detection weens is necessary titte isti Secret Tele: Nº __ of 15.1.40 to Sofs.



Enclosure in Secret Circular Despatch dated 12th October, 1939

MOST SECRET

LEMORANDUM ON ILLICIT WIRELESS TRANSMISSION

1. During the past few years information has come into our possession which leaves no doubt that enemy espionage organizations will use wireless telegraphy and perhaps telephony as a means of communicating information in peace and war.

Wireless presents an attractive proposition to the agent as a means of disposing of his information both speedily and with some degree of safety.

However, there are a number of difficulties which the agent has to overcome so as not to attract attention, such as:

- (a) concealment of his aerial.
- (b) the disguising of his set.
- (c) care with regard to the consumption of electricity and the purchase of components.
- (d) concealment of his activities from a wireless point of view, i.e. from interception and direction finding.
- 2. From the point of view of detecting the agent the first three points depend on personal observation. The last point, however, has to be dealt with technically.

For the purpose of technical concealment, and in many cases to meet his own requirements, an agent will almost certainly use short waves. This means that his signals can only be picked up by an intercept or direction finding set located either within his ground wave (a radius of say 20 miles depending on local conditions) or beyond his skip distance (say approximately 500 miles).

It is unlikely that the wireless agent will be responsible for collecting information as well as transmitting it, although this possibility should not be overlooked. Whatever his task may be, for purposes of speed it is fairly safe to assume that the transmitting set will be somewhere in the region of the place or places from which useful information can be collected.

It is, therefore, indisputable that in order to combat the activities of wireless agents some sort of technical organization must be set up.

3. In setting up an organization of this description it is fully realised that the problem will be different in almost every country. The following suggestions may assist in helping to form a basis to work on:-

The equipment required in most cases will be:

Interception set (mobile or fixed)
Minimum of two direction finding sets (mobile or fixed)
Field strength measuring set.

The functions of any such organization are twofold:

- (1) To search the ether in order to establish the existence of illicit wireless sets.
- (2) To locate exactly the position of the set.

The first function should be carried out by interception stations either fixed or mobile. Their role should be to search the ether throughout the twenty-four hours.

When an interception station picks up what it considers to be a signal emanating from an illicit set, it must pass on at once to the direction finding sets, the call signs, wave length and text of the message.

The direction finding sets should be in close proximity to the intercept sets. These, as in the case of the intercept sets, can be either fixed or mobile, but it must be remembered that the minimum number of direction finding sets required is two, so as to be able to obtain cross bearings. Three is an ideal number. For maximum efficiency the direction finding sets should be in direct telephonic or telegraphic communication with each other.

If it is possible the results obtained by the intercept station can be advantageously supplemented by building up a small nucleus of listeners, whose business it should be to listen in on certain wave lengths and report any unusual signals. These listeners should where possible be located in important centres.

The second function, i.e., that of locating an illicit set, should be performed by mobile direction finding sets and field strength measuring equipment.

When bearings of an illicit set have been obtained, the mobile direction finding sets should go to the area in which the set is located, obtain bearings from a close range and then by means of the field strength measuring equipment, determine the exact position of the station.

When an illicit set has been located, one of three courses can be taken:-

- (i) The set can be liquidated.
- (ii) The set can be watched and the messages intercepted by an intercept station. At the same time a watch should be kept on the operator to find out his personal contacts.
- or (iii) The set can be taken over and used to one's own advantage to send out false messages.

In this last case it would be as well to make the original operator work the set as a change would be detected at once by a skilled operator at the receiving station.

4. From this brief description it will be appreciated that a technical organization of this nature requires a very high standard of skill on the part of operators. Since the danger of illicit wireless communication exists now, no time should be lost in making a preliminary examination of the problem in anticipation of the establishment of an organized intercept and direction finding service.

War Office 25.7.39.

CIRCULAR

SECRET

Downing Street,

12th October, 1939.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of a memorandum prepared in the War Office on the subject of illicit wireless transmission by enemy agents. The memorandum sets out, in broad outline, the utility of wireless to an enemy agent and the steps considered necessary to establish an intercept system. An organization to deal with the menace in this country has been established, and it is considered desirable that the attention of Colonial Governments should be directed to the importance of the subject from the point of view of Imperial security. Any technical information gained from experience in this country will be at the disposal of Colonial Governments.

- 2. I shall be obliged if you will furnish me with your observations generally on the subject in relation to the territory or territories with which you are concerned, and, in particular, as regards the possibility of establishing an intercept system with existing local resources.
- 3. I need hardly emphasize that the subject should be treated as being of a <u>most secret</u> nature.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

Walcolm Walsonald

The Officer Administering the Government of

5/47/19. (3)

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From	London				431
To	H.E.The	Goveri	nor		TEFELL
Despatched :		-	19	Time :	
Received :	1.505/04	Ŧ M	19	Time ·	

117 Secret. My despatch of the 14th.October, circular. Secret Should be glad to receive early information by telegraph of action taken for enemy detection and prevention of illicit wireless transmission.

Secretary of State.



TELEGRAM.

From Colonial Secretary,

To Magistrate, South Georgia.

Desputched: 29th December, 19 39. Time: ...

Received: ... Time: ...

No. 7/4. It is very important to prevent any misuse of wireless telegraphy transmission sets. Please state whether you consider that there is any risk of the kind in South Georgia. You should maintain the strictest possible control over unauthorised use.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

• DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From Colonial Secretary,

To Magistrate, South Georgia.

Despatched: 10th January, 19 40. Time: ...

Received: 19 ... Time: ...

110. 5. My telegram No. 74 reply urgently required.

COLONIAL SECRETARY.

Redy

DECODE.

TELEGRAM.

From Lagistrate, South Georgia.

To Colonial Secretary.

Desputched: 12th January, 1940. Time: 1850.

Received: 13th January, 1940. Time: 1130.

No. 4. Your telegram No. 74 I have made a careful

enquiry but cannot find any misuse has been made here.

Every precaution will be taken to ensure that no unauthorised transmitters are employed.

MAGISTRATE.

9

TELEGR/M

FROM ... H.E. THE GOVERNOR.

TO.... SECRETARY OF STATE.

DATE ... I5th JANUARY 1940.

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No. 1. Secret. With reference to your telegram

No. II7 Secret and your Secret Circular despatch

of I2th October any illicit transmission in

Colony would be detected stop.

Magistrate South Georgia is unable to find evidence in that dependency of any such transmission stop I do not consider that the acquisition of any special apparatus for detection is necessary.